

JPRS-TND-94-014  
13 July 1994



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-014

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13 July 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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**Beijing Supports International Nuclear Safety Convention**

*OW1806020294 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0137 GMT 18 Jun 94*

[Text] Vienna, June 17 (XINHUA) - More than 80 countries, including China, approved a nuclear safety convention at a foreign affairs meeting of nuclear safety here today.

The convention, initialed after a three-day conference, is aimed at a high-level nuclear safety in the world through international cooperation and enhancing measures in individual countries.

Under the convention, all signatory countries should take proper measures including laws and supervisions to implement it.

The convention will be open for signature at the annual general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September and come into force once it has been ratified by at least 22 countries, 17 of which must have operating commercial nuclear plants.

The meeting, organized by the IAEA, opened on Tuesday and was attended by four international organizations and 84 countries.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Article Analyzes Foreign Ministry Strategy for Summit Talks***SK2306052694 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean  
22 Jun 94 p 2*

[By Ko Tae-song]

[Text] The ROK Government took the initiative to propose a preliminary contact for the early realization of the North-South summit talks. Diplomatic measures supporting the government's initiative in North Korean affairs are becoming concrete. As soon as the telephone message proposing the preliminary contact was sent to North Korea on 20 June, the Foreign Ministry immediately gave formal notice of the fact to its allies, including the United States and Japan, permanent members of the UN Security Council, including China and Russia, and international organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The government made it clear to the international community that it is moving toward dialogue while keeping the stick of sanctions in hand.

The government is pursuing the North-South summit talks while rechecking the alliance between the ROK and the United States under the assessment that the dialogue phase might be the last chance to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. This reflects the government's position that the United States and the international community's demands, including special inspections, are necessary elements for achieving the fundamental goal of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The government is reportedly evaluating the variables of the situation presented by the North-South summit talks and the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks while straightening up the confusion related to Former U.S. President Carter's visit to the North and rechecking the alliance to cope with the new situation. Based on various scenarios, the two governments are reportedly adjusting their positions regarding the verification of agenda in case the North-South summit talks are realized, the plan for achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the principles of the North Korea-U.S. talks.

The government also welcomed Japan's reaffirmation of the three-party alliance between the ROK, the United States, and Japan at a time when the North-South summit talks are being pursued, and reportedly asked for Japan's diplomatic support to realize the summit talks. The government is checking Japan's intention through diplomatic channels regarding Japanese Foreign Minister Kakizawa Koji's remarks at the House of Councillors' Foreign Affairs Committee on 20 June that the clear up of nuclear suspicion will not be a precondition to the resumption of negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. As negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan could actually be resumed around the time of the North-South summit talks, the government is also finalizing its position regarding this possibility.

As the general situation is inclined towards the possible resumption of dialogue with North Korea, the Foreign Ministry has readjusted the principle of three-channel dialogue—dialogue between the North and the South, North Korea and the United States, and North Korea and the IAEA—and established a policy to utilize the three channels to complement each other. The government's position in the case of dialogue between North Korea and the IAEA, is that, with North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA, it is better to induce practical dialogue rather than to agitate North Korea by demanding its return to the IAEA. According to a relevant government officials' explanation, the government's readjustment of the basic frame of channels of communication is designed to efficiently respond to Russia's intention to exercise influence on the North Korean nuclear issue with its proposal of an eight-party conference, while taking advantage of the development in the North-South summit talks.

With the resumption of the North Korea-U.S. talks, the government decided not to oppose the third round of high-level North Korea-U.S. talks if North Korea's sincerity is verified and to keep watching the result of working-level contacts between North Korea and the United States in New York. The government is positively appraising the remarks by U.S. President Clinton on 21 June that North Korea's proposal made through Former President Carter is a hopeful sign and that verifications will be made through contacts between North Korea and the United States. The government expects that the ROK and the United States may disagree on assuring the transparency of not only the present and future but also past nuclear activities of North Korea. The government reportedly conveyed a strong message regarding its position to the United States.

**ROK Informs DPRK of Delegates to 28 Jun Panmunjom Contact***SK2306054594 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0517 GMT 23 Jun 94*

[Text] [Unidentified announcer] The ROK Government has decided on the members of our side's delegation to a preliminary contact for North-South summit talks to be held on 28 June in Panmunjom. The delegation will be led by Yi Hong-ku, deputy prime minister and minister of the National Unification Board. The government notified the North Korean side of the list of delegates and accompanying officials just a few moments ago at 1400 [0500 GMT]. Reporter Hong Chong-chin reports from the National Unification Board:

**Hong Chong-chin:** Our side's delegation is composed of senior delegate Yi Hong-ku, deputy prime minister and minister of the National Unification Board; Chong Chong-uk, senior secretary for foreign and national security affairs; and (Yun Yo-chun), special adviser to the prime minister. The government sent a telephone message to the North Korean side to notify it of this list just a few moments ago at 1400.

## ROK Papers Assess Agreement To Hold N-S Summit

SK2906095294

[Editorial Report] Seoul vernacular newspapers on 29 June carry articles and editorials in reaction to the ROK-DPRK agreement to hold a presidential summit in Pyongyang on 25-27 July.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO on page 3 carries a 1,500-word editorial entitled "Great Turning Point in the History of Korean Division." Noting the historic significance of an accord to hold "the first-ever North-South meeting," the editorial says "the summit will mark a turning point in mutual relations riddled with hostility for the past five decades." Noting that North Korea did not stick to its initial plans on the date of the meeting, the article notes that the North's flexibility on the date could be viewed as a sign of readiness to have the South side as its future partner to avoid any further isolation.

However, noting failed attempts to set up a summit in the past, the editorial questions whether the summit meeting will bear enough fruit to satisfy the Korean people. The editorial then points out that there are many tangible and intangible obstacles that should be overcome to make the talks a true summit and questions North Korea's true intention behind its determination to hold the summit in Pyongyang. As for signs hinting at a "dark future" for the summit, the paper cites Kim Il-song's circumvention of the issue of whether or not he will visit the ROK; the North side's demand that the two sides should vow to "abstain from any activities that may harm the atmosphere of the summit talks"; and North Korea's attempt to downgrade the summit with President Kim Yong-sam as the meeting with the head of a party by terming the "inter-Korean summit meeting" a "meeting between top-level authorities." The editorial concludes by calling on the government to prepare for the summit talks in a "calm way" without being overly "attached" to it.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Things That Need To Be Done by the Two Leaders of North and South." Noting that the North side's promises cannot be guaranteed in light of its practices in the past, the editorial calls on the North side to prove its credibility through actions, such as securing its nuclear transparency, and, for a successful summit, urges the North and South to avoid from making rude remarks that may annoy the opposite side. The editorial then notes "the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula can never be defused unless suspicion over North Korea's nuclear development dissolves." The editorial concludes that the nuclear question should be the top subject in the summit, followed by other pending issues, including economic exchanges and family reunion.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO on page 2 carries a 900-word article by reporter Kim Hyon-chol entitled "The Background Behind the Summit Accord." The article first points out that the South side made many concessions to the North side, except for holding the summit on 15 August, the day North Korea insisted on to exploit the summit for its unification strategy by holding it simultaneously with a projected pannational rally. The article then

notes that even though North Korea showed the willingness to compromise on the date and basic agreements for the summit, it laid a hurdle by "not giving a clear answer on holding a second round of talks in Seoul" and insisting on "inserting a clause in the agreement that both sides will do its best to build up a favorable environment for the summit" which could be interpreted otherwise by the North side. The article then concludes "the summit will be greatly effected by the results of the third round of U.S.-North Korea talks slated for 8 July because it is clear that North Korea regards the North-South dialogue as a subordinate variable in promoting ties with the United States."

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN on page 3 carries a 1,100-word article by Kim Chung-il entitled "The Significance and Prospects for the Inter-Korean Summit Accord." The article begins by welcoming "the historic holding of a summit" and says it is a momentous event that is "an opportunity to open a phase of cooperation and dialogue." The article predicts that the phase of dialogue will be extended over a long time since it stems from North Korea's desperate need to escape from economic breakdown.

Summing up the stances of the North and South toward the summit, the article says that the summit is "a transaction-type summit aimed at securing the system of coexistence and co-prosperity of the North and South" rather than "a political summit for unification." It goes on to say that the summit will mainly discuss the issues pertaining to economic cooperation on the level of "restoring mutual confidence," and avoid a collision between the two sides over knotty issues, such as nuclear inspections, human rights conditions in North Korea, and family reunions.

The article concludes by writing that "however, restoring mutual confidence can only maintain the fire of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and build the road of reunification."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN carries on page 3 a 1,600-word editorial entitled "Finally the North-South Summit Talks Will be Held." The editorial appraises the 28 June North-South contact as a "good sign" providing "an opportunity for clearing up Cold War relations and shifting toward a new direction of reconciliation, trust, cooperation, and reunification." The editorial comments that although we still have to wait and see North Korea's true intention and sincerity, the North-South summit meeting itself will have substantial symbolic and historical significance. The editorial stresses that North Korea's change of attitude and actual practice is the key to building up a basis for mutual trust and reconciliation.

The editorial advises that the ROK Government should meticulously and calmly plan for the summit and be selective in giving priorities to pending issues and that decisions on the issues concerning the interests of the neighboring countries should be made through close coordination.

The editorial stresses that the summit is not a one-time festival and that a dialogue system should be established and maintained.

The editorial warns anti-dialogue factions not to distort or hinder the North-South summit talks, and urges the opposition party and dissident groups to act with discretion and not to make the summit talks a domestic political issue.

SEOUL SINMUN also carries on page 3 a 1,400-word article by reporter Kim Yong-nan on the significance of the North-South summit talks. The article states that the summit is a new milestone in the course of reunification and the first step toward mutual trust that marks the opening of the "coexistence era." To confirm this, the article speculates, President Kim Yong-sam will try to make sure that the North will give up the development of nuclear weapons, and Kim Il-song will want to be assured that the South will not pursue reunification by absorption [hupsu tongil].

The article quotes an analysis by Professor Choe Pyong-gil of Yonsei University that North Korea had to use the nuclear card under the triple fears of the collapse of its establishment, reunification by absorption, and war. The article also notes the possibility that North Korea might cancel the summit at the last moment because it still has the fantasy of reunification by force and has proposed the summit to gain more time to develop nuclear weapons and provide a background for talks with the United States.

The article reports that with the hope that "the physical contact of the two leaders might create mutual trust" and with the confidence that the ROK "can counter any trick by North Korea because the time is on our side," the ROK Government accepted Pyongyang as the venue despite the fact that North Korea might use it for propaganda purposes or later cancel the summit altogether.

The article stresses that the government should seek internal consensus first on major issues, particularly the position on the Korean War. Chongwadae officials say President Kim Yong-sam will mention the war during the summit talks not to hold North Korea responsible, but to "straighten up history."

SEOUL SINMUN also carries on page 3 a 1,600-word article by reporter Yang Sung-hyon on the agenda for the summit talks. The article points out the implementation of the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and mutual inspections [sangho sachal] as the most urgent issues and quotes ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu as saying that the two issues are "a must" for the agenda.

The article notes that ensuring the regular continuation of the summit talks is the second task. The article reports that relevant officials observe that President Kim Yong-sam will propose installing a hotline between the two leaders when a basis is provided for regular summit talks.

The article also speculates that President Kim Yong-sam will urge the early compliance with the basic agreement between the North and the South, and that he may present the "gift package" of economic cooperation and funding for light-water reactors if President Kim Il-song shows a sincere attitude toward the family reunion issue.

The article also anticipates discussions on easing tensions, including the replacement of the armistice with a peace treaty, the Team Spirit exercise, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, and arms reduction.

On the other hand, the article speculates that North Korea will focus on the issue of reunification through Kim Il-song's "Ten-Point Program on National Reunification" because North Korea's policy is to resolve the nuclear issue, the issue of U.S. forces in South Korea, and the peace treaty issue through talks with the United States.

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "South and North Korea Reach Agreement on Summit Talks." The editorial welcomes the result of the 28 June contact and gives high expectations for the North-South summit talks while expecting that some obstacles, including the nuclear issue and protocols, will be resolved if the two sides continue to make mutual concessions as done on 28 June.

The editorial expresses disappointment about the fact that North Korea did not promise to hold the second round of summit talks in Seoul and postponed the discussion on the venue until the first round of summit talks. The editorial condemns this as an "inappropriate measure," which makes it suspicious that the second round may not be held, and which may even lay obstacles on the way to a successful summit.

HANGYORE SINMUN also carries on page 3 a 1,500-word article by reporter Chang Chong-su on Chongwadae reaction to the preliminary contact. The article reports that Chongwadae was relieved by the positive outcome of the preliminary contact and immediately went into discussions on strategies for the summit.

The article reports that a relevant Chongwadae official was optimistic about the second round of summit talks saying "Judging from North Korea's sincerity in holding the summit talks, North Korea would eventually agree to hold the second round of summit talks in Seoul," and the possibility is even higher if positive results are accomplished during the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks.

The article reports that Chongwadae is preparing details on the agenda, security, and protocol and that President Kim Yong-sam is studying Kim Il-song's dialogue style through video tapes. The article also reports that Chongwadae will collect the opinions of domestic leaders of various sectors and coordinate with neighboring countries to prevent any misunderstandings.

#### **Chongwadae Concerned About Press Speculation on N-S Summit**

SK3006093394 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0919 GMT 30 Jun 94

[Text] Seoul, June 30 (YONHAP)—Amid the flooding of speculative press reports on the scheduled inter-Korean meeting, Chongwadae [presidential offices] has come out to apply a brake to the trend, saying unfounded reports would do no good to the talks.

"It is highly problematic for press medias to arbitrarily print the kind of proposals or items which the government has never thought of in connection with the upcoming summit meeting," a Chongwadae official said on Thursday.

He said such random reports would only fuel confusion among the people nor would they be of any help to the historic South-North summit meeting.



It is not desirable either for the press to print reports that make it look as if President Kim Yong-sam would make showdown negotiations with Kim Il-song, the official said.

"It should be known that the forthcoming meeting would be significant in itself as it is taking place for the first time in half a century since the nation was divided," he added.

#### Daily Reports on 'Critical' Confrontation During N-S Talks

SK3006015394 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES  
in English 30 Jun 94 p 2

[By staff reporter Son Key-yong]

[Excerpt] The landmark moment when chief delegates from South and North Korea exchanged texts of the agreement for an inter-Korean summit was greeted by a round of loud applause by other delegates and reporters watching the scene. It was a far cry from previous inter-Korean talks which had left those taking part in them with an unbearable sense of bitterness. A South Korean official called the day's event "big bargaining."

Following are the highs and lows of the 11-hour political drama which took place at the Peace House in the southern side of the truce village of Panmunjom from 10 a.m. Tuesday.

The most critical and spine-chilling part of the drama was the two-hour-long confrontation between North Korean delegate An Pyong-su and his South Korean counterpart Yun Yo-chun.

In an exclusive afternoon meeting, the two delegates exchanged a barrage of fierce accusations resulting from discrepancies in interpreting what had been discussed during the morning session.

"Upon witnessing the fierce arguments, I thought the preliminary talks might completely break down," a National Unification Board official told reporters.

The bone of contention was the North's insistence that the agreement for the inter-Korean summit must contain a phrase that the South should refrain from any acts marring the "atmosphere for the highest-level talks."

South Korean delegates sternly opposed the North's demand because the phrase, if included in the agreement, would give Pyongyang chances of unilaterally calling off the talks under the pretext of possible U.N. sanctions or military exercises by South Korea or the United States on and near the peninsula.

To add fuel to the already fierce arguments, the North Korean delegate expressed deep regrets over an article released by a local daily, which mentioned the North Korean leader's bulging benign tumor on his neck. Any references to Kim's tumor is taboo in North Korea where Kim and his Son Chong-il are revered as the "Great" and "Dear" leaders respectively.

As the two delegates failed to narrow their differences, chief delegates Yi Hong-ku and Kim Yong-sun met again in an exclusive contact and reached a compromise on the "atmosphere" issue. [passage omitted]

#### Editorials Comment on North-South Summit Talks

SK3006091894

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials carried by ROK vernacular newspapers on 30 June regarding the North-South summit talks scheduled for 25 to 27 July.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Wishing For a Businesslike Summit." The editorial expresses concern over the present festive mood and urges the ROK side to calmly review the background of the "unconditional" summit to achieve the objectives.

The editorial stresses that this is only the beginning, not a conclusion made through rounds of talks, and that the summit has even more difficult tasks because there has been no advance negotiations or compromises by the two sides' working-level officials. The editorial writes that "the ROK Government should not make the nuclear issue secondary by being too content with the meeting itself."

The editorial urges the ROK people to calm down and recall the numerous broken promises made by North Korea and also urges the media not to make their reports too sensational.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Stop Slandering the South First." The editorial questions North Korea's intention when it is slandering the South and talking about peace at the same time. The editorial recalls the same dual attitude of North Korea in 1971 and 1972 when it resumed slanderous campaigns against the South not long after the announcement of the 4 July North-South joint statement. Denouncing the slanderous titles given to President Kim Yong-sam by North Korea, including "the ugly flunkeyist traitor," "most vicious fascist dictator," "war maniac," and "vicious antireunification, antinational traitor," the editorial urges North Korea to stop all slanderous broadcast, propaganda, and instigation campaigns.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN carries on page 3 a 2,000-word editorial entitled "Contents Are More Important in North-South Summit Talks." Recalling past North-South talks that once looked successful and the numerous invalidated agreements, the editorial stresses that it is too hasty to think that all problems will be solved and writes that it will be meaningless if the two leaders meet only to take photographs.

The editorial states that the historical significance of the meeting itself should not be stressed too much and that the nuclear suspicion, including past nuclear activities, must be verified during the summit talks. Noting that the North Korean media are already attributing the summit talks to North Korea's "generosity," the editorial warns of North Korea's propaganda strategy and its nature of not recognizing the South Korean establishment.

The editorial analyzes that North Korea's demand for the suspension of all acts that may lay obstacles for the summit talks was "aimed at dissolving the international alliance system against the North, the Team Spirit exercise, and even the ROK-U.S. defense system." Noting that North Korea postponed discussion on the second round of

summit talks, the editorial doubts North Korea's sincerity and asserts that "this issue is critical to the successful holding of summit talks."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "Hasty Expectations Should Be Avoided." The editorial writes that the South Korean society is too excited by the decision to hold North-South summit talks but, in reality, there are many hidden variables. The editorial doubts if the second summit in Seoul will ever be held judging from North Korea's attitude in the 28 June preliminary contact. The editorial urges North Korea to stop slanderous broadcast campaigns against the South and "face the summit talks not as a political strategy but as a national task."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "The Nuclear Issue Should Be Resolved in North Korea-U.S. Talks." The editorial states that the third-round North Korea-U.S. talks will be a test stone to confirm if North Korea completely changed its nuclear policy or made a peace gesture to avoid the difficult situation, and that "the North-South summit talks should be reconsidered if it is proven that North Korea proposed the summit as a stepping stone for talks with the United States."

The editorial strongly asks the following points to the United States regarding the upcoming North Korea-U.S. talks: "First, North Korea's real intention of freezing its nuclear programs should be checked; second, it is absolutely not conceivable that North Korea's past nuclear activities can be buried by the assurance of present and future nuclear transparency; third, North Korea must return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accept International Atomic Energy Agency special inspection [tukpyol sachal] on the two undeclared facilities." The editorial hopes the North Korea-U.S. talks will have a positive effect on the North-South summit talks.

#### **ROK: Possibility of Not Requiring Special Inspections Examined**

SK2206084994 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN  
in Korean 22 Jun 94 p 1

[By Pak Chong-mun]

[Text] At the present phase of dialogue, the United States has decided not to take issue with North Korea's past nuclear activities for the time being, and the ROK has been examining the possibility of revising its policies toward accepting this U.S. policy.

The United States decided not to probe its nuclear past, which includes the extraction of plutonium, because it believed that it had already become impossible to measure the spent fuel rods and that inspections of the two unreported facilities, which are storage facilities, would not bring satisfactory results in finding the truth of the North Korean nuclear program.

This U.S. policy is reportedly related to the fact that the United States gives priority to preventing North Korea from pursuing nuclear development, replacing fuel rods, and reprocessing them over probing the past of its nuclear activities.

A ROK Foreign Ministry official said on 21 June: "The United States outwardly insists on the policy of pursuing special inspections. I know, however, it will not immediately demand special inspections because of technological limitations and a policy for continuing the present phase of dialogue." He also said: "Our government also considers special inspections to be a matter requiring political judgment."

This official added: "North Korea has so far attached greater and greater importance to special inspections of the unreported facilities. Therefore, it is expected that North Korea will not agree easily to special inspections. Also, there is no assurance that any physical evidence will be found in special inspections because North Korea may have relocated a significant amount of nuclear waste materials elsewhere. This is the general conception of the ROK and the United States." In this way he made it clear that the government is considering a plan to withhold special inspections for the moment. At the 20 June closed session of the National Assembly's Diplomacy and Reunification Committee, Yi Hong-ku, deputy prime minister and minister of the National Unification Board, reportedly said that the special inspections issue is a matter requiring not technological approaches but political judgment.

However, the ROK and the United States have not officially discussed and announced their plan to "withhold the probe into North Korea's nuclear history for the moment." Therefore, the United States is expected to refer to special inspections in a roundabout way at the third round of North Korea-U.S. talks.

The ROK Foreign Ministry believes that North Korea processed the fuel rods from the five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon in 1989 and accumulated seven to 10 kg of plutonium. This is enough plutonium to make one to two small nuclear bombs.

#### **ROK To Support DPRK Light-Water Reactor Project**

SK2406054994 Seoul MUNHWA ILBO in Korean  
24 Jun 94 p 1

[By Kim Chae-mok]

[Text] It was confirmed on 24 June that the ROK Government has established a policy to take the initiative to support the construction of light-water reactors for North Korea and is examining various concrete measures.

It is anticipated that President Kim Yong-sam will actively propose the ROK Government's policy to President Kim Il-song if the summit talks are realized.

The government policy is one of the active initiatives for assuring North Korea's nuclear transparency and providing a breakthrough in economic cooperation between the North and the South. Whether or not North Korea will accept the proposal will be noteworthy.

A high-ranking government official said on 24 July: "North Korea has explained to the United States about its plan to convert the current graphite-moderated reactors to light-water reactors and requested the United States to support this but the United States is having difficulties in providing actual support due to its domestic laws even though it agrees to the plan in principle. In this context,

our government is preparing measures to take the initiative to participate in the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea."

The official also said: "It is inevitable that North Korea's light-water reactor construction will be a multinational project involving the United States, Japan, and Russia. The ROK Government will soon begin discussing detailed support measures with the United States and Japan."

Another government official said: "The core question of the North Korean light-water reactor project is who will provide the capital. The ROK Government is examining a plan to assist North Korea in obtaining construction funds from the Asian Development Bank by guaranteeing the repayments."

Meanwhile, during a meeting with Selig Harrison, senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu said: "The United States could request Russia to provide light-water reactor technology to North Korea, and South Korea and Japan could provide the capital."

In the event that the ROK, the United States, and Japan reach an agreement to support North Korea's light-water reactor construction project, the project could begin upon the signing of a bilateral or multilateral treaty on nuclear power assistance.

It is estimated that the construction of one light-water reactor in North Korea would cost \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion for a period of over 10 years.

#### **Premier Informs ROK of DPRK Delegates to Preliminary Talks**

SK2506015294 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0123 GMT 25 Jun 94

["Telephone message" from Kang Song-san, premier of the DPRK Administration Council, to the South Korean Prime Minister on 25 June—read by announcer]

[Text] Kang Song-san, premier of the DPRK Administration Council, today sent a telephone message to the South Korean prime minister informing him of the list of our side's delegation to a preliminary contact for a North-South summit.

The telephone message is as follows:

I inform you of the list of our side's delegation to a preliminary contact for a North-South summit as follows:

Head of the delegation: Kim Yong-sun, chairman of the Reunification Policy Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly.

Delegates: An Pyong-su, vice chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland; Paek Nam-chun, responsible councilor [chaegim chamsa] in the Administration Council.

#### **KCNA Reports Results of 1 July N-S Contact in Panmunjom**

SK0107111394 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1102 GMT 1 Jul 94

["Contact Held To Discuss Working Procedures for Inter-Korean Top-level Talks"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Panmunjom, July 1 (KCNA)—A contact between delegates was held in camera in the morning and afternoon today at the Tongil House in the North side's portion of Panmunjom to discuss working procedures for North-South top-level talks.

The North side produced a draft of a 15-point agreement of working procedures for the implementation of the agreement adopted at the preliminary contact of vice-premier level on June 28 for the opening of the North-South summit.

The draft proposed by the North side is a reasonable and constructive one for successfully ensuring the opening of the summit, in which it strictly abided by the spirit and content of the "agreement on the opening of North-South top-level talks" and fully took into consideration the proposal of working procedures made by the South side.

The South side also put forward its draft agreement on the working procedures.

The sides had a sincere debate repeatedly on the two drafts and reached a unanimity of views on a series of problems.

The sides decided to continue the discussion on the differences at another contact of delegates in the South side's portion of Panmunjom tomorrow.

Paek Nam-chun, delegate of the North side, gave a news briefing to home and foreign reporters at the end of the contact.

#### **KCNA Cites Hanminjon White Paper Denouncing South Korea**

SK0107105994 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1040 GMT 1 Jul 94

["Hanminjon on Criminal Nature of Flunkeyist Nuclear Diplomacy of S. Korean Authorities"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, July 1 (KCNA)—The Central Committee of the South Korean National Democratic Front (Hanminjon) published a white paper on June 25 on the criminal nature of the flunkeyist nuclear diplomacy of the South Korean authorities, the Seoul-based radio Voice of National Salvation reported.

The white paper accuses the South Korean authorities of working hard to plunge the nation into the scourge of nuclear war, standing in the van of the U.S. anti-DPRK smear campaign over the "nuclear issue."

The white paper says:

The "civilian government" is no more than a marionette that thinks and judges according to a false information invented by the United States, without its own judgement or thinking as regards the nuclear issue.

As the April 1994 issue of the magazine MAL comments, the nuclear information of the "civilian government" is



"totally dependent on the U.S. CIA and the U.S. military intelligence unit," and the information supplied by the United States is structurally the basis for the thinking and action of the "civilian government".

This "civilian regime" goes among the people by the nickname of "nuclear robot" manipulated by the U.S.

Pak Chan-jong, chairman of the new Political Reform Party, deplored the flunkeyist nuclear diplomacy of the "government" caught in the trap of the U.S. nuclear policy toward the DPRK. The May 1994 issue of the magazine WOLGAN CHOSUN quoted him as saying: "The sorry sight of our government reminds us of a wretch slapped after being robbed of money. It has run about, unsteady of purpose and uncertain where to go, its face lighting up this moment and puckering into a frown at another moment, coordinating its policy with the keynote and position of the United States. Now it is like a dog looking up to the fleeing cock on the roof." The present "civilian regime" stepped forward as the "nuclear Trojan horse" in the drive for the aggressive "international cooperation system" sought by the U.S.

The South Korean authorities, attaching priority to the South Korea-U.S. cooperation, totally froze the North-South relations for the sake of the "cooperation system" with the United States. And, each time the nuclear issue reached the climax, they flew to Japan for the "South Korea-Japan cooperation system" and begged for its "participation in sanctions," loudly shouting "Long live his majesty the emperor".

When the DPRK-USA joint statement was published in June last year, they grumbled to the United States, their master, entreating him "not to make too much concessions to the North" and "no more to go about in tow of the North."

They put a brake on DPRK-USA talks in every step. Each time the talks reached an impasse, they cried for "sanctions," saying: "The strength of the U.N. Security Council must be invoked" and "sanction is the only way to solve the issue." When the United States manipulated some hostile quarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency to drive the situation to the phase of "sanctions", the South Korean authorities rolled up their sleeves and, visiting nuclear powers, asked them to join in the "sanctions."

The "civilian" bellicose group, at a loss where to go at the U.S. word of command "about turn" while racing headlong, urged by the U.S. hardliners, is seeing eye to eye with the Japanese reactionaries in trying to lay another artificial hurdle in the way of a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, which has shown a dramatic turnaround.

So long as such maneuvers of the "civilian government" continue, the nuclear issue cannot be resolved. In order to avert the danger of nuclear war, which will exterminate our nation, and defend peace and the existence of the nation, the ill-intentioned anti-North confrontation campaign of the "civilian government" must be frustrated, first of all.

### Reporter Describes Aspects of 1 July Panmunjom Contact

SK0107101294 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO  
in Korean 1 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by reporter Choe Won-ki: "Various Aspects of North-South Working-level Contact"]

[Text] The atmosphere of the North-South working-level delegates' contact held this morning at Tongilgak, the North side's area of Panmunjom, was relaxed and warm [puduropko ttattuthan] as a result of an agreement on some important matters during this preliminary contact for the North-South summit talks.

Unlike the past, North Korean security guard forces did not check the South side's reporters when they came over to the northern area to cover the news there.

A reporter from the North side said, "Like the day the North and South held the preliminary contact in Panmunjom, both sides should agree upon all working-level procedural matters by today, and if matters are not agreed upon by this morning or this afternoon, all should prepare to stay and sleep here until tomorrow until an agreement is reached." His remarks indicated that the North side is also active in agreeing to the working-level procedures.

Another reporter proudly said, "All matters will be agreed upon by today."

Reporters from the North side asked the South side's reporters about the South Korean people's reaction to the agreement reached during the 28 June North-South preliminary contact for summit talks. They expressed their interest in the reaction of our people and the Western countries by saying, "We heard that not only the South Korean people, but also foreign countries, such as the United States and Japan, favorably reacted to it. Is this true?"

In particular, one reporter said, "After the 28 June North-South contact, many South Korean separated families seemed to have sent letters to and called newspapers." Then, reporters from the North side asked the South Korean reporters if they really did.

Contrary to what was expected, Paek Nam-chun, chief counselor of the Administration Council, attended the contact instead of An Pyong-chun, vice chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland.

Delegate Paek Nam-chun from the North side conveyed his greetings to Delegate Yun Yo-chun from the South side and explained to him about Tongilgak by saying, "This is the first time you come to Tongilgak, is it not? We started the construction of Tongilgak in 1985. It symbolizes the people's desire for national reunification. It took approximately three months to complete it." Delegate Yun also conveyed his greetings to Delegate Paek by saying, "We should turn it into a historical place."

In response to a question about the health of Kim Yong-sun, head of the North side's delegation to the preliminary contact; and Delegate An, Delegate Yun Yo-chun said, "Kim Yong-sun, head of the delegation, looks like a poet because he is eloquent, and has a good appearance."

After their greetings, the delegate from the North side proposed first to proceed with the contact and said, "Let us try to finish our mission by today. Even if rain falls, there are no problems because we are sitting inside."

Delegate Yun from the South side said: "Our side's experts on North Korean affairs told me that all the talks in which you, Mr. Paek, have participated in have proceeded well in the past. I think that the past preliminary contact proceeded well, even though there were some difficulties in reaching the agreement. Is it not true?"

Delegate Paek was pleased to hear this and showed a big smile and said: "It is true. Let us step up the pace of today's contact."

The delegates from the two sides expressed a sense of responsibility for making the upcoming North-South summit talks a success by exchanging remarks concerning the good reaction from the people for the agreement reached during the preliminary contact.

Delegate Paek from the North side said: "It seems that the world is excited to hear that the South and North will hold their top-level talks. The people in the northern area are also excited and say that the two sides are likely to make history this year by turning division into reunification one year before the 50th anniversary of national division is marked."

Regarding this, Delegate Yun said: "In the national historical sense, it is very significant to hold the North-South summit talks in Pyongyang after half a century has passed since the nation was divided. Some people have a lot of hope in the talks. Their expectations are so great that some of them say they wonder if the talks are to be held in a dream."

The two delegates also agreed that the agreement reached during the past preliminary contact was a political decision made between the top leaders of the two sides.

Delegate Paek said, "President Kim Yong-sam made a resolute decision on the talks." Regarding this, Delegate Yun said: "Judging from the way the talks have been held so far, President Kim Yong-sam's acceptance to hold the first summit talks in Pyongyang is based on his great courage and resolution."

Delegate Paek talked about the monsoon season by saying, "The monsoon has also begun in the northern area." And added: "When the monsoon begins, people react differently depending on their job and status. For example, farmers like it because they can easily take care of the irrigation project. Hydroelectric power plant workers like it as well. However, youngsters may not like it because rain may ruin the camping activities they enjoy for 15 days every year. All funds needed for their camping activities will be provided by the government. They ardently wish to participate in them, but if it rains, they cannot enjoy them."

Regarding this, Delegate Yun said: "Once upon a time there was a mother who had two sons: One was selling umbrellas, and the other was selling straw shoes. However, this lady would not clearly express her feelings about whether she likes good weather or cloudy weather, because she had to take care of both sons."

## Tokyo Welcomes U.S., DPRK Agreement To Hold Talks

OW2306040694 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1224 GMT 23 June 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 23 KYODO - Japan on Thursday [23 June] welcomed an agreement between the United States and North Korea to hold high-level talks in Geneva early next month to defuse the standoff over North Korea's alleged push for nuclear weapons.

"We welcome the move toward U.S.-North Korea talks," Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshi Kumagai said at a regular news conference.

The top government spokesman also urged Pyongyang to allay international concerns over its nuclear program through action and pledged that Japan will continue efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in close concert with the U.S. and South Korea.

Specifically, Kumagai said North Korea should formally return to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), comply with international nuclear safeguards requirements, and implement a joint declaration with South Korea for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

"It is important to persuade North Korea in various ways," Kumagai said.

In March last year, North Korea said it was pulling out of the NPT but suspended the decision later.

U.S. President Bill Clinton announced Wednesday that the U.S. and North Korea will hold high-level talks in Geneva early next month following Pyongyang's assurances that it will freeze its nuclear program while the talks are in progress.

Japanese Foreign Ministry sources said Japan cautiously welcomed the U.S. Government's confirmation of North Korea's pledge to freeze its nuclear program, as well as Washington's intention to resume diplomatic talks with Pyongyang.

The sources said U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher conveyed Washington's decision to hold a third round of high-level talks with Pyongyang in a telephone call earlier in the day to Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa.

They said the U.S. took note of Japan's desire to see steps taken to uncover the history of operation of North Korea's nuclear reactor to ensure no plutonium has been diverted for a covert nuclear weapons development program.

U.S. officials were quoted as saying the issue may be on the agenda of the third round of talks.

But the sources said the Japanese Government is not optimistic about what may well turn out to a mere replay of events, in which North Korea proceeds at its own pace, putting off a resolution of the issue.

They said that if North Korea is not more forthcoming at the talks, the course of events will inevitably lead back to consideration of economic sanctions to force Pyongyang into compliance with the will of the international community.

Clinton said Wednesday that during the period of the talks the U.S. will suspend efforts to pursue a sanctions resolution in the U.N. Security Council.

### **ROK Foreign Minister: DPRK To 'Comply in Full' With NPT**

SK2306024094 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0210 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Seoul, June 23 (YONHAP)—North Korea has confirmed that it will accept international inspections of sites that could reveal its past nuclear activities, South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Thursday.

Pyongyang, in a letter to Washington, said it would "comply in full" with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, Han said at a press conference.

"You can take this to mean that this includes North Korea's compliance in explaining its past nuclear activities," said Han.

Han's remarks suggest that North Korea has agreed to the "special inspections" demanded by the IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog agency, of two sites believed to store nuclear waste materials after the North's secretive reprocessing activities in the past.

Han denied widespread press reports that Washington was ready to overlook whatever North Korea may have done during its past nuclear development.

"That's just not true," said Han. "The past has been the problem from the beginning, and that is why the matter was referred to the UN Security Council. We cannot close our eyes to that."

On the proposed inter-Korean summit, the foreign minister said Seoul will not try to set the agenda beforehand though the two sides are expected to discuss implementation of the agreement on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

### **RENMIN RIBAO Columnist on Carter's Visit to Pyongyang**

HK2306022394 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO  
in Chinese 22 Jun 94 p 6

["International Forum" column by Liang Fu (5328 1133): "Fruitful Mediation"]

[Text] Between 13 and 18 June, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter shuttled between the DPRK and the ROK. After returning to the United States, he talked on the telephone with President Clinton and met with relevant senior U.S. officials in order to brief them about his visit to the Korean peninsula. This time, Mr. Carter promoted an exchange of opinions between the DPRK, the United States, and the ROK on the nuclear issue, and his mediation activity was fruitful and has eased the tense situation on the Korean peninsula to a certain degree.

In the recent period, the situation on the Korean peninsula became tense due to the nuclear issue. In particular, after the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] adopted a resolution to impose sanctions against the DPRK on 10 June and the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the IAEA on 13 June, dialogue between the various parties concerned on the nuclear issue in the DPRK was suspended, and the situation on the Korean peninsula was strained further. The United States and some other countries intensively planned to push the UN Security Council to pass a resolution on imposing sanctions against the DPRK. The U.S. and ROK armed forces carried out exercises and deployed "Patriot" missiles. The DPRK also issued repeated statements, saying that sanctions in any form would be regarded as an act of war against the DPRK. At this moment, Carter was invited to visit the Korean peninsula. Although it was just a private visit, it still attracted extensive attention from the international community.

Before visiting the DPRK, Carter first visited the ROK and held a meeting with President Kim Yong-sam. In Pyongyang, he met President Kim Il-song twice, and the two talked for a long time. After leaving the DPRK, Carter once again visited the ROK and conveyed a message from President Kim Il-song to President Kim Yong-sam.

Carter's mediation has achieved positive results: the DPRK allowed IAEA inspectors and monitoring equipment to remain in the DPRK, and agreed that the United States should send personnel to help the DPRK search for the remains of American soldiers killed in the Korean war. President Kim Il-song also expressed willingness to unconditionally meet with President Kim Yong-sam at any time and in any place. The ROK gave a positive reaction to this, and proposed that the two sides hold a meeting of deputy premiers on 26 June in Panmunjom to make preparations for the first summit meeting between the leaders of the south and the north, which will be an important event on the Korean Peninsula and will promote the peaceful settlement of the Korean nuclear issue and regional stability.

After returning to the United States, Carter talked on the telephone with President Clinton, and then told the press that "the crisis was over." He also said that efforts made by the United States to impose sanctions against the DPRK would "just delay and hold up the diplomatic actions." Although the White House expressed "prudent optimism" about Carter's visit to the DPRK, it still "greatly appreciated the former president's benign efforts."

All international opinion valued highly Mr. Carter's trip to the Korean peninsula. His mediating activities once again show that dialogue is better than confrontation and that continuing to seek political settlement is more favorable to the settlement of differences than recklessly imposing sanctions and exerting pressure. People believe that through further dialogue, the relevant parties involved in the Korean issue will certainly be able to find a way to settle the issue peacefully and will eventually realize the two objectives of making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone and safeguarding the stability on the Korean peninsula.



## HONG KONG

### 'Crime Syndicates' Seek To Use Territory for Nuclear Trade

HK2006030094 Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 20 Jun 94 p 3

[By Darren Goodsir]

[Text] Organised crime syndicates may use Hong Kong as a base to trade in nuclear weapons, police have been warned.

Assistant Commissioner David Hodson, the Deputy Director (Crime), said yesterday it was clear that tough new laws were needed.

Latest international intelligence showed that organised crime might seek to use Hong Kong as a base for arranging deals to buy weapons of mass destruction, especially in relation to targeting nuclear storage depots in the former Soviet Union. He said the territory was vulnerable to profits from nuclear arms sales being laundered locally, if it had not already taken place.

Mr Hodson also lamented the failure of local legislation to fight money laundering.

"It is an example of a maximum problem scenario," he said on the risk of nuclear infiltration. "We have to be prepared for the worst—and hope for the best."

"We have got to keep up with the times. We need to be able to make sure we can keep these people from abusing our financial laws, to stop organised crime from using this place as a scene for financing this sort of activity. And, of course, laundering the proceeds of this activity."

In the United States, FBI director Louis Freeh and the CIA head, James Woolsey, have repeatedly voiced their concern about the threat of organised crime hoarding stockpiles of nuclear material capable of being used in terrorism. The problem stems from the collapse of security in the former Soviet bloc and the formidable strength of Russian organised crime.

The German Federal Police—the Bundeskriminal—last year reported 243 "incidents" involving breaches of security with nuclear-related material.

In April, Mr Woolsey told a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Russian crime was "actively involved" in the "illegal transport and sale" of nuclear weapons. He said the CIA paid "particular attention to the potential illegal sale of fissionable nuclear material".

"We've not seen significant quantities of weapons grade materials or any other nuclear warheads smuggled out," he said.

"But there have been... reports of thefts of low grade nuclear materials. In many cases the thieves or smugglers have been apprehended."

Mr Hodson said U.S. authorities rated Hong Kong-based organised crime as one of the most significant threats to their national security. He added it was unthinkable that Asian criminals would not try to become involved in nuclear transactions.

Mr Hodson said Hong Kong maintained "unimpressive" laundering laws and had "hardly an impressive record" in seizing the proceeds of crime. This made the territory ripe for brokering sophisticated criminal enterprise.

He said it was disheartening that no one had been convicted of laundering.

"We have to play our part. I think we have got to learn lessons from other countries."

"We have got to recognise that organised crime, in its many forms, is a very different animal now than what it was 20 to 25 years ago."

When asked of the threat of nuclear deals being organised from Hong Kong, he replied: "I think it important that we take reasonable, rational measures to protect ourselves from it."

"I am saying these are the concerns expressed by highly respected leaders."

"Traditionally, police have investigated crime after it occurred but we can no longer afford to take this sort of approach—we must go after it."

"When you have strong organised crime, you have something that is an ongoing activity."

"You become aware of the people involved in this kind of activity. But it requires a different approach—a different style."

"It is also international in nature and we have to look at things occasionally from the viewpoint that it is essential we play our part on the international scene."

Mr Hodson's comments highlight the concern felt by police.

It also marks the depth to which morale has slipped in senior ranks over the failure for 23 months of the Legislative Council to pass the Organised and Serious Crimes Bill.

## JAPAN

### Tokyo Says Use of N-Arms No Violation of International Law

OW0606104294 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1020 GMT 6 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 6 KYODO—Japan will tell the International Court of Justice that it does not regard the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of international law, officials said Monday [6 June].

The ruling coalition endorsed the government's traditional view on the issue in an official statement to be submitted to the Hague-based International Court, they said.

The gist of the government's statement on the use of nuclear arms was approved by a meeting of coalition executives when it was presented to the meeting by the Foreign Ministry.

The statement is in response to the court's request that each country submit such a document by Friday. The court

was asked in May by the World Health Organization (WHO) to decide whether or not staging a nuclear warfare violates international law.

WHO, inspired by growing concerns about the adverse effect any use of nuclear arms would have on people's health, sought the court's ruling on the issue.

In the statement, the government will also elucidate Japan's basic stance on nuclear arms as symbolized by the so-called three nonnuclear principles.

Japan has been holding strict antinuclear principles—not making, possessing or introducing nuclear weapons to Japan—as a national tenet since they were approved by the Diet in 1968.

Nagasaki, which suffered atomic bombing in 1945 after Hiroshima, has raised objection to the government's standing on the issue.

It presented a written request to Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata and Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa, calling on the government to denounce the use of nuclear arms as violation of international law.

Nagasaki argues in the document that the indiscriminate killing of people with atomic bombs clearly constitutes a violation of international law from a humanistic standpoint.

The city criticized the government for not fully acknowledging the devastating conditions in the A-bombed areas or the agony of the victims.

#### **Government Changes Stand on Use of Nuclear Weapons**

OW0806120994 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1136 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 8 KYODO—Japan will delete a phrase in an official statement that it does not regard the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of international law, Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa said Wednesday [8 June].

Kakizawa, taking back an earlier position, said the government will revise the statement to "the use of nuclear arms is not consistent with the spirit of humanitarianism existing at the basis of international law because of its power of destruction, killing and wounding."

Kakizawa made the comment at a session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee.

The ruling coalition on Monday endorsed the previous phrasing which was compiled by the Foreign Ministry and was scheduled to be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

The government had maintained there were treaties banning the use of gas and chemical weapons but no treaty in existence banning the use of nuclear arms.

However, after the government's view was publicized on Monday, opposition parties and some cabinet ministers criticized the statement.

Management and Coordination Agency chief Koshiro Ishida said Tuesday, "It is regrettable to say the use of

nuclear weapons does not violate international law." Environment Agency chief Toshiko Hamayotsu said the use of nuclear arms violates spirit of international law. Both Ishida and Hamayotsu belong to the Buddhist-backed Komeito [Clean Government Party].

A-bomb victims in Nagasaki and Hiroshima also raised objection to the government's standing on the issue.

At Wednesday's session of the committee, legislators from the opposition Liberal Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party and Japanese Communist Party criticized the statement saying it is not proper for Japan, the sole country to have experienced the wrath of atomic bombs, to recognize the use of nuclear arms.

Japan maintains three antinuclear principles—not to make, possess or harbor nuclear weapons on its territory.

The Hague-based international court called on nations concerned to submit a document on the issue after the World Health Organization (WHO) asked it in May to decide whether or not staging nuclear warfare violates international law.

#### **Kakizawa Says DPRK's Plutonium Extraction Undeniable**

OW2006080494 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0753 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 20 KYODO—It cannot be denied that North Korea has extracted plutonium from the spent fuel of its nuclear reactor, Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa said Monday [20 June].

Kakizawa's remarks appear to contradict Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata's statement Saturday that he does not think North Korea possesses nuclear weapons nor intends to build an atomic bomb.

"Based on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there is no denying that North Korea has extracted some plutonium (from its research reactor in the Yongbyon complex)," Kakizawa told the House of Councilors Foreign Affairs Committee in response to a question.

Kakizawa suggested that Hata's remarks expressed anticipation of the truth of claims by North Korean President Kim Il-song that North Korea has neither the will nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

#### **DPRK: Japanese Maneuvers for 'Nuclear Armament' Denounced**

SK2006142594 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0754 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Unattributed talk: "Crafty Trick To Conceal Nuclear Armament"]

[Text] The Japanese authorities are running amok recklessly with commotions over pressure on the pretext of our nuclear development by turning up in the forefront of the U.S. anti-Republic international cooperative system.

While spreading a groundless rumor that we have manufactured nuclear weapons, the Japanese reactionaries are not only raving that international pressure and sanctions should be imposed on us but are also making absurd

remarks that our nuclear development poses a threat to Japan's security. This is indeed ridiculous.

Moreover, the Japanese reactionaries are scheming to isolate us at the van of others by putting forward gibberish about international cooperative system and so forth in international conferences, including the United Nations.

By keeping in mind certain sanctions against our Republic, the Japanese authorities are accelerating the formulation of legislative measures in a bid to establish a war system, such as the emergency law, and are even raving about a marine blockade.

This is an undisguised disclosure of the Japanese reactionaries' will to join the war to invade Korea by following the United States in an emergency.

The Japanese reactionaries, who are busily running wild by joining the maneuvers of the United States and the South Korean puppets to crush our Republic, are spreading preposterous and groundless rumors and false reports about our Republic, thus strengthening the oppression of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan and Koreans living in Japan. This is a grave challenge to our Republic, an independent sovereign state, and is the greatest infringement on human rights. In addition, this is an act of illegal and unjust political suppression and is a criminal act of excluding other nations.

Today the Japanese reactionaries are attempting to conceal the development of their nuclear weapons by adhering to crafty tactics on the pretext of our nonexistent nuclear development.

As has been exposed, Japan accelerated on a full scale the nuclear weapons development beginning in the fifties. As a result, Japan has secured all material and technological foundations that enable it to manufacture nuclear weapons. With Japan's nuclear armament being pushed ahead, worldwide vigilance is becoming more keen and voices of denunciation are resounding more highly.

All flowery words uttered today by the Japanese authorities about the peaceful use of plutonium, the three principles for denuclearization, and so forth, are false. The Japanese reactionaries needed excuses for legalizing their nuclear armament. Our nuclear development, fabricated by them, is one of such excuses.

Today, the Japanese authorities, shamelessly enough, are actively accelerating their nuclear armament under a deceitful signboard by laying a blame on our side.

The recently-exposed incident of concealment of plutonium capable of manufacturing nine nuclear bombs is an incident of plutonium concealment carried out under tacit approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is applying double standards in the nuclear issue, according to instructions of the United States. This is an actual example of Japan's accelerating its nuclear armament.

What is grave is the fact that no one knows how much plutonium Japan, which was branded a flagrant offender, has systematically concealed for scores of years during which it kept operating nuclear facilities.

Nevertheless, the Japanese authorities, shamelessly enough, made provocative remarks while laying a blame on us for our so-called nuclear development issue, claiming that a

resolute attitude of international community is necessary, Japan's cooperation for sanctions when a resolution is adopted in the United Nations is quite natural, and so forth. This is a crafty tactic to prevent plutonium, which Japan has systematically concealed, from being exposed any more by diverting the people's attention to us.

The Japanese authorities, who accelerated nuclear armament by laying a blame on us, have now been officially recognized by the world as nuclear maniacs. Reality shows that nuclear threat comes to us from Japan, not from us to Japan.

Today the Japanese reactionaries are openly spreading remarks that the use of nuclear weapons is not a violation of international laws. This is indeed alarming. The Japanese reactionaries' hostile act against our Republic has reached an extreme pitch in collusion with the United States and the South Korean puppets.

If one attempts to gain benefit and to increase one's popularity by sacrificing others, such benefit and popularity will work as a gimlet piercing one's own eye. The Japanese reactionaries should precisely realize this. The more blame Japan lays on us, the more clearly will our innocence be proven, and the more clearly will Japan's dark and shameless intentions be exposed to the world.

We have already clearly stated that if Japan joins in any sanctions against us, whether by taking the lead or being dragged in, we will regard this as a declaration of war. If Japan turns up on the path of sanctions, at last while accelerating nuclear armament defying our warnings, Japan can never evade due punishment for this.

Japan should clearly realize the firm will and determination of our people, who dislike empty words, and should immediately stop its catastrophic maneuvers to become a big nuclear power and reckless commotions over sanctions.

#### Tokyo 'Obviously' Can Produce Nuclear Weapons

OW2006100794 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0950 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 20 KYODO—Japan "obviously" has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, a Japanese Government source said Monday [20 June], endorsing a similar remark made recently by Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata amid a crisis over North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program.

"Judging from Japan's scientific techniques and economic power, it is obvious," the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The source, however, said, "intention and capability are different. Absence of intention (to produce nuclear arms) should be definite."

"There is no need for the government to deny nor emphasize (such capability)," the source added.

Hata told reporters on Friday that "it's certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them."



The premier said Japan has abstained from holding such arms in line with its obligations as a nonnuclear power under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshi Kumagai has called Hata's remarks an insufficient explanation of the government's true position.

He told reporters that Japan "limits its use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, abstains from military utilization and does not endeavor to possess nuclear weapons technology or know-how."

### **Hata 'Acknowledged' Tokyo Can Produce Nuclear Weapons**

OW1706103194 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1017 GMT 17 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 17 KYODO—Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata acknowledged Friday [17 June] that Japan has the capability to produce nuclear weapons but said it has not done so in line with its international treaty obligations. "It's certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them," Hata told reporters inside the Diet building.

He said Japan has abstained from doing so in line with its obligations as a nonnuclear power under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Hata made the comment in connection with an alleged remark he made in a House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting earlier in the day.

The prime minister was quoted by parliamentarians as having said he "agrees absolutely" with an interpellator's view that Japan should confirm to other nations that it can indeed produce nuclear weapons, though it is refraining from doing so for political reasons. The interpellator, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Hiroshi Oki, cited the NPT and Japan's so-called three nonnuclear principles—to not possess, manufacture or introduce nuclear weapons on its territory.

Hata denied to reporters that he made the alleged remark, though Oki insisted the prime minister "roundly affirmed" Japan's potential for producing nuclear weapons. It is believed to be the first time for the Japanese Government to directly acknowledge such potential in the Diet or publicly.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshi Kumagai called Hata's remarks a somewhat insufficient explanation of the government's true position. He told reporters that Japan "limits its use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, abstains from military utilization and does not endeavor to possess nuclear weapons technology or know-how."

### **Hata Says Tokyo Can't Call Use of Nuclear Arms Unlawful**

OW2306104194 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1033 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 23 KYODO—Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata said Thursday [23 June] Japan cannot call the use of nuclear weapons a violation of international law, adding that doing so would risk the efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

"Japan has relied on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. If it calls it (the use of nuclear arms) unlawful, nuclear deterrence would be rendered ineffective," the premier said.

Hata made the remarks at a House of Councillors Budget Committee session in connection with a statement Japan submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on June 10.

Japan has dropped from the document a phrase saying the use of nuclear arms does not violate international law.

The country had been criticized at home and abroad after reports that it would present a document including such a phrase.

In spite of the deletion, the government has not changed its opinion that the use of nuclear arms cannot be called a violation of international law since nuclear deterrence exists.

Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa told the same session that the importance of nuclear deterrence cannot yet be denied, pointing out that China recently conducted a nuclear test.

## **NORTH KOREA**

### **IAEA Official Says DPRK Changed Over 60 Percent of Rods**

SK0206000594 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2205 GMT 1 Jun 94

[By Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] An official of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] said that approximately 5,000 of the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods at a five-megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon have already been replaced.

The official said: In the past 25 days, North Korea has already changed approximately 5,000—over 60 percent—of the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods at the nuclear reactor. It continued changing the fuel rods even yesterday, when the IAEA called upon North Korea not to do so.

He added: In the initial stages of replacing the fuel rods, at least 300 fuel rods must be analyzed to verify the amount of nuclear materials that may have been transformed. However, with less than 3,000 nuclear fuel rods remaining, the results are unreliable.

Also, IAEA Spokesman Hans Meyer said that because IAEA inspectors could not confirm the location of approximately 40 fuel rods—which North Korea says it has separately preserved—and because the location of the removed fuel rods has not been disclosed, taking samples from them would not be worthwhile.

### **IAEA Suggests Methods for Fuel Rods Surveillance to DPRK**

SK0106005294 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0000 GMT 1 Jun 94

[YONHAP from Berlin]

[Text] In order to confirm the operational history of the reactor in Yongbyon, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on 31 May suggested technological methods to the North Korean side, but the North Korean



side pointed out that it is already storing fuel rods taken from the reactor in Yongbyon according to its own standards in a bid to prepare for later measurement by the IAEA.

The IAEA revealed that confirmation of the location of fuel rods required for later measurement is impossible with the North Korean side's method of storing fuel rods, and suggested technological methods that would enable confirmation of whether nuclear material was converted or not.

To this, Yun Ho-chin, councilor in the North Korean Embassy in Vienna, suggested that North Korea will continue replacing fuel rods. However, he stressed that North Korea did not mix the fuel rods after taking them out at random [mujakchong], but that the locations and serial numbers of fuel rods have been clearly recorded before a surveillance camera and the fuel rods have been kept in a covered [chapye] water tank.

Meanwhile, Hans Meyer, a spokesman of the IAEA, said that in the event that North Korea continues the replacement of fuel rods, in a few days, the IAEA will come to a point where it will not be able to analyze the history of operation of Yongbyon reactor

#### **DPRK Rejects IAEA Suggestion on Fuel Rod Replacement**

SK0106023594 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0222 GMT 1 Jun 94

[Text] Berlin, May 31 [dateline as received] (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] said Tuesday it has proposed that North Korea take technical action that would enable the IAEA to confirm the history of reactor operations at Yongbyon despite the fact that Pyongyang's replacement of fuel rods has already passed the halfway mark. North Korea, however, announced that it has selected and stored spent fuel rods taken from the 5-megawatt reactor according to certain standards in an effort to guarantee future measurement of the rods.

The IAEA emphasized that it could not accept North Korea's method because it would not be able to confirm the location of the fuel rods, which is necessary for future measurement. Without confirming where the spent fuel rods had been located, the agency could not determine whether the North Koreans had diverted nuclear material, according to an IAEA announcement.

Yun Ho-jin, counselor at the North Korean Embassy in Vienna, stressed that the refueling is proceeding and "it should not be stopped."

Yun added, "we are not shuffling the spent fuel rods discharged from the reactor but putting them, 40 at a time, into a radioactivity-proof tank after writing the location and serial numbers on the rods, with monitoring cameras operating."

Therefore, when the nuclear problem is solved through a package deal between Pyongyang and Washington, the IAEA can find necessary fuel rods based on the records and measure them, he said.

The IAEA wants to take 300 fuel rod samples from 30 fuel rod channels, Yun explained, and has demanded that North Korea segregate and secure 10 fuel rod bundles per channel.

North Korea, however, is putting 40 fuel rods from four channels into a case, increasing the number of sample fuel rods to 1,200, Yun said.

"The IAEA is actually demanding that North Korea accept ad hoc and routine inspections," he said. "We can never accept this demand, considering our special position that we reserved our decision to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT)."

Meanwhile, IAEA Spokesman Hans Meyer confirmed that North Korea had not stopped replacing fuel rods in spite of a statement by the president of the UN Security Council.

He expected that the refueling would reach a critical point in one or two days, after which the IAEA could no longer analyze the history of the reactor's operations.

The UN Security Council Tuesday adopted a presidential statement demanding that North Korea comply with IAEA safeguards.

#### **IAEA Chief Hints of Additional DPRK Undeclared Facilities**

SK0806000194 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2206 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Report by Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] Han Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], strongly hinted today that there are still several undeclared nuclear facilities [in North Korea] by disclosing for the first time that it is essential to make approaches to more facilities, in addition to ad hoc inspections of two undeclared facilities, for the purpose of looking into the exact amount of North Korea's stockpile of plutonium.

In the second-day session of the IAEA Board of Governors held early this morning, Director General Han Blix made a separate report on North Korea's violations of the nuclear agreement in which he expressed with high intensity and certainty that there is undeclared plutonium in North Korea at the moment, while saying that he did not know whether it is in gram or kilogram.

Director General Han Blix pointed out that the two undeclared facilities, which North Korea has not opened to inspections claiming they are military facilities, exist within the Yongbyon nuclear complex. He stressed that North Korea's allegations they are military facilities are not sufficient to set aside inspection.

In particular, Director General Han Blix said for the first time that it is essential to make approaches to more facilities in addition to ad hoc inspections of the treatment site of nuclear waste materials for the purpose of looking into the exact amount of the plutonium produced, thereby strongly hinting that there are several new undeclared nuclear facilities.

In the meantime, the IAEA Board of Governors will adopt a resolution of warning against North Korea after discussing North Korea's nuclear issue either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

### **IAEA Says 90 Percent of Fuel Rods Removed From DPRK Reactor**

*AU0806144094 Paris AFP in English 1425 GMT 8 Jun 94*

[Text] Vienna, June 8 (AFP)—Almost all fuel rods have been removed from the core of the experimental reactor believed by western experts to be feeding a covert North Korean nuclear arms programme, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] said here Wednesday.

Discharging of the five megawatt reactor had now been 90 percent completed, said a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Pyongyang has repeatedly refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to the reactor and one other nuclear site where the agency suspects solid and liquid nuclear waste from a military nuclear programme are stocked.

IAEA Director General Hans Blix told the UN Security Council last week that 70 percent of the fuel rods from the experimental reactor had been removed, and that the organisation was no longer in a position to prove whether North Korea was building bombs.

Blix said the IAEA knows "undeclared plutonium" exists in North Korea but does not know if it amounts to grammes (ounces) or kilogrammes (pounds). At least eight kilos (17.6 pounds) of plutonium are needed to build a nuclear weapon.

The IAEA board of governors is due to meet behind closed doors here Thursday, with the Pyongyang nuclear crisis likely to head the agenda, an IAEA spokesman said earlier Wednesday.

On Tuesday North Korea repeated its categorical refusal to allow access to its two sites.

### **North Reportedly Allows IAEA Inspectors To Continue Activities**

*SK1506100894 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean 0900 GMT 15 Jun 94*

[Text] KYODO News Agency reported on 15 June from New York that regardless of the official notification to the United States on its withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], North Korea is continuing to recognize nuclear inspection activities, such as the work to measure and regulate inspection machines by the two inspectors dispatched from the IAEA.

Quoting a U.S. Government official, KYODO News Agency reported that North Korea had hinted that it would expel the inspectors when it declared its withdrawal from the IAEA, but it seems that North Korea allowed inspection activities by the IAEA inspectors to avoid strong measures against the North by the international community, such as the strengthening of economic sanctions by the UN Security Council.

This official also said it is important that the inspectors are carrying out activities, not that they are still in North

Korea. He hinted that the content of the sanction resolution against the North will be influenced if the inspectors are expelled.

He also said that as long as North Korea allows the inspectors to continue inspection activities, sanctions by the UN Security Council will not be strengthened abruptly. In particular, he said that the withdrawal from the IAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] by North Korea are significantly different, and emphasized that it is necessary for North Korea to implement the requirements of the NPT. Thus, he did not attach much importance to the fact that North Korea withdrew from the IAEA.

### **Pyongyang 'Virtually Finished' Removing Yongbyon Fuel Rods**

*OW0806125394 Tokyo KYODO in English 1227 GMT 8 Jun 94*

[Text] Vienna, June 8 KYODO—North Korea has virtually finished removing fuel rods from its 5-megawatt reactor, defying demands by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to stop refueling, an IAEA spokesman said Wednesday [8 June].

IAEA inspectors on the spot have confirmed the situation, the spokesman said.

The IAEA submitted a report last week to the United Nations Security Council saying Pyongyang has made it impossible to determine whether plutonium has been secretly taken from the fuel rods to manufacture nuclear weapons.

An IAEA Board of Governors regular meeting now in session in Vienna is expected to resume debate as early as Thursday, and is likely to demand that North Korea accept inspections of its two undeclared nuclear facilities as a possible alternative means of judging if it has been developing nuclear arms.

The undeclared sites in the Yongbyon nuclear complex 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang are suspected of being secretly used to develop nuclear arms.

North Korea has rejected the IAEA's demands to stop removing fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor, also in Yongbyon. The nuclear watchdog said removal would spoil chances to determine if plutonium has been diverted for nuclear weapons.

IAEA Director General Hans Blix said at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting Tuesday that it is now impossible for the U.N. agency to know whether North Korea is developing nuclear arms.

Blix also said inspections of two unreported sites suspected as nuclear waste facilities are now "even more important" and urged Pyongyang to cooperate.

Yun Ho-chin, North Korean delegate to the IAEA in Vienna, said Tuesday that North Korea will "never" allow special international inspections of the undeclared nuclear facilities, adding that the organization can carry out satisfactory inspections by checking the removed fuel rods.

**ROK Paper: North Reportedly Set To Test Ballistic Missile 'Any Day'**

SK1806013794 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
18 Jun 94 p 1

[Text] North Korea appears set to test-fire a ballistic missile to rattle states seeking to punish it for defying U.N. nuclear inspectors, a leading expert said Thursday, citing U.S. intelligence sources.

Joseph Bermudez, a consultant to Jane's Intelligence Review who is an authority on the North's military and intelligence affairs, said the intelligence community expected Pyongyang to test-fire a Nodong-1 ballistic missile "any day now."

North Korea initially test-fired its Nodong-1 into the East Sea (Sea of Japan) in May 1993.

**NODONG SINMUN Justifies DPRK Withdrawal From IAEA**

SK2306103994 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1032 GMT 23 Jun 94

["Who Can Trust IAEA?"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 23 (KCNA)—The withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is entirely attributable to the unfair and insolent acts of the IAEA Secretariat, declares NODONG SINMUN in an article today. It notes that the IAEA has left a disgraceful stain on its name by launching an anti-DPRK campaign, contrary to its competence and mission.

The article entitled "Indelible Stain and Disgrace" cites facts to prove that some officials of the IAEA Secretariat took a threatening posture from the very beginning in a bid to overwhelm the DPRK and stubbornly demanded an unreasonable "special inspection" and worked for an international "pressure and sanctions", serving specific forces as their spy.

It says:

The IAEA made six ad hoc inspections of the DPRK from May 1992 to early February 1993.

At the time of the fourth ad hoc inspection in November 1992 some officials of the IAEA Secretariat urged the DPRK to "declare more" of the inventory of nuclear material, threatening that "it is the last chance of correcting the initial inventory", "if the chance were missed, tragic consequences would follow."

They behaved very insolently during the inspections, threatening the DPRK over the "principal inconsistency" even before hearing a scientific explanation from experts.

All this tells that they have sought from the very beginning to overpower the DPRK with a threatening attitude.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat also served specific forces as their spy.

The IAEA Secretariat, complying with the demand of specific forces, tried to send as its inspectors those whom we considered as personae non gratae. The agency's

inspectors in the DPRK also acted on orders from those behind the scene, making inquiries into this or that in an effort to pry out secrets.

All the more exasperating was that they handed inspection results over to the United States, South Korea and others in violation of Article 5 of the safeguards agreement that provides for protection of the data obtained in inspections.

This was a grave encroachment upon the interests of the DPRK.

IAEA's inspections of the DPRK are characterized from a to z by partiality.

On December 22, 1992, the IAEA general director requested being allowed to "revisit" some military sites. The DPRK was not obligated to show them the sites and facilities which were no more objects of safeguards, but showed them, taking various aspects into consideration. Nevertheless, some dishonest officials worked hard to attain their sinister aim by abusing the sincere cooperation offered by the DPRK.

The DPRK rejected it decisively.

On February 25, the IAEA general director convened a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, which adopted a "resolution on special inspection" of ordinary military sites of the DPRK. This was something unprecedented in the history of inspections by the agency.

And the IAEA Board of Governors adopted an unjustifiable "resolution" against the DPRK on June 10 when reactor core refueling was under way at the DPRK's five megawatt experimental atomic power plant.

The dishonest officials of the IAEA Secretariat took the DPRK's "nuclear issue" even to the United Nations in an effort to gratify their wicked aim by "internationalizing" it and imposing collective "pressure and sanctions" on the DPRK.

The IAEA Board of Governors last year adopted one "resolution" after another to transfer the DPRK's "nuclear issue" to the UN and submitted even "an annual report" to the UN General Assembly. They went the length of faking a "letter" of the UN secretary-general.

Who can trust the IAEA which is behaving like this?

We will never tolerate any act of infringing upon our national sovereignty and supreme interests of our country.

The IAEA must know clearly that whatever intrigue it may hatch up to stifle the DPRK, it will only bring a stain and disgrace to itself.

**Commentary on North Korea's Withdrawal From IAEA**

OW1606234394 Beijing China Radio International  
in English to Western North America 0400 GMT 16 Jun 94

[Li Shaowen "Commentary"]

[Text] North Korea says it would immediately withdraw from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and rejects any inspection of its nuclear facilities. It now sees any UN sanctions as an act of war. Li Shaowen has a commentary:



Pyongyang is toughening its stand in the wake of mounting pressure. It will not reverse its decision until the nuclear issue has been solved fairly through dialogue and negotiations. A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement issued on Monday [13 June] charges the IAEA with committing an act of grave encroachment on its dignity and sovereignty.

The United States responded immediately. The State Department said on Tuesday [14 June] that Washington has worked out a draft resolution calling for UN economic sanctions. Also on Tuesday, North Korea's UN ambassador said its government has informed the United States of its decision to withdraw from the agency. It will also order the remaining two agency inspectors to leave the country.

North Korea and the IAEA have been differing over the nuclear fuel rods replacement. The agency accused Pyongyang of blocking a full inspection of the refueling process. The United States suspected it transferred plutonium from the Yongbyong nuclear reactor for its weapons program. On 10 June, the IAEA adopted a resolution urging North Korea to open its military facilities and suspended the agency's assistance to it. The United States, South Korea, and Japan agreed on imposing UN economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Washington has been lobbying support for the measures but failed to win any agreements from the international community.

Russia has called for an international conference to find a solution to the issue. On Monday, President Boris Yeltsin discussed the latest development with his U.S. counterpart Bill Clinton by a telephone call. They also discussed ways to settle it through political means.

China is opposed to sanctions imposed on North Korea. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has stressed the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and regional stability as two of the goals in the fundamental interest of Asia-Pacific countries. China has time and again called for dialogue to resolve the dispute and appealed to the international community for restraint from taking hasty actions.

The door is still open for a political solution. North Korea has been calling for the resumption of talks with the United States on the issue before considering further inspections. It has threatened to withdraw from the IAEA and has not done yet. What is more, it is still a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All this indicates that only dialogue can bring about a resolution. Further confrontation and hostilities will just intensify the already tense situation and will cause a greater threat to regional peace and stability. After all, talks, however tough, are better than extreme actions.

#### **Dailies on UN Statement on DPRK Issue** SK0106071594

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of editorials and articles carried by ROK vernacular newspapers on 1 June commenting on the UN Security Council presidential statement on the North Korean nuclear issue.

Conservative CHOSON ILBO on page 3 carries a 1,000-word editorial entitled "Though Another Presidential Statement Has Been Released...." which starts out by

saying that this statement is a "very soft statement," then notes that "North Korea is unlikely to comply with this statement" and that "this may have merely added an ace card to North Korea's hand of nuclear cards." Pointing out that "the stronger the North Korean position, the more carrots the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the ROK, the United States, and the United Nations have offered," it concludes by saying: "Even if the international community imposes sanctions on North Korea, North Korea, which is enjoying the nuclear game, is not expected to promptly change its attitude. Also, if the international community tries to resolve the issue through negotiations even while going in the direction of sanctions, North Korea will try to take ill advantage of this, as well. Therefore, resolving the nuclear issue requires our side's resolute will."

The moderate TONG-A ILBO carries a 1,000-word editorial on page 3 entitled "Quickened Pace at the Security Council." The editorial first describes the background of the UN Security Council's adoption of the presidential statement and notes that "if North Korea refused to accept the UN Security Council's presidential statement, the Security Council will, unavoidably, pursue sanctions." It then says that "we cannot accept any negotiations in which North Korea's past nuclear activities will be overlooked" and that "the carrots that will be available to North Korea once the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved diplomatically have already been made public." The editorial finally expresses the hope that "North Korea will make a wise choice."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries a 1,000-word article by correspondent Chong Yon-chu in Washington on page 3 entitled "Sanctions Will Be Inevitable If North Korea Continues To Replace Fuel Rods." The article starts out by saying that the adopted presidential statement is likely to lead to the resumption of negotiations between North Korea and the IAEA, and that it is speculated that North Korea may stop short of replacing fuel rods at the last moment. The article then notes that if North Korea should continue to replace fuel rods, "this should be interpreted as North Korea's determination not to disclose its 'nuclear past' at all costs."

Moderate CHUNGANG ILBO carries a 1,200-word article by reporter Kang Yong-chin on page 3 entitled "Government's Measures on the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

The article says the ROK Government is busy mapping out measures as the uncertainty over the North Korean nuclear issue increases and is even examining the possibility of imposing sanctions against North Korea by the ROK, the United States, and Japan if North Korea refuses to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue and if international sanctions are not possible because of China's veto at the UN Security Council. It also says that even though it considers military sanctions to be undesirable, the ROK Government is looking into possible measures should the United Nations or the United States choose to impose military sanctions.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,000-word article by Kim Su-chong, the correspondent at UN Headquarters. The article points out that "China's flexible

position made it possible for the UN Security Council to adopt the presidential statement immediately," and quotes a Chinese diplomat as saying "China is concerned about the possible situation to be resulted from the rupture of North Korea-U.S. talks if North Korea continues hurried replacement of fuel rods."

The article says that "without any concrete countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue, the United States seems to expect that the presidential statement of the UN Security Council will induce Chinese influence upon North Korea as well as urge it to accede to dialogue."

The article concludes by noting the possibility that "North Korea will break through the crisis caused by its fuel rods replacement by using its unique tactic," and saying: "North Korea has used a hide-and-seek tactic. While driving the nuclear issue to a critical phase, North Korea has strung the United States along by offering dialogue whenever the UN Security Council was going to take measures against it."

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word article by New York and Washington-based correspondents Pak Su-man and Yi Chong-yon. After explaining the background of the adoption of the recent UN statement on North Korea, the article reports that "the IAEA's abandonment of negotiations and the abrupt adoption of the UN Security Council president's statement on the North Korean nuclear issue has made the prospect of U.S.-North Korea dialogue very cloudy."

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN carries on page 5 a 900-word article by Washington-based correspondent Yi Kyong-hyong. The article stresses the following three points as being significant in the adoption of the UN statement on North Korea: First, the statement "supports the IAEA position on future measurement of nuclear fuel rods;" second, the implication in the statement that "the UN Security Council's will to take immediate follow-up measures, such as sanctions, if North Korea rejects the future measurement of fuel rods;" and third, the promptness shown in adopting the statement. It stresses that this reflects the UN Security Council's recognition that "the issue of replacing North Korea's fuel rods is an imminent problem in need of a speedy solution."

Regarding China's position, the article cites experts' analysis that "in view of smoothed relations with the United States, China will take great account of the fact that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula complies with its own interests." Quoting diplomatic sources in the United Nations and Washington, the article also reports that China will "inactively participate" in taking possible follow-up measures against North Korea.

#### **Foreign Ministry Spokesman Previews U.S.-DPRK Talks in Geneva**

SK2706102594 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1019 GMT 27 Jun 94

[*"Information on Expected Third Round of DPRK-USA Talks"*—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang, June 27 (KCNA)*—A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK issued the following information today on the expected third round of DPRK-USA talks.

A series of working contacts have of late taken place between the DPRK and the USA for the opening of the third round of talks.

The sides agreed to begin the third round of talks on July 8, 1994, in Geneva.

The talks will be held alternately at the DPRK Mission and the U.S. Mission in Geneva, the first-day session taking place at the DPRK Mission.

The talks will be attended by a delegation of the DPRK led by Kang Sok-chu, first vice-minister of foreign affairs, and a delegation of the USA led by Robert L. Gallucci, assistant secretary of state in charge of political and military affairs.

The talks are expected to discuss matters for a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue in a package deal and other outstanding issues between the DPRK and the USA.

#### **KCNA Cites Foreign Papers Supporting Withdrawal From IAEA**

SK0107104294 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1018 GMT 1 Jul 94

[Text] *Pyongyang, July 1 (KCNA)*—Newspapers of different countries expressed full support for the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

The Tunisian paper *AHBAR AL JOURMOURIA* said that the DPRK's step of withdrawing from the IAEA was an absolutely just one. *AL MAOQIF*, another newspaper of Tunisia, noted that by declaring its withdrawal from the IAEA to cope with U.S. moves the DPRK showed its principled stand in practice.

The Mexican paper *LA AFICION* in an article headlined "Constancy of the Korean People" said the decisive stand of the DPRK is an expression of the independent faith which it has maintained since its founding. The Korean people have their faith which the West cannot understand, and it is an indomitable revolutionary spirit, it stressed.

The Tanzanian paper *UHURU* wrote that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has laid solid foundations whereby to progress ahead, neither yielding to pressure nor hesitating, which way the wind may blow.

It noted that North Korea has strengthened immensely and adhered to its firm principled stand in international issues, too, thanks to the wise guidance of President Kim Il-song and Comrade Kim Chong-il and the excellent policy of the Workers' Party and Government of Korea that hold the people dear.

#### **Reopener—Further on Foreign Minister's Remarks on DPRK**

SK2306031594 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0257 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] A "miraculous" breakthrough in the nuclear impasse was achieved after former U.S. President Jimmy Carter met directly with North Korean leader Kim Il-song.

Kim relayed through Carter that North Korea would comply fully with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and with the IAEA safeguards accord, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, keep IAEA monitoring equipment in operation and freeze its nuclear activities.

Pyongyang confirmed these intentions directly to Washington Thursday, and U.S. President Bill Clinton personally declared that efforts for UN sanctions against North Korea will be suspended and the next round of U.S.-North Korea high-level talks will open in Geneva early next month.

What North Korea said about complying fully with the NPT and the safeguards accord "carries in it various meanings," Han told reporters, especially regarding its intentions to show what it has done in the past with spent fuel.

"At least the possibility of recounting the past through access to the two undeclared sites remains alive," he said.

"It is unclear as to whether it is still possible for the IAEA to recount what North Korea did with its spent nuclear fuel rods in a way it wants and needs. But an explanation of the past would be possible when this complemented access to the two sites," said Han.

As to what constituted satisfactory inspection of past activities, the foreign minister said it would have to be a method guaranteeing 100-percent transparency deemed satisfactory to the IAEA.

He denied reports that the Clinton administration was ready to overlook what North Korea may already have done.

"It was a choice of whether the issue of the past should be settled before or during the third round of North Korea-U.S. high-level talks. It was not a choice of whether to address or ignore it," said Han.

While stressing the importance of both tracing the past and staving off nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Han said the time factor places more emphasis on freezing the North's nuclear program.

He described a "new basis" to continue diplomatic efforts on the nuclear problem created by Pyongyang's latest gesture.

"It's true that the basis for dialogue was broken when North Korea unloaded fuel rods from its nuclear reactor," he said.

"But a new basis was laid with new conditions such as North Korea's promise not to reload and reprocess."

#### **IAEA Officially Recognizes DPRK's Withdrawal**

SK1606005794 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2200 GMT 15 Jun 94

[By Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on 15 June was informed by the United States of North Korea's notice of withdrawal, and officially declared that North Korea is no longer a member state.

The United States, the trustee of the IAEA ratification treaty, delivered an official document to the IAEA Secretariat on 15 June which stated that North Korea was withdrawing from the IAEA. The official document received by the IAEA clearly points out that North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam officially notified the U.S. Government of the North Korean authorities' decision to withdraw from the IAEA as of 13 June.

With the receipt of the official document, the IAEA, as authorized by the United States which is the trustee country, declared that North Korea has given up its membership as of 13 June and informed the 35 board of governor states and other member states. The IAEA reaffirmed, however, that North Korea's withdrawal of its member state status does not at all affect the nuclear security agreement signed between North Korea and the IAEA in 1991.

#### **ROK Defense Minister: DPRK Tested Nuclear Bomb Detonators**

SK1506073294 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
0600 GMT 15 Jun 94

[Text] Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said that signs have been detected through various sources that North Korea has recently been conducting tests for detonators of nuclear bombs. Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said this today at a meeting of Democratic Liberal Party lawmakers and local chapter chairmen. He said that although there were no signs of North Korea having conducted nuclear testing to determine the success of nuclear weapons development, he has obtained, from various sources, signs that North Korea has been conducting tests of detonators used in exploding nuclear bombs. Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said that North Korea must therefore have developed a nuclear explosion device at least to an elementary stage.

Regarding North Korea's recent military moves, Defense Minister Yi Pyong-tae said: North Korea has continued provocative demonstrations by conducting inspections assessing the combat-readiness of the entire armed forces under the supervision of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces since the middle of last April and by having its party Military Commission begin inspections confirming its war preparedness posture.

Defense Minister Yi said that in the event of North Korean provocation, the ROK will prevent it from spreading into



an all-out war with an immediate and powerful counterattack. Saying that the Defense Ministry is keeping an eye on all the North Korean moves by thorough intelligence activities, he disclosed 13 military intelligence photographs of the North Korean area, including the radiochemical laboratory in Yongbyon.

### **ROK Papers Review North Korea's Withdrawal From IAEA**

SK1406142194

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles published in Seoul vernacular newspapers on 14 June on North Korea's withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA.

The moderate CHUNGANG ILBO carries on page 1 a 1,600-word report on the movement of the ROK Government, the United States, the IAEA, and China in the face of North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA, writing they are all agonizing over mapping out countermeasures. The report notes that the North Korean nuclear issue is at the edge of a cliff, while noting that the ROK Government confirmed again its stance of pushing for UN imposition of sanctions against North Korea by convening an emergency meeting of the Unification-National Security Coordination Council on 14 June. The report continues: "Because North Korea has not withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, NPT, a mother law of the IAEA, it still has a legal duty to undergo inspections of its nuclear facilities. In case North Korea should reject the inspections and order inspectors to leave, a process for international inspection of North Korea's nuclear activities will completely disappear, thereby greatly shocking the international community. North Korea's nuclear issue will surely bring about long-term consequences, depending upon the international community's response."

The report quotes Yi Hong-ku, deputy prime minister and minister of the National Unification Board, as saying after the 14 June Unification-National Security Coordination Council meeting that North Korea's breaking away from all safety devices guaranteeing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is decisively running counter to the peaceful solution of the nuclear issue, while urging North Korea to cooperate to secure all safety measures as required by the NPT system. The report further quotes Minister Yi as stressing that there is no peculiar military activity on North Korea's part, while noting the government will continue to make solid and consistent efforts for the peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

CHUNGANG ILBO also carries on page 3 a 1,200-word article on the reaction of the ROK Government. The article quotes participants in the 14 June Unification-National Security Coordination Council meeting as analyzing that North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA was carried out to emphasize its threats that if the IAEA imposes sanctions, it will withdraw from the NPT; and if the UN Security Council decides on sanctions, it will regard this as a declaration of war. Government officials concerned are quoted as saying that North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA is a low-level measure—one step lower than withdrawal from the NPT—to secure as many bargaining chips as possible; not to abruptly escalate the intensity of confrontation; not to yield to the pressure of

sanctions; and to hold in check sanctions by the UN Security Council. The article comments: Considering that North Korea's latest move is aimed at testing our government's will, the ROK Government has decided to react strongly.

The article reports that it will be easier for the ROK Government and the United States to persuade China and other neighboring nations to deal with North Korea's nuclear issue, predicting that China and Russia will be able to exercise stronger influence and North Korea's nuclear issue will be discussed at a forum other than the United Nations. The article concludes that the government is concentrating its efforts on mapping out security countermeasures against North Korea's possible provocations.

CHUNGANG ILBO also carries on page 3 a 1,000-word editorial on the dangerous nature of North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA, noting that North Korea's diplomacy is moving toward an extremely dangerous all-or-nothing stage. The editorial comments that North Korea has two goals: One, North Korea will deal only with the United States to the exclusion of the IAEA; two, North Korea is trying to drive a wedge in the international community's discussion of the imposition of sanctions. The editorial concludes that North Korea is trying to achieve a dramatic effect with the approach of the upcoming visit by former U.S. President Carter and urges North Korea to understand that the United States is not so easy and that if its excessive strategy fails, there will be a larger danger.

The moderate, culturally oriented MUNHWA ILBO carries on page 1 an article on ROK and U.S. reactions. The article predicts that as a result of the increasing mistrust of North Korea, discussion at the UN Security Council will proceed more quickly, while noting the ROK and the United States have reaffirmed their position to push for the UN Security Council's imposition of phased sanctions on North Korea.

MUNHWA ILBO also carries on page 1 an article on Pyongyang's ulterior motives. The article reports that Pyongyang is trying to realize direct negotiations with the United States, while noting that in the eyes of North Korea, the IAEA is nothing but an obstacle to its negotiations with the United States. The article continues that North Korea did not withdraw from the NPT, reporting this means that North Korea is not preparing for a face-to-face confrontation with the United States, but shows that it has not given up its nuclear diplomacy through negotiations.

### **Papers Assess Carter's Visit to North Korea**

SK1406064994

[Editorial Report] Seoul vernacular newspapers on 14 June publish editorials, reports, and articles on former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's upcoming visit to North Korea.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO carries on page 3 a 1,200-word editorial entitled "North Korea's Withdrawal from IAEA and Carter's Visit to North Korea." The editorial notes that Carter, who is expected to meet North and South Korea's presidents at a time when the North Korean nuclear issue has become the top world issue, can



be regarded as the most important nuclear envoy. However, the editorial states that North Korea, while waiting for Carter, chose a hardline position, namely the withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, instead of making an appeasement gesture, and put a wet blanket on the expectations for Carter's visit, thus causing people to worry about the possibility of Kim Il-song taking advantage of Carter's visit. Recalling Kim Il-song's past tactics to selectively invite Americans and give them the warm treatment, the editorial stresses that Kim Il-song's propagandistic remarks have more falsehood than truth as shown in the case of North Korea's promise to allow the IAEA's nuclear inspections. The editorial points out that "even if the United States begins to support North Korea's light-water reactor, North Korea will undoubtedly continue extracting plutonium from the so-called 'military facilities' while pretending that it froze the extraction of plutonium only in a certain reactor."

The editorial then calls on Jimmy Carter to keenly be aware of this situation during his visit to North Korea, and not be dragged into Kim Il-Song's deceitful tactics. The paper concludes that "at a time when the people think that there is no other means but sanctions, Carter's visit may be the last opportunity for North Korea. North Korea should not attempt to use Carter just as it has used other people who visited North Korea in the past."

CHOSON ILBO also publishes on page 4 a 1,500-word article by reporter Kim Tu-sik, under the headline "Carter's Visit to North Korea—What He Should Do and What He Should Not Do in Pyongyang." The article notes that the people are hoping that during his visit to North Korea, Carter will clearly convey to the Kim Il-song regime the resolute will of the international community for a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. The paper expresses the hope that "Carter will emphasize that only when North Korea immediately allows the 'special inspection' of two undeclared nuclear facilities in Yongbyon as demanded by the ROK and the United States, can North Korea get rid of the sanctions crisis." The paper then stresses that "Carter should urge North Korea to make public the record on the extraction of plutonium in the past and detailed additional information on the operational plan of the reactor in Yongbyon." The article adds that Carter should raise the issue of reform and openness of the North Korean society, as well as its human rights issue.

As the points that Carter should refrain from doing, the article emphasizes that Carter should not give a wrong message that may encourage North Korea's hopes; should refrain from causing North Korea to misunderstand that he is a special envoy of the U.S. Government, and should not exaggerate the result of his visit to North Korea. The paper concludes by saying that our government will inform Jimmy Carter of our aforementioned hope before he crosses Panmunjom on 15 June.

The moderate daily TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,200-word editorial entitled "We Call On Carter To

Grasp North Korea's True Intention." Attaching importance to Carter's meeting with Kim Il-song during which mutual messages may be exchanged, the editorial expresses the belief that he is the last nuclear special envoy of the U.S. Government, although he stated that his visit is strictly personal, in view of his past role in U.S.-Syrian relations and in negotiations for the Ethiopian war. Pointing to a possibility for North Korea to take advantage of his visit for a peace offensive to evade sanctions and for gaining time, the paper asks Carter to precisely inform North Korea of the international community's demand and to grasp North Korea's true intentions, whether they are aimed at establishing diplomatic relations with the United States and receiving support for a light-water reactor, or at ultimately pursuing nuclear development.

The paper also calls on Carter to raise North Korea's human rights issue while in Pyongyang since he was known as the president for human rights, and to demonstrate his ability in blocking North Korea's nuclear development since he blocked the ROK's nuclear development plan while he was in office.

The moderate HANGUK ILBO publishes on page 3 a 1,600-word article by reporter Ko Tae-song, entitled "The Government To Cope With the North Korean Nuclear Issue Based on Sense of Reality." Pointing to recent delicate and cautious changes in the government steps to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, the article states that the government appears to be turning from a hardline position by favoring sanctions to the attitude of accepting the reality that requires active participation of China and Russia, and this government attitude is reflected in viewing Carter's visit to North Korea. The article notes that the government was at first worried about a possibility of Carter being dragged in by North Korea's delaying and propaganda tactics but is now trying to take the best advantage of his visits to both North and South of Korea for directly conveying the worries and warnings of the international community and of our government to North Korea on its nuclear problem.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 2 a 1,200-word article by reporter Yi Song-chol, entitled "Carter's Role—Half Affirmative, Half Negative." The paper notes that the government's view on Carter's visit to North Korea is more on the negative side at the moment because his visit may give unfavorably impact our security strategy when sanctions are being discussed at the UN Security Council. On the contrary, some people are hoping for his positive role because he maintains special relations with the Clinton administration and because North Korea expressed the will to invite Carter since 1991. The article refers to remarks made by Professor Kim Yu-nam from Danguk University on the possibility of Carter taking a certain U.S. message accepting the North Korean demands. However, the article says: "Most experts point out that the success of Carter's visit depends more on what kind of message North Korea will give him rather than on whether he will bring a message with him or not and than on his role as a mediator."

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

### Serbs Allege Muslims Used Poison Gas in Doboj Area

LD1706211494 Belgrade TANJUG in English  
2040 GMT 17 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Doboj, June 17 (TANJUG)—Moslems on Friday again violated the March 8 ceasefire, under which they have renounced offensive action, and attacked Bosnian Serbs on all fronts in the area of Doboj in the north, even using war gases in some cases. Bosnian Serb Army sources said that Moslems had mounted a series of infantry attacks from the direction of Zavidovici, with strong artillery and tank support in which shells charged with poison gases were used again an effort to break through the Serb defences southeast of Doboj.

The Serb forces put up a strong resistance and checked the assaults with accurate fire, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and beating him back, the Serb sources said.

To the Moslem shelling of Serb positions and adjacent localities with poison gases, the Serbs responded with strong fire on Moslem Army positions designed to protect their positions and defend their lives, the sources said.

Moslem attacks have been reported also west of Doboj, where nearly all Serb lines were targeted by the Moslem infantry and mortars. Three civilians were wounded in Moslem attacks on civilian targets in the Serb villages of Puracic and Stanari in the area.

## ROMANIA

### Daily Views Radioactive Materials Traffic

AU0606091194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI  
in Romanian 30 May 94 p 1

[Dan Damian article: "Romanian Companies Trade With Radioactive Material and Armaments From the Former Soviet Union"]

[Text] The changes that have taken place in the Romanian society after 1989 have enabled the small and big entrepreneurs that have emerged in the business world, to amass capital. The expansion of business links in the wake of the opening of the borders of the former socialist camp, has led to the emergence of a new sale market, where the relationship between the sellers and buyers is determined by the offer.

Aside from big deals, such as the import of infested sugar and corn and of other foodstuffs from the Middle East, a special place among the various products currently on offer is taken by the trade with arms and radioactive materials.

### Armaments and Radioactive Materials Are Delivered From the States of the Russian Federation

The dismemberment of the former Soviet Union in 1990 has led not only to the appearance of new political forces and of new concepts about whether to remake "Great Russia" or not, but also to the redivision of the huge military arsenal of the former USSR.

Part of this arsenal—the nuclear part, which is deployed in such areas of the former USSR that were suitable, from a geographic viewpoint, for pointing missiles at capitalist targets—are under the control of the Western powers and will be dismantled by 1996. The other part of this arsenal, which is active, can jeopardize life in Central Europe and throughout the world at any moment, not only because of the political instability prevailing in the area of the former USSR, but also because of the maintenance of various armed conflicts, which can generate true nuclear holocausts at any time.

In keeping with existing treaties on nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, one portion of the nuclear charges resulting from the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR is earmarked for peaceful purposes, while the other part is meant to be securely destroyed, so as not to endanger human life and the environment.

Since the quantity of radioactive material resulting from the destruction of nuclear weapons is very large, a good part of it was sold for further use either to countries in the Middle East or to other countries currently interested in producing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Equally true is the fact that the former USSR countries possess mineral resources containing very many radioactive elements, such as radium, scandium, osmium, plutonium, and other strategic elements used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The new trade in radioactive materials has attracted people from both the former USSR states and from the former Warsaw Pact countries, since the profits inherent in this trade are large and immediate.

Among the Russian companies involved in the sale of radioactive substances, we would mention just two: LUCH-3, whose owner is Sergey Alekseyevich Pushkin, and LEGION, represented by Russian citizen Klynchagov [name as received].

### Romanian Firms Are Involved in the Traffic With Radioactive Materials

In a short period of time, several people from Romania—including Nicolae Costel, representative of several Romanian companies such as ROMBEL and SIRCOM, and Elisabeta Ana Stefanescu, owner and sole associate of TECHNOTOURS company—have managed to establish contacts with Russian companies from the Russian Federation and with various firms in Romania.

Under the cover of ROMBEL company, Nicolae Costel managed to contact several people and representatives of certain foreign companies, such as EURONOR BUSINESS PARTNER Ltd, with headquarters in Norway, DB FINANZ CONSULTING AG from Germany, or DHS MERGER- Alois Geissler, offering to deliver red mercury, osmium 192, radium, and scandium in quantities varying between 15 and 200 kilograms, at a cost price of \$73,000 per gram, which would be tantamount to a profit of \$1 billion.

Throughout the 1992-1993 period, Nicolae Costel made several visits to Russia to decide on the ways and means of delivering the goods as well as on the amounts of hard currency to be paid into various banks.

#### Codes Are Used for the Transactions With Radioactive Materials [subhead]

The offers of the supplier of the respective commodity were sent by fax, with the analysis certificate attached. The analysis bulletins also specified the purity of the radioactive material and the density of the other component substances.

In order to ensure the secrecy of the transaction, the two sides used codes. The codes, containing various names such as "Sunshine," "Apple," "Stardust," or "Nautilus," were used to codify both the transaction and the product. For instance, the code "Nautilus" was used to denote osmium 187 while the code "red oil" was used for the red mercury-RM 20/20.

The letters of intent received from the party interested in buying the product always mentioned that the transaction can only take place after a sample of the respective material was submitted to chemical analyses that would attest to the purity and quality of the product. Only analysis certificates in accordance with the "Karpov" and "Frieberger" methods are valid for such radioactive substances.

#### The Transport of Red Mercury Samples Is Done With TAROM Airplanes

Although the red mercury is a nonactive substance, its characteristics can turn it into a very strong explosive when it merges with other chemical substances. As a matter of fact, red mercury RM 20/20 is used in the manufacture of the neutron bomb.

Using not only her imagination, but also her relations, the owner of TECNOTOURS company, Elisabeta Ana Stefanescu used the Bucharest-Rome TAROM flight of 5 July 1992—which landed in Rome at 1415 hours local time [1315 GMT]—to transport a sample of red mercury.

The red mercury sample was handed over to the airplane captain by Rosca Stanescu, deputy commander of Otopeni Airport. In Italy, the "small package" was handed over by the airplane captain to Florin Groman, head of the TAROM office in Rome. The package was then passed on to another man within the Rome Airport by Florin Groman himself, who was ostentatiously carrying a sign with the name of the individual supposed to take over the package, namely the Italian citizen Egidio Musso.

Once the transaction was completed, Elisabeta Ana Stefanescu told her Italian business partner, Egidio Musso, to open a dollar account for her at the Italian bank Credito Italiano, with herself as the only one entitled to withdraw money from that account.

Using the "Rosso" code for the red mercury, Elisabeta Stefanescu informed the Italian company OMNIA TECNO SRL, with headquarters in the town of La Spezia, that the "Rosso" sample was brought to Romania by an agent of an embassy empowered to deal with this affair. In the same message, Elisabeta Stefanescu—who until 1989 had occupied various administrative posts at several foreign diplomatic missions in Romania—expressed the fear that she had attracted "too much attention" at home.

For the same material, RM 20/20, Elisabeta Stefanescu used the code "992/LDEASGC/101-M" in a transaction

involving 138 kg of red mercury for the MUELLER TREUHAND company of Zurich, Switzerland, asking for \$340,000 per kilogram. She also made clear that the deal was concluded in Moscow with Russian partners, with the red mercury procured from the Russian town of Chelyabinsk.

In the July-December 1992 period, Elisabeta Stefanescu spent a "long vacation" in Italy, more precisely in Lerici town, staying at the most luxurious hotel in the region. On that occasion, she got in touch with the business connections in Italy and also established new contacts with people interested in purchasing radioactive material.

At the end of a prosperous business trip abroad, she returned home with two boxes full of jewelry, two fur coats, two Mercedes 220D, a Nissan Patrol cross-country vehicle, and "small gifts" for her connections in Romania. In May 1992, Elisabeta Stefanescu moved out of her parents' home in Londra Street No. 25 into a villa (number 45) in Snagov, which she is renting for 500,000 lei per month.

#### From the Trade With Red Mercury to the Trade With Military Technology

TECNOTOURS' business turnover, which in 1992 stood at 2 billion lei, exceeded 23 billion lei in 1993, but registered zero profits?! All this was achieved with only three employees and a sole "single associate," Elisabeta Ana Stefanescu. All was made possible by expanding the company's sphere of activity to include the trade in military technology.

By establishing several contacts with the Russian citizen Anatoliy Ivanov, general director of the BIISIK [name as received] Ltd. company, and with Eduard Hiznicenco, director of the COMINET SRL company from Odorheiu Secuiesc, Elisabeta Stefanescu began offering the Middle East "market" a whole range of products from the Russian armaments industry: from AKM and AK-47 machine guns—each costing \$170, with some 3 million pieces on offer—up to MI-26 and MI-35 helicopters, T-72 and T-80 tanks, and MiG-29 planes, with the prices varying between \$19 million and \$55 million.

#### The Use of Coded Messages and Other Codes in Arms Transactions

Another private entrepreneur involved in the transactions with radioactive materials and armaments, Niculae Costel, representative of SIRCOM company, contacted the ROMTEHNICA company.

In a letter marked "confidential" and "ultra confidential," Niculae Costel informed Rear Admiral C. Raducanu, deputy chief of the Army Supply and Equipment Service, of an impending transaction, namely the confidential project "Yacht," whose destination was the Great Lakes region in Canada. The customer was demanding that the name of the vessel should be kept secret and that the Romanian crew should train the foreign crew during the voyage. In exchange, the customer was offering, in codified terms, "stinger, hot, and patrol" plus "some money." Meanwhile we have managed to identify the meaning of "stinger" and "hot," which stand for anti-tank missiles.



**Red Mercury Smuggler Claimed To Have Accompanied Vacaroiu**

AU0606092394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 31 May 94 p 1

[Dan Andronic report: "On His South American Tour Nicolae Vacaroiu Was Accompanied by the Representative of a Company Involved in Radioactive Materials Traffic"]

[Text] After having published our article titled "Romanian Companies Trade With Radioactive Material and Armaments From the Soviet Union," now we can let you know that we are in possession of information proving that one of the members of the government delegation headed by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, which [at the end of May] visited a number of Latin American countries, was the representative of such a company.

Thus, in the official list of the delegation, in Chapter 5, which contains the names of the businessmen accompanying the prime minister, one finds the name of Constantin Francu, the board director of the Dunarea Ltd. company.

We consider it strange that the same person, Constantin Francu, had been caught at the Varsand border crossing point, in Arad County, trying to take over 10 kilograms of red mercury. It is noteworthy that this was the largest red mercury seizure ever made on the territory of Romania and that the place of origin was the former Soviet Union.

**Police Investigate Illegal Sale of Uranium Pellets**

AU3006174094 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 25 Jun 94 p 12

[Article by Nicolae Militaru: "Romanian Nuclear Programs Discredited by Blackmarketeers"]

[Text] Recently, officers of the Directorate for Arms, Explosives, Drugs, and Toxic Substances of the General Police Inspectorate caught three individuals who were selling uranium pellets in Pitesti Municipality. The tablets originated from the Nuclear Research Institute in Pitesti and the Nuclear Fuel Factory respectively, and were meant to be used in the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. The possessors of the uranium pellets offered a considerable amount of it to some Romanians from Baia Mare, asking them to sell it. Due to a lack of customers and wishing to show that they are honest people, the Romanians told the Pitesti Police about it. From this act to actually catching the criminals was only a step.

The officers of the General Police Inspectorate went to the house of the salesman, pretending to be interested in buying the pellets. In this way, Ion Popescu, age 42, of Colibasi, Arges County, a graduate of a higher education institute; Marin Stanciu, age 51, a driver; and Mugur Scarlat, age 31, from Darmanesti, Arges County, who was recently released from prison where he was serving a sentence, also for the sale of uranium, were arrested. Police found 3.5 kg of nuclear fuel pellets in their homes.

In 1993, as many of the readers of ADEVARUL probably still remember, our newspaper drew attention to the fact that 240 kg of such pellets were removed from a factory manufacturing similar products in Brasov County.

Other amounts, that is, scores of kilograms were also found in the possession of some black marketeers in the flea market in Pitesti. Scores of tablets were also discovered in the Mures River, thrown there by a vendor from Arad, while other quantities were confiscated from a Hungarian, the owner of a motel close to the Romanian border.

Regarding all these facts, one question arises: Who is interested, and for what reasons, in buying uranium pellets produced in Romania? The price offered for each gram is much higher than the official price of these tablets. In order to be able to use them in nuclear power stations, several tonnes of one single charge are required! A few hundred kilograms of such uranium has disappeared from Romanian factories. Thus, the intention to use it for producing electrical power is excluded and the pellets cannot be used in any other area. Who is buying them and why is the illegal removal of these tablets encouraged?

We have received an answer in this respect from experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. After careful examination of the data supplied by the Romanian authorities, the experts concluded that those who are buying uranium pellets want nothing else except to discredit our country's programs in the field of nuclear energy. The theft of pellets, that is of radioactive uranium, presupposes disorder and thus shows the inability of Romanian enterprises to ensure the required security in dealing with such a substance. When this fact is proved—and the black market in uranium pellets on the flea market is already proof—the international control bodies and commissions will impose new restrictions on Romania. On the other hand, Romanian enterprises will not be allowed to produce certain components for nuclear stations, because of the lack of security, and we will be asked to import these components. Certainly, we will have to pay for everything in dollars and by having our machine-building industry ruined, an industry that showed signs of competitiveness in certain areas of nuclear energy.

**ARGENTINA****Menem Signs Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in Canada***PY2306175394 Madrid EFE in Spanish  
1929 GMT 21 Jun 94*

[Excerpt] Toronto, 21 Jun (EFE)—On 21 June, the Canadian and Argentine Governments signed a nuclear cooperation treaty that will allow Argentina to broaden its program for the use of nuclear power.

The document was signed during a special ceremony attended by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Argentine President Carlos Menem, who is paying a three-day visit to Canada.

According to the agreement, Canada may provide special technology and cooperation in the nuclear field to Argentina.

The agreement will allow Argentina to make better use of its nuclear resources for strictly peaceful purposes, especially in the energy field, according to official Canadian sources.

Canadian Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet said during the ceremony that the agreement "marks the beginning of a new phase of the relationship between the two countries."

The minister announced Canada will sell Argentina technology and equipment for the installation of a second nuclear plant in addition to granting aid for the research being carried out by Argentine experts.

The agreement was signed after Argentina this week signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in which the signatory countries agree to use nuclear power strictly for peaceful purposes. [passage omitted]

**Menem Announces Support for Nonproliferation Treaty***PY2306131494 Buenos Aires PAGINA/12 in Spanish  
22 Jun 94 p 11*

[Article by Maria O'Donnell from Ottawa]

[Text] After signing an agreement on nuclear cooperation with Canada, President Carlos Menem announced here that next week he will send a bill to Congress asking for approval for Argentina to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. "This is the only step that is lacking so the country can receive credit as a trustworthy country in the world," a diplomatic source said, and he explained that the president's promptness is due to the fact that the treaty is about to be revised and therefore it is the appropriate time for Argentina to sign the document, having refused to sign it in the 1970's.

The president's promptness also is due to the fact that as a UN Security Council member, the Argentine Government

told the United States that it is willing to support that organization if economic sanctions are imposed on North Korea for having violated the treaty. If Jimmy Carter's mediation with North Korea to get the latter to accept routine inspections of its nuclear plants fails, then Argentina would find itself in the position of sanctioning the Koreans without having signed the treaty.

In the 1970's the following countries, in addition to Argentina, did not sign the treaty: India, Pakistan, Israel, Cuba, and Brazil, although Brazil, like Argentina, signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, but it was not willing to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

"The countries that do not sign the treaties are saying that they reserve the right to develop nuclear technology for non-peaceful means. But we already have changed our position and now we do not want to be left out of the meeting that will be held in April to decide whether the treaty, which is for 30 years, should be extended," the diplomat said.

The most important local newspaper, the GLOBE AND MAIL, on 21 June on page 2 published an article lauding Menem for signing the agreement with Canada and the announcement regarding the treaty. Greenpeace [preceding word in English] had another interpretation: It organized a small demonstration to protest the agreement because the organization says the main objective is to pave the way for the sale of the Canadian reactor Candu-3 to Argentina. "Argentina does not need it because it already has one, but construction was postponed due to the lack of funds," according to Greenpeace [preceding word in English]. "It is evident that Canada is interested in selling the Candu to Argentina," admitted Canadian Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet.

**BRAZIL****Exchange of Angra II for Nuclear Submarine Considered***PY1406032294 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO  
in Portuguese 9 Jun 94 p B12*

[From Alberto Tamer's column: "A Nuclear Plant for a Submarine"]

[Text] No one has yet proposed it, but the possibility of exchanging the Angra II nuclear power plant—which Brazil purchased from Germany and which remains fully packed—for a Russian nuclear submarine, is already being considered. Brazil is striving to enlarge its submarine fleet and is building a nuclear submarine, while Russia badly needs nuclear plants to replace its old reactors that run the risk of causing a tragedy at any time. They do not need submarines, which they have in excess and which are expensive to maintain. We do not need the plant, which we bought without needing it and without having the money to install it.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### India's, Pakistan's Nuclear Progress Examined

94WP0106 Calcutta THE STATESMAN  
in English 16, 17 May 94

[Article by Raja Menon in two installments on Nuclear Arms; first paragraph THE STATESMAN comment]

[Part I, 16 May p 8]

[Text] Nuclear weapons confer stability when both sides are "deterred," says the author, a retired Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy, in the first instalment of a two-part article. To achieve this level of deterrence, it is necessary to escalate one's nuclear delivery and holding capability to match the other country's. He adds that there is no deterrence in South Asia because neither India nor Pakistan believes that the other side has the requisite holding and matching delivery capability to create deterrence. The concluding part will appear tomorrow.

Between 1945 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1990, the world has known the longest period in two centuries when the major powers were not in direct confrontation. This can only be ascribed to nuclear deterrence. To understand deterrence it is necessary to go into what is called nuclear theology by those whose business it is to practise it. There are two kinds of nuclear weapons. The first called counter-value are weapons whose accuracy is so poor that one can only reasonably hope to hit a city with them. The resultant loss of life and property is considered to have a deterrent effect on the victim State's ability to start or continue a war. The second, called counter-force are weapons whose accuracy is good enough to use them to knock out the enemy's nuclear capability.

Counter-force weapons have to be used in a first strike to derive the maximum benefit. But since they are not aimed at population centres, they are thought to have less of an escalating effect than counter-value weapons.

#### Accuracy

The accuracy required to field counter-force weapons came about 25 years after counter-value weapons and, for this reason, modern nuclear-weapon States have a greater preponderance of counter-force weapons, with which they have a reasonably better chance of protecting their own population centres by destroying the enemy's nuclear capability. Primitive weapon States have plenty of dirty bombs to deter the enemy but have less chance of protecting their own people.

Counter-force weapons alone cannot be a total deterrent. If two States have enough counter-value weapons to almost destroy each other, they achieve what has been called a level of mutual assured destruction (MAD) which is considered stabilizing. The word stabilizing is important, as nuclear weapons are not actually meant to be used in war to save a tactically difficult situation but to prevent the other country from using its nuclear weapons, in the first place, in the manner of what the cowboy books used to call a Mexican stand-off. This is deterrence at the lowest level.

Now if one State develops counter-force weapons when the "enemy" has only counter-value, then the situation is destabilizing. Stability is, therefore, lost when nuclear

weapon States begin to contemplate the possibility of "success" of a nuclear strike because of the imbalance between them. Now let us assume that both powers have counter-force weapons. Then, again, stability is restored until one party decides to put its counter-force weapons in submarines. The submarines dive, disappear into the oceans and the other person's counter-force weapons are all rendered useless. We now have nuclear instability once again. There was a time when the constraints on board a submarine prevented counter-force weapons from being installed in submarines. Modern miniaturizing techniques have since made this possible, and the U.K., for instance, was particularly hard put to decommission its entire Polaris force (counter-value) and spend a huge amount inducting counter-force missiles.

Once missiles are inducted into submarines, then further stability is created because these are second strike weapons. The submarine is so nearly impossible to detect that, even after the parent country has been struck by every imaginable bomb and missile, it is still capable of retaliating with its submarine force. Therefore, the other side will not try launching a strike as long as it can be counter-struck by an unseen submarine force. Hence stability.

#### Balance

Inducting nuclear weapons is to embark on climbing a ladder, an escalatory ladder from which there is no getting off until a high level of technological balance between States, is achieved. Both the United States and the USSR had achieved this level of technological balance when President Reagan embarked on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. If SDI had been successful, it would have seriously destabilized the nuclear balance between the two countries to the extent that one side could once again have started contemplating the use [of] nuclear weapons as part of its policy.

It may be seen that nuclear weapons confer stability when both sides are "deterred." To achieve this level of deterrence, it is necessary to escalate one's nuclear delivery and holding capability to match the other country's. At any time, therefore, there is one cardinal yardstick whereby the achievement of deterrence is judged. If the enemy is deterred in his mind that the possibility of using nuclear weapons will result in complete or unacceptable destruction, then, and only then, is deterrence achieved. The level of nuclear weapon holdings and its means of delivery will keep undergoing changes to perpetuate this hold on the minds of the enemy's leadership.

Today, in South Asia, there is no deterrence. Neither India nor Pakistan's leadership believes that the other side has the requisite holdings and matching delivery capability to create deterrence in the other party. Neither do the Army Forces believe it. Hence the United States is quite right in its belief that the two South Asian neighbours cannot be allowed to continue pursuing vague and dangerous games called "nuclear ambiguity."

#### Hysteria

There is no such recognized policy in the field of nuclear theology. The hysteria over trying to control South Asian

nuclear stocks must be seen to largely stem from the picture we give of children trying to poke their fingers into electrical sockets.

Many have said that a national debate is necessary on this issue. A nuclear capability must never remain a secret because, if it does, it has no worth politically and militarily. The reason why it remains secret in India is that in New Delhi information is power. Those who know a little will not let anyone else into the club. The result is that decisions on nuclear issues may well be taken by politicians, bureaucrats and scientists—none of whom are permanent players in the country's nuclear strategy; nor are they educated in this art. Chiefs of staff of the services are on record as saying that up to the time of their retirement they were never consulted on nuclear issues.

It is India's inability to field a competent team that makes U.S. decision-makers apprehensive and makes them even more certain that South Asia must be denied nuclear capability. The world went through many "near misses" before nuclear stability was more or less assured. It is not necessary for the two South Asian powers to reinvent the wheel and stumble about before learning how nuclear stability can be achieved.

[Part II, 17 May p 8]

[First paragraph THE STATESMAN comment]

[Text] In the concluding part of his article on nuclear policy, the author, a retired Rear-Admiral of the Navy, quotes Perkovich as saying that India and Pakistan have hit upon a new variety of nuclear deterrence. In this scheme, deterrence is created not by making nuclear weapons but by possessing the capability. He calls for a restructuring of the management of security which will lead to a clear nuclear weapons policy.

Nuclear capability comes in four broad varieties. Initially, there is the crude variety of a few bombs to be dropped from any available aircraft. Then there is the inaccurate rocket or air-dropped bomb, stocked in sufficient numbers to be able to devastate the opponent, preferably a few times over so that a pre-emptive strike by the enemy leaves a sufficient number of warheads still usable.

Deterrence begins here. The first, which is only a nuclear capability and not a deterrence, would cost around Rs 1,000 crores. India and Pakistan are said to be at this stage. Progressing beyond the first actual deterrent level, we come to rockets with CEP [expansion not given] close enough to target the enemy's nuclear strike capacity. This requires surveillance and command, control, communications and Intelligence (C3 I) capability which would cost around Rs 2,000 crores, including a surveillance satellite launching system, the satellites themselves, the down-linking and data processing facilities and the information passing and display systems.

#### Hardened Sites

The weapon system would cost around Rs 3,000 crores, including the deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in "hardened" sites. The initial expenditure of Rs 1,000 crores then becomes a waste as this primitive capability becomes obsolete when replaced by the next level of capability.

This third level still does not confer a truly safe second strike capability as the survivability of even "hardened" missile silos are questionable when struck by a large enough warhead. In any case, large numbers of missile silos on land more or less invite strikes by the enemy with enormous collateral damage on nearby population centres. The ultimate in "safe" second strike capability comes with the installation of nuclear missiles on board submarines. This capability would cost around Rs 10,000 crores, including the attendant surveillance and C3 I facilities. The question burgeoning nuclear powers need to ask is: where does it wish to enter the game? Does it wish to enter at the lowest level, acquire each progressive capability, discard it when it becomes obsolete, wasting thousands of crores at each ascent of the escalatory ladder? Or, does it wish to pursue a truly ambiguous policy until the technological base of the country makes it possible to slip into the last and most effective deterrent capability, as in the case of Japan?

The ultimate capability must be based on five strong technological bases. These are a strong submarine building capability; a nuclear weapon capability; an accurate missile firing capability; a surveillance and communications satellite capability; and a strong C3 I base to marry all these separate technical capabilities into an integrated weapon system. We established a submarine building capacity with German help after wandering in the woods for a couple of decades, and then permitted the building yard to wither and die because of the HDW [expansion not given] connotation. Worst of all, the people who learnt to build a submarine were scattered to pursue their individual careers.

A surveillance and communications capability is nowhere on the horizon as the armed forces which once led in these fields are being rapidly marginalized by even the communications systems of trading companies because of the inertia of an uneducated military leadership. A C3 I system to conduct even conventional warfare is still a distant dream for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that a C3 I system creates no bang, is difficult to comprehend, and is not a demonstrable military capability until hostilities begin. If the situation in India is calamitous, in Pakistan it is a good deal worse, as the powerful Army leadership understands even less of these technical matters.

It is in this background that the entire question of the acquisition of F-16s by Pakistan is to be seen. It is not that these planes are a deadly and potent instrument which confer a serious military advantage to Pakistan. The frightening aspect is that Pakistan actually wishes to be considered to possess a nuclear capability based on fewer than a dozen dirty bombs mounted on F-16s or that Indian planners are in a state of mind where they are prepared to accept this.

#### Potential Danger

In fact, hardcore military planners in India at a strategic level cannot possibly think of any defensive plan which does not include the initial destruction of this pathetic Pakistan capability purely because it is so achievable. Nor would his Pakistani counterpart be unaware of what the perception is on the other side of the border. So why



should either country embark on a scheme that is bound to remain incomplete, and a source of potential danger to its owners?

According to Perkovich, India and Pakistan have hit upon a new variety of nuclear deterrence. In this new scheme of things, deterrence is created by not even making nuclear weapons but simply by possessing the capability. According to a few Indian defence analysts, conventional nuclear war fighting wisdom is a "Western" concept and South Asia should strike out on its own. This is patriotism above logic and commonsense.

In Japan, the submarine building industry is very advanced and scaled down models of the tear-drop hull submarines were being built in the late seventies. Their rocket industry has been allowed to develop to beyond missile capability by launching satellites for their own use. Their mastery of C3 I techniques and satellite surveillance is perhaps second only to the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The Japanese, therefore, are in a position from where they could, if their constitution had permitted it, enter the nuclear escalatory ladder pretty near the top rung; but, while they have such a technical capability, they have no ambitions of possessing any bombs in the basement. This is because the Japanese have demonstrated that they are capable of thinking a problem through to the very end instead of embarking on a dangerous route without adequate protection and getting hurt in the process.

#### Just Aircraft

The F-16s are just aircraft. To make full use of them, the way the coalition forces did in the Gulf war requires a logistic, administrative and C3 I backup which the Pakistanis simply do not possess. Indeed, if the Iraqis had F-16s they would have been decimated just as easily as the other Iraqi aircraft were. They would have been picked up on the ground by satellite imagery. If moving, they would have been spotted by J-STARS aircraft. If airborne they would have been detected immediately after take off by AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]. Their radar would have been taped and identified, and counter-measures taken. If used in the strike role, they would have been supported by an intelligence, reconnaissance and post-strike assessment system the Pakistanis cannot dream of.

India's emergence into the real world appears to be proceeding satisfactorily in the financial and economic areas, led by a Minister with the correct ethics, ideals and education. To match this projection in the security and power arena, we need a restructuring of the management of security which will lead to a clear and unambiguous nuclear weapons policy. A weapon is not a bomb. A bomb is like gold—certainly precious but not negotiable. To use it, or make us capable of using it, we must have an institution educated in nuclear theology, and the comprehension of the enormously complex system that is required to convert it into deterrence. If we are not capable of all this, someone bigger has every right to take these dangerous toys away from us and from Pakistan.

#### Government Said Canceling HATF Manufacture Under U.S. Pressure

94AS0300B Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 5 May 94 p 17

[Article by Nasrullah Gazalzai: "HATF Production Stopped"]

[Text] Dr. Abul Kalam, the Gandhian missile man of India, said about his missile program, "India has attained such missile power that it can drop its selected missiles anywhere it wants. A decision will be made by the government whether to use missiles for launching atomic bombs or conventional bombs. The success of the Agni missile demonstrates the success of this technology, in which India has attained expertise. Prithvi is a surface-to-surface missile of international standard. Nag is an anti-tank missile. Akash is a surface-to-air missile that is unequalled in its division. Tarishul is also a surface-to-air missile of high standard. These missiles will shoot at double force when used over the ocean. Agni is an answer to the NTCR imposed on us. We are able to fire missiles over 1,000 to 2,500 kilometers, and even farther. At the end of the year, Prithvi will be presented to the Indian military for its use. We have learned that Pakistan has obtained M-11 missiles from China. Prithvi will be the answer to this."

If we join this Indian program with its space program and its efforts to obtain cryogenic engines from Russia, then it is clear that India is making rapid progress in developing non-traditional weapons.

We had to refer to this non-traditional war program of India's because the military, political, and diplomatic experts from the United States, as individuals and as a team, had been visiting Pakistan before Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's visit to Pakistan and India. Everyone knows that U.S. General P. Hoover has visited Pakistan more than once. During this period, he went to inspect Siachen, the roof of the world, to see the Pakistani military front and meet the soldiers there. Both these visits were made public through the eyes of cameras; however, there was another visit for which there was no camera allowed. Only human eyes saw it. The tongues below these eyes, however, were tied, and will remain so. What was the purpose of this visit, and what did the two parties—the host and the guest—get from it? We cannot say anything about this.

The man in charge of India's missile program has especially mentioned China's M-11, which, according to him, Pakistan has installed on its borders. But it is important to remember that the United States has made a lot of noise about the transfer of M-11s from China to Pakistan. China has repeatedly insisted that it did not supply M-11s to Pakistan, but the United States has not stopped its campaign.

If we analyze U. S. pressure in this context, we can divide it into two camps: One is composed of Senator Pressler and other members, who are working hard to make Pakistan totally unarmed against its enemy India which is loaded with traditional and modern weapons. The other group wants to reach this goal indirectly. This group includes the Clinton government, and Strobe Talbott, as its important representative, has emerged on the scene. Before visiting Pakistan he went to India, where he was given a flat refusal and was told that India has no desire to

cap its nuclear program. Still, Mr. Talbott returned "satisfied" from there. In Pakistan he was welcomed with a great deal of pomp and show. Here the main point of his demands was that Pakistan should first cap its nuclear program; should have it inspected in such a way that the whole world can see that the program has been capped; and it then should destroy its weapons of mass destruction.

After discussing this agenda, Mr. Talbott telephoned his boss, U. S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, on 10 April 1994.

"Mr. Secretary, in the context of relations with the United States, I can at least say that we have received good news in Islamabad. In addition, I consider this trip successful at the diplomatic, political, and even human rights levels.

"We have established the groundwork for taking concrete steps in resolving various problems. From my perspective, this trip has been totally successful, and I am thankful to my Pakistani hosts, who made it possible to attain the solid results that will help Pakistan attain its security and political goals, meet the goals of the safety and stability of this region, and attain the goal of stopping proliferation of nuclear weapons at the international level. We have to work together." In response to a question, he said, "About the nuclear issue, I can say briefly that we have made solid progress, and officials in both countries will have to build on the foundation that we laid over the last two to three days."

During Strobe Talbott's visit, the Benazir government said emphatically that it has been made clear to Mr. Talbott that Pakistan will not roll back its nuclear program. Meanwhile, the announcement about a freeze on the nuclear program (at what level, no one in Pakistan knows) was made by Benazir during her previous rule between 1988 and 1989. The question arises: What success was there that it was important to tell Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was working in Washington on his day off?

If we take a closer look at this "success," two things become clear. First, a few days earlier, the talented Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan said, "I have nothing to say about the nuclear policy or program." This is the same Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan the PPP leadership never tired of saying was brought to Pakistan by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Therefore, whatever is credited to Pakistani is credited to Bhutto I. Now Bhutto II, alias Benazir, has put the same scientist in such a situation that we cannot explain it in any words.

Secondly, Ms. Robin Raphael, a member of Mr. Talbott's deputation, said in her earlier visit that a nuclear bomb can be fired from even an ox cart or dropped from a C-30 transport plane. These words have some relation to Dr. Abdul Qadeer's words. Dr. Khan finished the work of enriching uranium in the Kahuta plant a long time ago. President Ziaul Haq said about the results of this, "We are a screwdriver away from a bomb."

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's interview with Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar is on record, and only a few days earlier, during Strobe Talbott's visit to India, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said, "Pakistan is a nuclear power, and this has been confirmed by the former Chief of Military

Staff in Pakistan, Aslam Beg." It is not necessary to blast a nuclear bomb to prove you have it. These facts and much similar information is available, and when the government of Pakistan insists that it will continue its nuclear program as is (whether it has been frozen or capped), where did the U. S. Deputy Secretary of State have such success that he was so overjoyed about that he could not wait until the morning, and informed his boss that very night?

Let us try to understand the news that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has hinted about.

It should be clear that President Ziaul Haq had asked Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and his team to develop a delivery system after attaining nuclear capability. It is common knowledge that when the United States provided F-16s to Pakistan, these planes did not have a system to drop nuclear bombs. At that time, concern was expressed that Pakistan had received "incomplete" planes. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and his team were given other responsibilities, and the people of our country saw that supercomputers, Giraffe radar, and similar sensitive electronic equipment began to show up. In addition, the first phase of Pakistani missiles, HATF-1 and HATF-2, were created. This gave a shot in the arm to Pakistan's defense forces. As the department made progress, India and its supporters in the West began to get worried. They thought that with the arrival of these missiles, Pakistan's ability to attack farther was improving. It has developed a delivery system without which a nuclear power cannot be said to have a defense umbrella.

Thus, the biggest question for India and the United States was how to stop Pakistan from improving its delivery system. Under this strategy, the first attack was made on China, accusing it of providing Pakistan with M-11 missiles. The U. S. government went to extremes in this context, stopping a Chinese ship in the open seas and searching it to see if M-11 missiles were there. They could only be found if they existed, though. But this gives us an idea of U. S. worries. American experts have told Pakistan several times that they have information about Pakistan gathered from satellites. This information shows that China provided Pakistan with M-11 missiles. China and Pakistan have denied making such a deal.

In any case, the question that emerges with full intensity and importance against this background is: Was the purpose of Mr. Talbott's visit to stop the Pakistani missile program? Mr. Talbott, at the end of his visit here, addressed a press conference in which he said, "Both governments have decided to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to launch them. In this context, we have agreed to cap the nuclear program, followed by a roll back, and finally, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in South Asia."

Thus, the evidence that emerged during Mr. Talbott's visit to Pakistan makes it clear that the United States has changed its strategy a bit and made its first priority the finishing off of Pakistan's missile program. Thus, without the missiles, nuclear weapons can only be used for exhibition, and not for defense. The reason for this is clear. The nuclear program has become such a sensitive issue for the

Pakistani people that ignoring it is not possible. Therefore, the United States achieved its goal in a different way.

In this context, we received the disappointing news that Pakistan has stopped its work on the HATF-1 missile program. At the site where this program was housed, they announced, "We do not want to upset the Americans." Perhaps this is the success that Mr. Talbott was bragging about, and he did not waste any time informing his boss in Washington about this "success." As mentioned earlier, if we look at India's nuclear program, the helplessness of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, and Mr. Talbott's success as a series of events, then it should be clear that this whole effort was to defeat Pakistan's nuclear program. Benazir's agreement with Mr. Talbott to suspend the missile program (it is not difficult to confirm this) will harm Pakistan so much that it is impossible to make an assumption about it.

#### **President Leghari Discusses Nuclear Issue, Indian Missiles**

*BK1906125894 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu  
0200 GMT 19 Jun 94*

[Text] President Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari said recent bilateral contacts at various levels resulted in reducing American insistence on rolling back Pakistan's nuclear program. In an interview with a group of foreign correspondents and Pakistani journalists working for news agencies in Islamabad, he said Pakistan told the United States that it is not prepared for unilateral inspection of its nuclear installations. He said the nuclear nonproliferation issue should be resolved from a regional perspective. Pakistan cannot endanger its security by exposing its nuclear program to any country. He said Pakistan has made it clear to the United States that to realize the objective of nuclear nonproliferation, it should adopt an identical standard in South Asia.

Referring to the manufacture of Prithvi missiles by India, the president said these missiles may have a range up to Pakistan and their purpose and target will also be Pakistan. Agni, however, is an intercontinental ballistic missile, which poses a threat to the areas between Kazakhstan and China, Southeast Asia, Saudi Arabia, and beyond. The president said the only solution to the missile race is to declare South Asia a missile-free zone. He said the United States understood Pakistan's concern for its security and described as just Pakistan's stand on nuclear and missile issues.

President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari also highlighted in detail the opportunities that exist for foreign investment in Pakistan. He said foreign investors are very much impressed by the excellent economic stability created in Pakistan. The president said his discussions in the United States were highly fruitful and he hopes that large-scale American investments, especially in the energy sector, will soon begin in Pakistan. He expressed the hope that within the next two years, there will be an investment of \$2 million to \$3 million, especially in the energy sector, in Pakistan.

The president said besides the economic field, there is consensus among the country's major political parties on national issues like Kashmir, the nuclear program, and the security of the nation. About his land deals, which has been

made a controversial issue by the opposition, he said that he clearly has submitted all the relevant facts before the nation and that he did not conceal anything. He has no association with Yunus Habib nor did he extend him any benefit. He said a positive aspect of this campaign is that the person holding the highest position in the country is also accountable to the nation and that he is glad of it. President Leghari said that there should be a formal pattern for this process of accountability and he suggested that the prime minister take steps in this regard. The president categorically stated that the Nawaz Sharif government provided relief to the Mehran Bank. Former Finance Minister Sartaz Aziz also approved the relief order by his own signature.

On the law and situation in Sindh, the president said it is a matter of concern, but, not to the extent described.

#### **Threat From India's Prithvi, U.S. 'Skewed Policy' Viewed**

*BK1506104494 Islamabad THE NEWS in English  
15 Jun 94 p 6*

[Editorial: "The Prithvi Threat"]

[Text] In his conversational address at the National Defence College, the points raised by President Farooq Khan Leghari about Pakistan's security in the wake of India's successful testing of Prithvi, are well taken. The addition of this short-range surface to surface missile, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to India's weapon stockpiles poses a deadly threat to the country's security. The missile, which is highly mobile and can be hardened and deployed at a very short notice, can reach and target all important civilian and military installations in Pakistan. And though they never carried any credence, after Prithvi, Delhi's professions of peaceful intentions have acquired a particularly hollow ring.

But it would be minimizing the problems created by Prithvi if seen only in the context of how these accentuate Pakistan's security predicament. The missile, which is only one of what jingoists in Delhi boastfully claim are five fingers of its defence punch—Agni, Nag, Tirshol, Akash being the rest—has created a huge negative incentive for arms race in the whole of South Asia. So far Pakistan has exhibited remarkable restraint in reacting to the testing of Prithvi. But the deployment of the missile along its borders will eventually force it to fortify its fences through whatever means possible. If that happens, the responsibility will lie on the shoulders of India policy makers whose weapons fetish is setting the pace of an infinite arms race on the region's track.

Surely this is not a happy scenario, not least because it blows a big hole in the efforts of the international community to curb weaponisation of regions like South Asia. Already, fears have been expressed by world leaders like US President Bill Clinton of a possible nuclear show-down in South Asia. Though blown out of proportion, these concerns underline the unpredictable and volatile.

A big slice of the blame for the gradual vitiation of South Asia's security environment has to go to the U.S. On de-weaponising the region, Washington, at best, has been long on rhetoric and short on action, and at worst, guilty of discrimination against Pakistan. For all its preoccupation



with the goal of securing regional peace, the US response to the testing of Prithvi has been that of a gutless policeman who, seeing a murder, tut tuts but never acts in time to nab the fleeing culprit.

However, Washington's graciousness in dealing with Delhi's missile programme contrasts sharply with the petty-mindedness it has shown in treating Pakistan. Last year, on grounds of mere suspicion that Pakistan was getting M-11 missile related technology from China, it made Islamabad go through the hoops. Now the sum of this skewed policy is before us India is going merrily on the path to missile power while the US and the allies are still engaged in pettifogging arguments on what does and does not constitute a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). If even the testing of the Prithvi does not make the US realise that the shoe of threat to regional peace is on Delhi's foot what will, we wonder? Its use?

#### **Paper Views Prithvi Tests, Relations With U.S.**

*BK1506105094 Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 7 Jun 94 p 8*

[Editorial: "So, at last"]

[Text] Although, belatedly, the test flights of the Prithvi missile have recommenced, it is natural that the Pakistani leaders should call these flights a potential danger to the peace of the entire subcontinent. What is important is that the Indian Government did not take the suicidal decision to sacrifice the many years' toil of the Indian scientists to please the American industry and administration by postponing the launch. This time the Prithvi test flights are to be conducted under our army's supervision so that the defence experts might fully understand the technology used and implement any necessary changes. This test flight was not launched from a static projection site but from a specially designed vehicle. The Prithvi missile has been so designed that it can be launched from a moving vehicle near the border. What has caused Pakistan and the USA to worry is our army's recommendation that the first batch of these Prithvi missiles be stationed near our Western border. Since the range of this missile is about three hundred kilometers, Pakistan's two important provinces, Punjab and Sindh, would fall within it. Pakistan not only objects to the Prithvi but to all the missile systems that India is producing. The importance of the two other missiles, Akash and Nag, besides Prithvi, is not hidden from Pakistan's view. In fights on land in the Western sector, tanks have always played a vital role. Nag is an anti-tank which can easily penetrate the most modern outer armor of the tanks; and Akash is an anti-aircraft missile exactly like the American Patriot missile. Pakistan is naturally worried because she has never been in the position to subdue India on the strength of her weapons, especially in the traditional engagements.

During the summit talks with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, the American President, Bill Clinton, suggested that if India stopped developing missiles like Prithvi or Agni, the U.S.A. might provide India with a protective umbrella. But this offer is neither honest nor practical. It is impractical, because from the view point of the nation's welfare, the relations between two countries will never remain the same. The priorities in the relations undergo frequent changes. The latest examples of fundamentally changing

relations are the relations between the erstwhile USSR and China, and India and Russia. The American President's offer does not appear honest because in the current tension-ridden conditions the U.S.A is still selling long-range bombers to Pakistan. The attempt to postpone the defense programmes of India in the face of the hostile neighbor's acquisition of the latest long-range bombers will naturally cause apprehension and worry. Hence it is necessary for India not to neglect her far reaching security advantages for temporary and immediate gains. The U.S. declaration granting special status to China clearly indicates that, in contrast to its dealings with unarmed or inadequately-armed nations, America is ever prepared to treat powerful nations as equals.

#### **Editorial Views Advent of Prithvi Missile**

*BK1606135294 Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi 7 Jun 94 p 9*

[Editorial: "Due to the 'Prithvi'"]

[Text] After two successful test flights of the 'Prithvi' missile within three days, it has finally been decided to give this very important 'land to land' missile of India to the army. This time both the test flights were conducted by the Army itself and not by the DRDO [Defense Research and Development Organization], especially by that wing of the Army which has to actually use this short-range missile during wartime. The second test flight, conducted by the officers of artillery of the Army, was more vital because despite the first successful test flight conducted on the Saturday [date not specified], this test flight was to determine whether the Prithvi missile could actually be used by the army or not. Proving its credibility for the purpose, this second test flight, which was, all told, the 14th test flight of the missile, was the final one and soon the Army will place its order for 75 Prithvi missiles. The 'Prithvi's' strike range is 150 to 250 kms, and its warhead can be loaded with 800 to 1000 kg of explosive material. The Prithvi missiles likely to be used by the Army will have their strike range curtailed to only 200 kms.

While the addition of the Prithvi to its arsenal has boosted the morale of the Indian Army, Pakistan has naturally panicked at this achievement. The Prithvi missile, within its strike range, can fully devastate the military installations, airstrips, and huge machines with its unerring aim. India never said that she would use this missile against Pakistan. In spite of this, if panic grips Pakistan and out of fright, if the people there say that now all their big cities are within the strike range of this missile, it means that a guilty conscience cannot reverse its alarmed status. But it is clear that India's acquiring Prithvi missile is a fitting reply to Pakistan's getting F-16 planes. Its appropriateness increases all the more because Prithvi missile gives no time to the enemy to prepare its defence.

What will be the American reaction? Obviously it cannot be any better. Having failed to rope in India, either on the world level or the regional level atomic nonproliferation propaganda despite her best efforts, the United States recently began to show her intentions to stop our missile program. We were being subjected to repeated direct and indirect pressures for not handing over Agni nor Prithvi missiles to our army. But our Prime Minister displayed his undaunted resolve already by giving a statement in our



Parliament before his departure to the United States, that India would not accept pressure in this matter. Any residual doubt must have been banished by these two successful test flights. Now, with better perspective, we realize the importance of the diplomatic move that aimed at postponing these test flights of the Prithvi missile before Rao's visit to the United States. The country hopes the recent decision of the government to postpone the test flights of the Agni missile is also linked to some similar diplomatic farsightedness.

#### **Spying Activity by Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya Increasing**

LD1806084194 Berlin DDP/ADN in German  
2317 GMT 17 Jun 94

[Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—Countries in crisis such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are trying to build up their arms stockpiles with nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC] weapons by the extensive use of agents. Information from the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution obtained by the Cologne EXPRESS newspaper (Sunday edition) reveals they are increasingly trying to obtain 'sensitive' goods necessary for the production of NBC weapons.

The documents say that employees of the former Soviet KGB secret service have expanded the range of their spying activities in Germany. The goal is not to acquire know-how but to exert direct influence on firms and associations. Eastern secret services have also increased their activity through former Stasi agents who have not yet been detected.

### **INDIA**

#### **Columnist Views 'Dread' of Nation's Missile Acquisition**

BK2006115594 Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 11 Jun 94 p 6

[From the "Perspective" column by Manohar Talkh: "The Dread of the Indian Missiles"]

[Text] The Pakistani newspaper did not mention anything special about Prime Minister [PM] Rao's trip to the VOA. Perhaps they did not find anything catering to their interest in this trip. So much so that even the joint statement released at the end of the visit was also gulped by the Pakistani press as bitter dose. They didn't lash the United States on any issue. Maybe, in the hope of getting F-16 bombers from the United States, they didn't wish to antagonize America in any way. But they did criticize the statement given by PM Rao on the Kashmir issue during the latter's visit to the United States.

Their English daily 'THE MUSLIM' writes: "By comparing Kashmir with an American state, Texas, the Indian PM did prove his ignorance about the real status of both the states. It is time India stopped these mental acrobatics about such a delicate issue as Kashmir and took some solid initiatives to solve this highly explosive problem."

While referring to the joint statement given by the Indian Prime Minister Rao and the U.S. President, Bill Clinton, which said that India and Pakistan would solve this Kashmir problem according to the Shimla Agreement, by mutual negotiations, the English daily, 'DAWN' writes:

"In the efforts for ensuring peace and stability in South Asia, Pakistan has been siding with the United States for a very long time. It was for this reason that Pakistan had hoped that President Clinton would coolly explain the things to Prime Minister Rao and like an expert player would make moves with such dexterity as would be conducive to creating an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation in the region. But, alas, the Clinton-Rao joint statement did nothing in this direction." The English daily 'NEWS' writes: "What worries us most is that the United States may also start thinking like India about atomic weapons and Kashmir." The English daily, 'FRONTIER POST', writes: "The growing relationship between India and the United States clearly indicates that Pakistan cannot take the American attitude for granted." The English daily 'NATION' says: "During his trip, the Indian prime minister talked about an agreement proposal which, until the time an agreement is reached by the entire world about disarmament of atomic weapons, India and Pakistan must enter a pact of not initiating the use of atomic weapons—this is such a deadly move that if India succeeds in her designs, in the traditional arms field, India will always remain superior." Writing in the weekly magazine 'IMAGE', Mr Abid Hussain says: "It appears that to please India, the U.S. policy has undergone a sudden change. Before the U.S. visit of Narasimha Rao, the American attitude was not like this."

"The Indian generals positioned in Kashmir have lost their morale and are no longer fit to fight a battle"—this is the essence of a lengthy article by Retired Air Marshal Ayaz, which was published in the English daily 'MUSLIM'. The author says: "The Indian commanders stationed in Kashmir have not even of an iota of moral character left in their personality. When such is the condition of the commanders, how can the soldiers fight if war ensues? The army is led by very inferior commanders now. Many instances have emerged showing personal vendetta and enmity in full play. Recently the Director General of the National Rifles, Lt Gen N.P.S. Bal, was dismissed only because he had a tiff with Major General Vinod Sehgal on some issue. General Bal is the fourth highest ranking General who has been dismissed. Before him Lt Gen J M Singh, Major General Ashok Mehta, and Brig Gen Jal Mistry faced dismissal."

After this, describing certain events in which the officers were beaten by the soldiers, the author says. "The level of discipline in the forces is apparent by the fact that most of the officers above the Brigadier's rank do not go to the front lines. Even if they go, they use helicopters, because in going by jeep they fear death from attacks by the guerrilla squads of the terrorists."

It appears the retired generals of Pakistan have started writing on everything concerning the Indian army. The Urdu daily 'JANG' has published an article by Retired Major General Altaf Hussain, entitled: "Indian Missile Power." "The pace with which India is conducting her latest missile test-flights reveals that the Indian experts have been secretly working very hard for many years in the field of missile power. What is amazing is the fact that a country, so much troubled by hunger, poverty, unemployment, and inflation could so lavishly spend money on the manufacture of the missiles, and the whole world closes its

eyes to the fact. Not even one of the various countries and organizations that give loans to India worth billions of dollars for her developmental programs is asking her how these deadly missiles, these 'Prithvis', 'Agnis' are made overnight? Where did India get the money for years of work before the final test flights? Obviously, she used the money she received from the world for developmental works and welfare plans in her military preparations. In less than three to four years the successful test flights of the Indian missiles and rockets have forced Pakistan to seek help from her friendly countries for getting some matching power in this field. Pakistan made her missiles long after India has made them. Now if India fits nuclear warheads on its missiles, as the United States thinks, Pakistan would not just sit back and do nothing. It is our sheer good luck that we have a country known for her atomic and missile power like China as our friend who is not prepared to wilt under Russian or American pressure tactics.

### Importance of Missile Program Stressed

BK2706153594 Delhi DAINIK JAGRAN  
in Hindi 19 June 94 p 6

[Article by Laxmi Shankar Yadav]

[Text] On 4 June, India successfully conducted test flights of its medium-range-surface-to-surface-missile Prithvi from the coastal town of Chandipur. The artillery unit of the Indian Army witnessed the first successful test flight of the one hundred percent indigenously made missile, Prithvi. This missile was launched from our Indian-made Tetra Missile Launcher on 4 June at exactly 11:40 A.M.. This eight and half meter long, one meter wide silvery white missile launched from the Tetra Mobile Launcher spewing fire and vanished into the blue sky to blast its target about 80 km away on Wheeler Island to smithereens in approximately four minutes. Although it was the twelfth successful test flight of Prithvi, it was the first in the presence of Army experts. On 6 June, the test-flight was again conducted in the presence of Army experts, and was equally successful. On this flight the target was situated 145 kms away and Prithvi destroyed it without error in just four minutes and 47 seconds. The maximum strike range of this missile varies from 150 to 250 kms. It is hoped that it will be inducted into the Army within a few days.

The Advent of the New Missile Era: With the successful test flights of Prithvi, our military power enters a new missile era. The success of the Prithvi missile symbolizes defiance of U.S. pressures and demoralizes Pakistan, as well as reflects the technological supremacy of Indian missiles. With one hundred percent success in the very first phase of the missile program, India has shown to the high technology-braggarts that it, without any external help, can manufacture for its defense a modern missile based on the latest technology. It also showed that India will not cower down before superpower hooliganism. Through these successful test flights, India has enlightened the U.S. on a few hard facts. For some time during Prime Minister Rao's U.S. visit, doubts crept in about the future of the Indian missile programs. In fact, the U.S. and its protegee countries constantly pressure India to put this ambitious plan into cold storage. After the successful scientific test flights of the missile, when a delay occurred in its testing for military

purposes, the apprehension—lest our policy makers wilt under U.S. pressure and stop our Prithvi missile program—grew alarmingly. But now its successful, final test flights have assured us that when we celebrate our Republic Day this year, our missile will be firmly guarding our western frontiers.

The Enhanced Capacity to Strike: The successful test flights of the Prithvi missile have not only sent an unambiguous message to the U.S., they have tremendously affected the morale of Pakistan by displaying its precise target technique and enhanced capacity to strike. Goaded by its old aggressive attitude and tendency to aggrandize, Pakistan was busy flouting all norms of international diplomacy and arms control by buying deadly, destructive weapons and openly challenging India. Under such circumstances, for our national security, it was imperative for us to produce a deadly missile to guard our western frontiers. Now the way is paved to include this missile, which can hit a target at 250 kms using its unerring striking technique, into our Army arsenal. Equipped with a guided system like the havoc-wreaking cruise missiles, the most modern, fully indigenous, Prithvi missile will enhance the capacity of the Indian Army to destroy and devastate enemy installation with unerring precision and increased maneuverability. The Prithvi missile is not only capable of giving Iran's Scud-B Mushka-2000, and Pakistan's Hatfa-1, Hatfa-2, Hatfa-3 and M-11 missiles a fitting reply, but in many respects it is even better than those missiles.

The Deployment of Pakistani Missiles: It is also very important to be aware of the Pakistani missiles Hatfa-1, Hatfa-1A and Hatfa-2, which are stationed directly across our border. Pakistan is also planning to place Hatfa-3 and M-11 missiles along the Indian border. The strike ranges of Hatfa-1 and Hatfa-2 are 80 and 300 kms respectively and these ranges can reach many big Indian cities near the border. Hatfa-2 is capable of launching weapons of 300 to 500 kilograms. The Hatfa-3 missile is more advanced with a strike range of 600 kms and the capacity to carry a 500 kg weapon.

The strike range of M-11 missiles: It is a known fact that Pakistan has already acquired the M-11 missile from China, whose strike range is 500 kms with an 800 kg warhead. Thus, even major Indian cities, including Delhi fall within this range, although these missiles are expected to be unable to hit their targets with unerring accuracy. But Pakistan can also use them on a wide target like a very populous big city in India, or against the prominently large Army camps or cantonments. These missiles can be fitted with five types of explosive warheads, of which one can be nuclear, capable of causing havoc in an area of 400 square kms. The remaining four warheads can have only traditional explosive material. Out of these four, one head can house smaller bombs which explode early and cause devastation in a large area before the missile reaches its destination. Recently, Pakistan has also bought from China the M-9 category missile. Not only this, but China is likely to give Pakistan her HY-5 surface-to-air missile after further developing its destroying capacity and giving it the name Red Sey-Sey-8, which then will be as deadly as the U.S. Stinger missiles are now. When China can ignore innumerable U.S. protests and objections to give these missiles to Pakistan, what guarantee is there that it will

also not provide the deadly Tungjung CMS-2 category missiles, with a strike range of 2500 kms, to Pakistan.

**International Military Equation:** Looking at the deployment of Pakistan's missiles and its aggressive and combative stance, it is very essential for India to place its missiles strategically in the border regions. It should not worry about the existing international military equations because if Wisner can recommend to the Clinton Administration to give Pakistan F-16 Bombers, how can he object to India placing missiles in the border regions and aiming them at Pakistan. After all, India must have a defense-arrangement to force the military power of Pakistan. So India should develop a missile for its defense and depend solely on its capacity to protect itself. The gratifying symptoms in this direction are the Indian Ground Forces placing an order for 90 Prithvi missiles with a strike range of up to 150 kms, and the Indian Air Force's order for the same missiles with a strike range of up to 250 kms. These orders have been placed with the government sector ordnance factory which can produce three missiles per month.

**Indian Missile Program:** In order to make India self-dependent in the sphere of military equipment, weapons, etc., and not dependent on any superpower, our first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundation by instituting in 1958 the DRDO (Defense Research and Development Organization). The Indian missile program is our national program formulated according to the needs of the ground, air, and naval forces. The project for integrated guided missile development program was launched in 1983 by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This program formed the basis of our highly developed missiles and their successful test flights. So far the following missiles have been successfully test-flighted: surface to surface missile Prithvi, surface to air, short range missile Trishul, surface to air, medium range missile Akash, medium range advanced anti-tank missile Nag, and the incomparable example of developed technology, the Agni missile. When this missile development program began 1983, the DRDO had already laid a solid foundation for development of the liquid engine rocket system, high fabrication techniques, inertial guidance technology, and systems designs. Dr. V.S. Arunachalam, scientific advisor to then Defense Minister R. Venkataraman constituted a study team for implementing plans to develop integrated guided missiles in which the director of the DRDO Hyderabad, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, and members of the three wings of our defense forces and the defense production section were nominated. This study team gave its initial report within four months to the defense minister, the three chiefs of the defense forces and the defense secretary. Then after careful deliberation the decision was made to develop five types of missiles with necessary modifications suiting our needs. The government granted permission to run these five projects simultaneously within a four month period. The chief features of these projects were: the missiles should be of a contemporary design based on state-of-the-art technology; their development and a limited production should be simultaneous; and coordination of the user section with the Army with the missile development program.

**The Missile Projects:** The 'Guided Missile Board' was a body mainly entrusted with the responsibility of achieving the aims of the integrated guided missile program. The

secretary of the DRDO was its head. The other members of this body were the defense secretary, the secretary of defense production, the financial advisers of the defense forces, the vice presidents of the three wings of the defense forces, the presidents of the main-public-sector defense organizations, the chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics, and the managing director of Bharat Dynamics Limited. The next level—'The Program Management Board'—of this top body was entrusted with the secretary of the Guided Missile Board, who was to be its chairman. The Guided Missile Board members were: all the project directors of the Five Missiles Programs, the directors of the laboratories affiliated with these programs, the director of the Planning and Resource Administration, and the director of the Rocket Wing. In addition, the body had financial advisers, high ranking officers of the three wings of the Defense Forces, and members of the Production Organization Committee. Thus, these projects had representatives from the DRDO, the Space Organization, scientists, the Industrial Development Council, the public sector and non-government organizations, educational bodies, etc. In all there were more than 80 representatives from all these organizations to collectively think and develop the highest form of technology for these missiles. Owing to this special constitution of the body responsible for the development and manufacture of the missiles, these projects could speedily reach their culmination by jumping across the normal administrative delays and hurdles and quickly produce the results we have before us. India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), began in earnest only in 1983. In the initial phase, the Indian Government sanctioned 380 crore rupees annually. After about 11 years after its beginning, the IGMDP has reached a stage where its developing all five projects and continuing simultaneously, out of which the Prithvi, Agni, and Akash have already been successfully tested. Work in the remaining two missile projects: Nag and Trishul is progressing satisfactorily. The latest position of these projects is as follows:

**Prithvi:** In the history of the Indian missile program, 22 February 1988 can never be forgotten because on this very day the surface-to-surface missile Prithvi underwent the first successful scientific test. This test was conducted at Sriharikota Satellite Launching Range in Andhra Pradesh. Prithvi is one of the latest missile systems which is being used by the U.S., Russia, Iran, China, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, and Egypt. This 8.5 meter long and one meter wide missile can carry 800 to 1000 kg of explosive material in its warhead, which is enough to create havoc in enemy installations, and devastate airports and ordnance depots. This is a deadly missile which can blast to smithereens any target on land and wreak havoc.

This missile can be fixed in a transporter to take it to the most inaccessible target on the front. Its most modern warhead can penetrate deep into enemy lines. Prithvi missile's main use could be in breaking the concentration of enemy forces, and blasting the air stripes and the big enemy installations and headquarters. This reliable and less expensive missile can also be launched from frigates and warships. It has enough capacity to damage advance aerial routes and well equipped enemy installations. Its chief specialty is that no other enemy missile, due to its large size, can deter it from reaching its chosen target. The



Prithvi missile is like the much acclaimed American Patriot missile used in the Gulf War, and like the Patriot it can also hoodwink other counteractive missiles.

If in this SM-150 missile, with a strike range 40 to 150 kms only, a light warhead of 500 kgs is placed, its strike range increases to 250 kms. In that case the missile is called SM-250 and has the capacity to carry 800 to 1000 kg of explosive material. So far it has undergone fourteen successful tests and, barring one, it emerged with flying colors in the rest of the test flights. The two flights, referred to in the beginning of this article, were conducted in Chandipur, a coastal town, just 12 kms from the Bay of Bengal, at the Space Test Center in the presence of Army experts. The coming test flights of Prithvi will be conducted in the desert regions. These tests will be over by July 1994 and thereafter the missile is likely to be deployed at our border. This missile is more powerful than the American Lancer missile. From a mobile launcher, these missiles can be fired every two minutes.

**Agni:** Agni is a medium-range-surface-to-surface striking missile. On 22 May 1989, it was test-flown for the first time from Chandipur's Space Test Center, which was successful on all accounts. It was with Agni's success that India received international acclaim and joined the missile club as the sixth member, having the capacity to develop, manufacture, and launch a medium range missile. Previously, the members of this club were the U.S., Russia, China, France, and Britain only.

The concept, manufacture, instruments, and systems in the two-stage Agni missile are indigenous. It was developed by the DRDO laboratory in Hyderabad and its project director was R.N. Agrawal. In the first stage of the Agni-system solid fuel is used, while in the second, re-entry, stage liquid fuel is used. The first stage of Agni is a replica of SLV [Satellite Launch Vehicle]-3, and the second is an advanced form of the Prithvi missile. This 21 meter 'Agni'-system weighs 16 tons and it can carry 1 ton of weapons or explosive material. Its strike range varies from 1500 to 2500 kms. With a normal fuel-load it can travel up to 2500 kms, but with heavy fuel its strike range is reduced to 1500 kms.

Agni's second test-flight was conducted on 29 May 1992. But it was only 60 percent successful because during flight it deviated from its predetermined course. Fortunately, the third test-flight conducted on 19 February 1994 was totally successful. Although the Agni missile is still undergoing various scientific tests, the results of the tests already indicate that its technique is of very high quality. With an investment of more than 30 crore rupees, this missile, manufactured with the latest techniques, can be compared with the U.S. Jupiter, Tow, and Pershing-II missiles, and the Russian SS-20 and SS-22 missiles. The political decision to include the Agni missile in the arsenal of the Indian Army has yet to be made. In this connection, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam's opinion is that as far as the technological level is concerned, the successful Agni test flights have proven its high class. Now the government must decide when it will be included in the Army's arsenal.

**Akash:** This long-range surface-to-air-striking Akash missile's successful test flight was conducted on 14 August 1990 from the Interim Test Site in Chandipur in Orissa.

This missile was also developed by the DRDO in Hyderabad. It still must pass certain tests before inclusion in the military.

Akash can destroy a moving target—plane or missile—flying at an altitude 25 to 30 kms. Akash, an Indian model of the Patriot missile, is an ideal antidote to the F-16 type bombers. Equipped with the latest electronic combat system, this well-guided missile can be launched from mobile launchers to target the F-16 like bombers. It was chiefly developed keeping the F-16 bombers in mind, but it can also devastate low flying bombers, scuds, and M-11 type Pakistani missiles. This almost indigenous-technique-based missile will definitely enhance our aerial strike range capacity and it is hoped that it will replace the currently-used Sam missiles. According to Professor V.S. Arunachalam, the ex-director of the DRDO, Akash will prove to be a better missile than the U.S. Patriot missile. Only Abraham or Leopard can rival the main battle tank [sentence as published].

**Nag:** Based on the strategy of 'fire and forget,' the Nag missile is still in the developmental stages. This missile has the capacity to destroy enemy tanks from a distance of four kilometers. This third generation antitank missile underwent its first successful test flight from Chandipur Space Test Center, Orissa, on 29 November 1990. According to defense scientists there is a great scope to enhance its range and destroying power. Its chief features are the operational facilities to 'fire and forget' and a high capacity to destroy. It can be launched from any surface-moving-mobile launcher or even from a helicopter.

This is coordinated with the moving vehicle in such a way that it is loaded on the vehicle launcher when it is ready to strike. In addition, many other small missiles can be housed in it which are also kept on the launcher vehicle. It sights its target by heat variation, the CCD [expansion unknown] system, and the laser range identifier system. With the CCD system, the target information is achieved. Then through the auto-trigger process the missile is given by the operators to the missile range path-finder. When the operator receives the audio-visual indication, he fires. By self-generated acceleration it moves on its projected path and destroys the target. This is why this system is called 'fire and forget,' because once the target is sighted and it is fired upon, the rest of the work is done by the missile itself.

In February 1990 its test-flight was conducted to check the air-frame direction, electric supply system, and the telemetry system. For its auto-pilot sensor package and the actuation system and the trajectory scheme, the missile was tested in November 1990. This year on 29 and 30 January, it was tested for the missile carrier and track-vehicle systems. After more tests it will be included in the Indian Army. The Nag missile has already undergone nine test flights and its production is likely to start very soon.

**Trishul:** This is a short-range-land-to-air striking missile. Its first successful test flight was conducted in November 1991. After 30 to 40 successful tests and the approval of the Indian Air Force, it was to form part of our defense arsenal, but because of the slow pace of the missile development program it did not happen. Notwithstanding its short range, Trishul is a multi-purpose missile, and very useful for all three wings of our defense forces. After his



return from the U.S., our prime minister has given the green light for its production.

Now the pertinent question that arise is why our government is so slow in completing some of these missile projects? Headed by the U.S. there are 22 countries which are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Short range ballistic missiles and ICBMs also come within the purview of this group. For this arrangement, on 16 April 1987, some guidelines were established. The very purpose of this group was to check the proliferation of the missiles or weapon launching systems. As a matter of fact, whenever India tried to quicken the pace of its missile development program, the U.S. always worried, while for the last four years missiles were being developed and strategically deployed in South Asia and the U.S. remained silent. Both hostile neighbors of India—China and Pakistan—are quite advanced in this field. Pakistan has already deployed her Hatfa-1 and Hatfa-2 missiles strategically aimed at India and is likely to place her Hatfa-3 and M-11 in similar positions. India's other neighbor, China, is so well equipped with nuclear ICBMs that India would need years to reach an equivalent status.

If we consider the present world situation, we find that all countries who have short-range and medium-range missile development programs are doing so in competition with their neighbors to match mutual strike range and power. There are about 32 countries which have medium- or long-range missiles. Their number of missiles, the warheads, the capacity to carry explosive material by the missiles, their technique, range, and the destroying power are aimed at one goal—not lagging behind their neighbors in this race. When all countries are altering and improving their missile techniques to make them more deadly, it is essential for India, too, in view of the suspicious stand of her neighbors, that it not only continue her missile development programs, but complete them speedily.

#### **BJP Reiterates Demand for Nuclear Weapons**

BK1706005194 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English  
13 Jun 94 p 17

[Text] Baroda, June 1, The Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] today countered the Prime Ministers "posture" on the issue of nuclear option and asserted that India ought to declare itself as a "nuclear weapon state".

BJP president L. K. Advani as well as senior leader A. B. Vajpayee said that while the BJP was all for de-nuclearisation and disarmament the most question was whether this was happening anywhere.

"China", Mr Vajpayee said, "has just tested another nuclear device" Iran is on the threshold of the bomb while Pakistan is widely believed to have already made the bomb.

"So, where is the de nuclearisation?" Mr Vajpayee said and added: "We can also destroy the bomb. But first we have to make one. We should declare that we are a nuclear weapon state. That declaration itself would suffice."

Mr Advani, while talking to news men, said he for one was amused by the Prime Minister's reported remark that the BJP was resorting to one-upmanship on the nuclear option issue. "I would say that it is the Prime Minister who is

indulging in one-upmanship by saying that his Government has kept the nuclear option open."

The BJP, Mr Advani said, has been a consistent advocate of India going nuclear. An additional argument in support of this view now stemmed from the sort of attitude being adopted by the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its emergence as the only superpower.

Mr Vajpayee, touching upon the PM's remarks while delivering his own valedictory address at the BJP session, said it would not suffice for the Prime Minister to say that the nuclear option has been kept open. "You have to move further," he said.

Indiscipline flayed: Mr Vajpayee highlighted the need for the party to take all sections alone in its onward march. He also called upon partymen to live up to the party's image by making a break with factionalism and indiscipline.

In his customary session-end address, Mr Vajpayee told the National Council members that the contagion of factionalism and indiscipline widely prevalent in the other political parties was threatening the BJP as well. It was for partymen to see this danger.

Mr Vajpayee also spoke of the need for the Party to rise to the aspirations of Dalits. "In fact, the Dalits have started rallying behind the BJP in a big way. It is a good development but we are not even aware of it," he said, and called for Dalit conventions in the various States.

Mr Vajpayee came down heavily on anti-party activities being resorted to by some. The party should not condone this. No leniency should be showed to those who defy party discipline.

He also came down heavily on partymen jostling for position and power.

#### **Troubles With Kaiga Nuclear Plant Building Told**

##### **Commissioning Delayed**

94WP0104A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 21 May 94 p 8

[Text] Bangalore, May 20—The commissioning of the Kaiga nuclear power plant, scheduled for June 1996, will be delayed by a couple of months following the collapse of a "minor portion" of the inner dome of the controversial project.

Officials of the atomic energy commission and the nuclear power corporation, Bombay, told the TOINS [Times of India News Service] here yesterday that work at the reactor buildings had been stopped soon after the 15cm long—30 cm thick—concrete weighing nearly 40 kg fell, injuring 13 people on Saturday.

"A decision on continuing the work would be taken only after the experts' committee of the atomic energy regulatory board submits its interim report by June end," a senior official of the Nuclear Power Corporation said.

The officials appeared surprised by the concrete falling off the inner dome because a lot of testing of construction material is done before it is used. "The entire dome might have to be redone. We are not sure. Only the experts' panel will have to advise. There are also two consultants from a

private engineering firm which specialises in industrial building activity on the panel," said one of them.

Asked what would have been the impact if a similar concrete piece collapsed from the dome once the plant became functional, the Nuclear Power Corporation official said that "some equipment may get damaged. It all depends on where it fell. It would not fall on the reactor because it is far below."

Another official of the atomic energy commission, however, said that the question would not arise at all because all the safety measures would be taken before the plant was commissioned and such an accident was unlikely to take place.

The collapse of the small portion of concrete has already raised the eyebrows of people in Uttara Kannada district. It has again buttressed the viewpoint of environmentalists that the site itself was unsafe for such a project.

It is still not clear whether the ecologically conscious groups would relaunch their campaign on the safety aspects of the entire project. Their campaign had delayed the project in the past.

#### Demand To Halt Work

94WP0104B Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
23 May 94 p 4

[First paragraph *THE STATESMAN* comment]

[Text] Bangalore, May 22—A CANE [Citizens for Alternatives to Nuclear Energy] activist said more than 200 people were working inside the reactor dome when the concrete inner container dome caved in on May 14.

Citizens for Alternatives to Nuclear Energy here yesterday demanded a stop to work at the Kaiga Atomic Power Project since such "shoddily built" plants could pose a grave danger to the environment and people, reports UNI.

CANE coordinator, Mr Sanjay Havanur, told reporters here that the "bizarre" mishap of May 14 at Kaiga, when a portion of the concrete inner container dome crashed down, was a matter of concern. The Nuclear Power Corporation authorities were trying to hush up the matter, he alleged.

Mr Havanur said if the mishap occurred when the reactor was in operation, the consequences would have been devastating since the steel and concrete debris of the dome would damage the core and leave it exposed like a smouldering radioactive volcano. The entire population of Uttara Kannada district and Goa would be in danger and would require immediate evacuation. Neither the Government nor the atomic energy establishment was equipped to handle a disaster of such magnitude.

Quoting labourers, Dr Kusuma Sorab, a CANE activist, who visited the site after the concrete slab caved in, said more than 200 people were working inside the reactor dome at the time of the mishap.

She said the NPC [Nuclear Power Corporation] authorities had not disclosed the true extent of the damage or the number of casualties. "The injured workers have been kept in police custody and not allowed to meet any one," she added.

CANE activists demanded a comprehensive inquiry into the cause of the accident by a team of independent experts.

#### Journal Describes Prithvi as Support Missile

94WP0105 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
16 May 94 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, May 15—India's short range surface-to-surface missile Prithvi, the "User trial" of which by the Army was postponed this month in view of Prime Minister, Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to the United States, is described as a battlefield support missile, reports UNI [United News of India].

According to the Defence Journal, with its short reaction time, supersonic speed, and ruggedness, Prithvi could be more effective than air strikes under many battlefield circumstances. The missile can be taken close to the forward line over any kind of terrain.

The journal says "It has been designed to deliver advanced conventional warheads."

Prithvi's main use will be in destroying troop concentrations, crippling air bases and striking at large static installations and headquarters.

The Defence Review says "It is a reliable and low cost battlefield missile produced in a relatively short time." Unlike its predecessor, the Soviet-made Scuds, which followed a purely ballistic trajectory, Prithvi's flight is throughout controlled by an on-board computer.

According to the DRDO [Defense Research Development Organization], Prithvi is far more accurate than the Scud series or the U.S. Lance over a 250 km range.

The 8.5 metre high and one metre thick missile is due to be inducted into the Army in 1994-95. It can go up to a maximum of 250 km with 500 kg warhead and 150 km with 1,000 kg warhead. Its minimum range is 40 km. The Army has ordered 75 of these missiles with 150 to 250 km range and the Air Force has ordered 25 of the 250 km ones.

Among the warheads developed for Prithvi is the cluster submunition bomblets which are released in air bursts. However, the deployment of Prithvi missiles would require close collaboration between the Army and Air Force strike units which to date is lacking.

India would need to strengthen its reconnaissance capabilities if it wants to take effective use of the missiles for reaching enemy reserve formations. The Indian Defence Review also points out the need for critical peripheral equipment to match Prithvi's stated performance.

These include an accurate survey and orientation of the missile, geodetic target data, meteorological corrections for the boost as well as free ballistic phases.

But overall as a first development, the missile is likely to prove powerful and accurate. An Army or Corps Commander will at least have a weapon of influence commensurate with his operational responsibilities both in attack and defence.

### Rao Says Prithvi Missile Program on Schedule

94WP0098A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
13 May 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, May 12—Denying that there was any U.S. pressure on the country's missile programme, the Prime Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, told the Rajya Sabha today that the Prithvi surface-to-surface missile programme was on schedule.

He said that the trials, scheduled for May 14, had been postponed because if they were conducted in his absence—Mr Rao leaves for the USA on May 14—there could be "embarrassment in case of a particular result".

Echoing this, a Government statement before both Houses of Parliament said that the postponement had been agreed to as "generally, major missile launchings are conducted when the P.M. is in the country".

Incidentally, a report that the Prithvi tests had been postponed following instructions from the PMO had raised a furore early this week.

Today's statement said that the final "phase" of the Prithvi trials, that began in April this year, would conclude on schedule in July. However, the dates for the "sub-phases" of the trials would be suitably adjusted. "There is no question of pressure from anywhere", the statement said, "nor is there any jeopardy to the (missile) programme".

**Lok Sabha:** In the Lok Sabha, where the statement was read out by the Minister of State for Defence, Mr Mallikarjun, the Opposition greeted it with derisive laughter, indicating that it did not believe that the trial was put off for the reason mentioned.

The Prime Minister was present in the House when the statement was read out. When he stood up, the Opposition members apparently expected him to elaborate on the issue. However, that did not happen and Mr Rao left the House.

Mr Jaswant Singh, (BJP), said that the occasion should have been utilized by the Government to clarify its stand on the Agni programme, too.

Mr George Fernandes, (JD), warned against what he called U.S. pressures on India to scuttle its missile programme.

**Rajya Sabha:** Replying to queries from members, Mr Rao said that his visit came in an atmosphere created by "reasons that could have been avoided". There was a need to "undo" that atmosphere, he said.

While he did not elaborate on the missile programmes being undertaken in India and the region, Mr Rao said that missiles had been deployed "all around here". That was why India was developing its own missiles, he said.

However, Mr K. R. Malkani, (BJP), said that by deferring the Prithvi test rather than altering the dates of the P.M.'s visit, an impression had been created that India had yielded to U.S. pressure.

Meanwhile, addressing the general body meeting of the Congress(I) Parliamentary Party today, Mr Rao reiterated his stand on the missile programme.

### Paper Gives Details of Successful ASLV Launch

94WP0097A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English  
5 May 94 pp 1, 13

[Text] Bombay, May 4—India took a significant step towards becoming a global space power with the successful launch of the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) today from Sriharikota, not far from Madras.

A graphic account of the launch from the Sriharikota launch centre stated that the ASLV-D4 lifted off at 5.30 a.m. with the ignition of two strap-on boosters. And 44.1 seconds later the first stage motor ignition was initiated by the on-board "realtime decision (RTD)" system.

The strap-on boosters separated and then the first stage separation and ignition of the second stage followed. Thereafter what is known as the "closed loop guidance system" went into action, according to an Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) spokesman at Sriharikota.

The launch was witnessed by the ISRO chairman, Dr K. Kasturi Rangan, and other top aerospace officials. Needless to say it has proved a tremendous morale-booster after the not-too-successful launch of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in September.

According to the ISRO spokesman, the heatshield was jettisoned after the vehicle had cleared the dense atmosphere at the predetermined altitude of 107 km, 142.9 seconds after the thunderous lift-off.

The payload of the launch vehicle is a SROSS-C2 satellite weighing 113 kg, it carries two payloads, namely the Gamma-Ray Burst experiment developed at the Bangalore-based ISRO satellite centre for detecting celestial gamma-ray bursts and the retarding potential analyser designed by the National Physical Laboratory, to investigate the characteristics of the equatorial and low latitudes ionosphere and thermosphere.

After the burnout of the third stage of the launch vehicle occurred there was a long coasting phase. The "closed-loop guidance system" functioned normally till the third stage separated. The fourth stage along with the satellite was spun up and it ignited. Then there was the separation of the SROSS-C2 satellite from the spent fourth stage of the launch vehicle.

All the events were monitored using the network of telemetry and tracking stations at Sriharikota, Bangalore, Thiruvananthapuram and Car Nicobar. Data relayed at the Car Nicobar tracking station shows that the separation of the SROSS-C2 satellite from the fourth stage was normal.

The success of today's launch would send an important signal to the Clinton administration that India was totally self-sufficient in the field of aerospace technology.

In this context it would be relevant to quote a statement made by the father of India's missile programme and rocket technology, Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, to *India Today*.

Referring to India's missile programme, he made it clear that the sanctions of the missile technology control regime would in no way affect this country. And, again to quote the chairman of the atomic energy commission, Dr R. Chidambaram, who played a key role in designing the



Indian atomic bomb along with Dr Raja Ramanna and Dr P. K. Iyengar, "there is nothing that India cannot do." He made this remark in an interview to *India Today*.

ISRO officials said that the success of the ASLV-D4 flight had helped in evaluating a number of technologies employed in advanced launch vehicles like the PSLV and the Geo-synchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV).

These include the strap-on booster technology, the closed-loop guidance system, the realtime on-board decision system apart from the telemetry, tracking and command systems.

The Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC) at Thiruvananthapuram, the lead centre for the development of launch vehicles at ISRO, was responsible for the design, development, integration and flight-testing of the ASLV.

The nearby Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre was entrusted with the task of the design and development of all control power plants for both the launch vehicle and the satellite.

The ISRO inertial systems unit developed the inertial systems. At Sriharikota itself the processing of the performance-matched strap-on motors, static testing of motors and the launch operations was successfully carried out.

The ISRO telemetry, tracking and command network (ISTRAC) provided the telemetry, tracking and command network and will conduct operations on the SROSS-C2 satellite from its spacecraft mission control centre at Bangalore. This would be achieved in co-ordination with a network of stations at Bangalore, Lucknow, Mauritius, Sriharikota, Thiruvananthapuram and Car Nicobar.

A number of Indian industries, research and academic institutions have contributed towards the success of the ASLV programme.

The payloads on board the satellite would be switched on within the next few days after determining the orbit, and health checks on the satellite were completed.

The successful launch of the five-stage, solid propellant, ASLV-D4 has demonstrated the country's maturity in the development of launch vehicle technology. "The success of the ASLV-D4 launch has proved the 'repeatability' of the performance of all vehicle systems many of which are used in the PSLV and GSLV," an ISRO spokesman said.

Soon after the successful launch Dr Kasturi Rangan addressed a meeting of all aerospace scientists at Sriharikota to congratulate them on their performance.

In an interview to SPACE INDIA, ISRO's official organ, Dr Kasturi Rangan said that the top of his agenda was getting the ASLV off the ground and "getting nothing short of full success of the mission."

The mission control centre is eight km from the launch site and the ASLV was placed in position a fortnight ago. The satellite with its payload was fixed on top of the 23.8-metre tall launch vehicle on April 24.

What is known as the "vehicle integration" at the launch site was carried out from a 44-metre tall mobile service

tower (MST) that encloses the launch vehicle. The MST was withdrawn from the launch vehicle two hours before lift-off.

All the parameters in the launch vehicle during the count-down were monitored through the 10 computer-linked check-out consoles, located half a kilometre away.

## ISRAEL

### U.S. Accused of Silence Over Israel's Nuclear Option

NC2906102194 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Mursi 'Atallah: "When will Nuclear Option Questions Be Applied to Israel?"]

[Text] I think the Arab world can no longer afford the luxury of keeping silent and waiting for the unknown in view of the dreadful danger of the nuclear option that is threatening the security, peace, and stability of the entire area. Israel insists on retaining this nuclear option and refuses to sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which has been signed by the Arab states and all the other states in the area.

It is hard to be reassured of the fairness of peace, which everyone in this area, including Israel, wants, and to ensure its continuation, while Israel alone enjoys the advantage of nuclear weapons and the advantage of international protection, particularly from the United States, for this serious violation. Israel's violations have not disturbed the international community, whereas military concentrations, diplomatic pressure, and threats of comprehensive economic sanctions have been made against North Korea just because it has refused to allow a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear installations.

President Mubarak's realization of this danger prompted him to launch his famous initiative in 1990 to free the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction. President Mubarak's view remains that peace is not just a signature on a piece of paper. Agreements remain ink on paper unless they embody a true desire for peace.

To put it more clearly, President Mubarak's call to free the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction was a principal part of Egypt's concept of the basis of real peace, which requires a genuine intention to abandon concepts of hegemony and create a healthy atmosphere for building confidence without fear of the unknown.

The Iraqi regime's foolishness in invading Kuwait in August 1990 and the regime's earlier threats to use chemical weapons to burn half of Israel have greatly helped to gain sympathy for Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But the situation has drastically changed. We can tell the United States that now, after Iraq's nuclear installations and its chemical and biological weapons have been destroyed and brought under strict and constant international inspection, it is unacceptable for Israel to remain the exception, not only in the area, but also throughout the world.

Unless the Arab nation wakes up from its deep sleep and truly and genuinely rallies around President Mubarak's



call to free the Middle East of nuclear weapons, many question marks will remain hanging over the future of the area, the future of peace, and the future of an Arab existence.

The time has come to end such tragicomedies as the Yemeni war, which is exhausting the effort and capacity for joint Arab action, and to unite every effort for the more important goal of establishing genuine peace in the area under the canopy of legitimate guarantees, the most important of which is freeing the area of all weapons of mass destruction.

I am not one of those who advocate incitement against the United States and its biased policy toward Israel concerning the nuclear option, because such methods are no longer useful or suitable in today's world. But I call for a unified Arab stance with political influence to make the United States feel that defending its vital and strategic interests in the area does not require the Israeli nuclear option, but the freeing of the area from all weapons of mass destruction. It is impossible to ensure Israel's sole and continuing possession of such weapons indefinitely.

No one is qualified to undertake the task of pressuring, convincing, and influencing Israel in this regard except the United States. There is no more suitable time to utilize the desired U.S. role regarding this dreadful danger than now, when Washington is assuming a central role in the peace process and is trying to establish its credibility in the area on the basis of being less biased toward Israel and being closer to the principles of international legitimacy.

I think that missing the current chance to link the peace process with the need for Israel to abandon the nuclear option not only represents a real threat to the future of the peace process, but also a dreadful threat to the possibility of maintaining the minimum of joint Arab action on regional and international challenges.

I say, regrettably, that unless the Arabs act quickly to establish a unified Arab position based on President Mubarak's initiative, the talk about Arabism, Arab solidarity, and national security becomes a waste of time and a joke.

We must be guided in our action on this issue in the international arena by two parties' inability to coexist peacefully while one of them possesses the nuclear option. This is not just a faulty equation; it is an impossible one.

Let our question be: Why Iraq and then North Korea? Why not Israel, which possesses much more than the nuclear capabilities of Baghdad and Pyongyang?

Let our chance be the world conference next year on the 25th anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the invitation to sign it again.

## LIBYA

### U.S. Accusations on Nuclear Activities Rejected

LD0706143194 Tripoli Great Jamahiriya Radio Network in Arabic 1230 GMT 7 Jun 94

[Text] The secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation has issued a statement which states:

The U.S. assistant secretary of state has been quoted expressing his country's concern over the nuclear activities of a number of states, among which he mentioned the Great Jamahiriya.

The Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation would like to remind the American official of the remarks made by the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency while visiting the Great Jamahiriya at the head of a team of the agency's experts in January 1993 confirming what we have repeatedly announced and affirmed about Libya's noninterest in possessing weapons of mass destruction. This prompted it to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and to participate in all conferences seeking to ban the use or the threat to use weapons of mass destruction.

What has been said by the assistant secretary of state irrefutably confirms that nobody is able to believe the claims of the United States and this therefore erodes its credibility before the peoples of the world. Instead of warning the Great Jamahiriya, this official should have referred to his country's measures against the Zionist entity which refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Moreover, western sources friendly to that entity confirm its possession of nuclear warheads. Instead of warning it, the United States is supplying it with means to enable it to intimidate the states of the region by the threat of using those weapons against them.

The tone of warning and intimidation is no longer useful against the Great Jamahiriya. American officials spare no opportunity to include its name whenever they circulate false and unfounded accusations.

## PAKISTAN

### President Views Political Scene, Nuclear Program, Missiles

BK2306044894 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari has called upon the government and the opposition to negotiate their political differences and sort out the important critical issues facing the nation. In an interview last night, he said what is needed now is for both sides to sit together and evolve a joint strategy to reach a consensus on such major issues as Kashmir, the nuclear program, and economic stability.

Refuting the opposition's allegation that he is biased, the president said he resigned from the Pakistan People's Party following his election as president because of an evident polarization in the country's political environment. Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari said the country's political structure is such that nobody can bargain on important issues of national interest. Matters relating to the country's security and economic affairs are fully under the government's control.

On the nuclear program, the president said that Pakistan's nuclear program is peaceful. He added that Pakistan has made several proposals to India, including the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia. The president

asked the United States and the United Nations to take note of India's expanding missile program, which could start a regional missile race.

Answering a question, the president said the armed forces played their role in conducting free and fair elections and they are in favor of democracy in the country.

On the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution [giving discretionary powers to the president to dismiss the government and dissolve the National Assembly], the president said he has expressed his desire to abrogate it many times.

#### **'Propaganda' Against Nation's Nuclear Program Condemned**

BK2106023694 Karachi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
17 Jun 94 p 4

[Editorial: "The Purchase of Nuclear Materials—the Old Drama"]

[Text] According to BBC, the German Government has ordered two Pakistani diplomats to leave the country. It has been alleged that in collusion with German traders, the two have been supplying nuclear bomb manufacturing technology and long-range missile parts to Pakistan. The chief of a German firm has also been arrested. Although the report has not been officially confirmed by either Pakistan or Germany, it is unfortunate in that Pakistan has once again been targeted. This time the drama has not enacted by the United States itself. Rather, the anti-Pakistan propaganda was repeated through the German Government.

The same old ploy has been employed again. But this time it is intended to realize two aims with a single blow. First, to set off a fresh propaganda campaign to cap Pakistan's nuclear program. The second, to impair Pakistan's relations with Germany, its traditional trading partner. Noteworthy is that the material "used in nuclear program" seized in the United States earlier is not only being exported to many countries without any restriction, but that a country like India, which has carried out a nuclear test, buys it in the free market without any obstruction. No objection is being raised on India's purchase of heavy water either. Obviously, this reflects the malice against us. All unethical trade restrictions are being used against us in an attempt to see our nuclear program capped.

There are sensitive equipment that can be used for various industrial purposes. But the governmental and nongovernmental lobbies of the West cannot tolerate the export of such equipment to Pakistan using the pretext of Pakistan's nuclear program. It needs to be pointed out here that Pakistan's neighbor, India, has embarked on an elaborate missile program in which at least four types of military-oriented missiles are being produced. It is an obvious example of discrimination when India, which even has a record of carrying out brazen aggression in the region, is allowed to import anything unrestricted. In the case of Pakistan, restrictions are imposed even on the purchase of better quality electrical switches on the plea that it can be used in a nuclear program. It may be recalled that the items seized by the United States a few years ago also included modern electrical switches used for various purposes.

This reveals that the United States and its allies are not interested in purely restricting nuclear weapons, but in ensuring that Islamic countries are deprived of any nuclear capability. Aside from the punishment against Iraq for its aggression, the inspection of its nuclear program by UN inspectors makes it clear that the Islamic countries are being targeted.

So far as the expulsion of our diplomatic personnel is concerned, it is a violation of universally accepted diplomatic norms. Expelling a diplomat only on the grounds that he was purchasing something for his country is tantamount to ridiculing the provisions of the norms dealing with a diplomat's involvement in activities prejudicial to the host country's security. Why should only Pakistani diplomats be picked and expelled for just purchasing any item? If a foreign firm violates the arms control and foreign trade laws, then why should that incident be used as propaganda to malign another country? One of the two German firms referred to in the report is alleged to have supplied items to Pakistan in 1992. We do not know which international principle is being honored by digging up an old grave? Obviously, it is aimed at exerting pressure on Pakistan. It is hoped that the Government of Pakistan will protest against any attempt by any country, especially Western, to carry out propaganda using the excuse of a trade control list. This is a very old drama of the West and it needs to be resolutely resisted. The report has set off a new campaign aimed at either a roll-back or a cap on our nuclear program. It is also hoped that the German Government too will not be influenced by any propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear program. Germany has always had friendly relations with Pakistan and instead of joining the West's discriminatory policy, it should decide issues only on a merit basis.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Moldovan Police Intercept Radioactive Cargo From Russia

LD2206184094 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1522 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] The Moldovan police held a cargo with a radioactive substance from Russia Tuesday [22 June]. Officials in the Interior Ministry's organized crime department told Interfax that one Russian and two Moldovan citizens had been apprehended as they tried to smuggle a radioactive substance into Moldova and sell it for \$20,000.

The officials said that gamma-cobalt-60 had been obtained and put into a container in Russia and that the weight of the cargo and its destination were being determined.

This is the first time the Moldovan police have found material of this high quality and packed so thoroughly. A small radioactive leak was detected that could be hazardous.

Experts from the Moldovan Academy of Sciences are trying to determine to what use the cobalt was to be put.

The officials also said that a Romanian citizen is suspected of being the customer who had ordered the cargo but there was insufficient evidence for his arrest.

## RUSSIA

### Kozyrev Fears DPRK May Have A-Bomb in 'Near Future'

LD2106125694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1244 GMT 21 Jun 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[Text] Moscow June 21 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev fears North Korea may soon get its own A-bomb and said the issue is of "a principle importance for Russia and the United States".

"Evidently, North Korea has no nuclear bomb at present, but it can be created in the near future. The production of a nuclear bomb is no problem for a centralized economy which has a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor", he told Russian mass media chiefs on Tuesday.

"If we close our eyes on the North Korean attempts to get nuclear weapons, this would serve as an example for other states with a nuclear potential", Kozyrev said and mentioned South Korea and Japan, in particular.

"It is known that the West resorts to hidden sanctions against such countries as it happened with Ukraine during the signing of a cooperation agreement with the European Union", he said.

The Russian foreign minister made it understood that the recent tensions in Russian-U.S. diplomatic relations which

emerged after Washington, contrary to bilateral agreements, distributed its unilateral UN Security Council draft resolution on sanctions against Pyongyang, have been eliminated.

He said Russia and the United States have begun to draft a completely new joint document which will be ready by Wednesday or Thursday.

Kozyrev also said that his U.S. counterpart had forwarded a detailed outline of the report of former US President James Carter who had met the North Korean president.

### Joint Russia-U.S. Appeal to DPRK: Sanctions in 30 Days

LD2206152694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1347 GMT 22 Jun 94

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov and Aleksandr Mineyev]

[Text] Brussels, 22 Jun—Russia and the United States have today practically agreed the text of a draft UN Security Council resolution in connection with the nuclear problem of the DPRK. This was announced by Andrey Kozyrev and Warren Christopher, the heads of the foreign policy departments of the two countries at a news conference in the Russian Embassy in Brussels after the talks, which were held here.

This joint initiative was discussed on the instructions of the presidents of Russia and the United States, Kozyrev said. As a result: There has occurred a drawing-together and coincidence of approaches on all the fundamental questions, and only the drafting work remains for the representatives of the two countries in New York.

The main aim of this initiative, in the words of the Russian minister, is to get the DPRK to observe the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution will clearly indicate that sanctions against Pyongyang are inevitable in about 30 days if the DPRK does not take positive steps. To help it take such steps and open the doors to positive movement, Kozyrev said, it is proposed to use the opportunity of the conference and already in the very near future, send the relevant invitations. In this way, these 30 days should be used, including by means of convening the conference, in order to avoid sanctions which, of course, are an extreme means.

### First Underground Nuclear Power Station Planned

LD2106008194 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian  
0900 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Russia's first underground atomic installation is to be assembled in Apatity [Kola peninsula]. Power engineers from the Moscow research institute for power engineering, the Russian research and design institute for power engineering technologies, and the mining institute of the Kola research centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences are working on the project. The installation will consist of four units and will be used to provide 60 percent of the city's heating requirements.

### **Yeltsin: Russia Will Uphold Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime**

*LD0206164894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1540 GMT 2 Jun 94*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Nikolay Geronin and Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Jun—Russia will firmly uphold the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced today at a state reception in the Faceted Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in honor of South Korean President Kim Yong-sam. One of the primary goals of this is to guarantee a nonnuclear status for the Korean peninsula, the Russian head of state stressed.

Yeltsin recalled that Russia has proposed an international conference on this issue, which could find a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue and in particular bring about specific agreements making it possible to reduce and subsequently remove the dangerous confrontation on the Korean peninsula. The main aim is to begin a movement toward trust and cooperation.

Moscow is ready to play and will play an active part in creating international mechanisms aimed at strengthening a climate of trust, security, and cooperation in relations between the states of the Asia-Pacific region, the Russian president said.

Yeltsin expressed confidence that close interaction between Russia and the Republic of Korea would help to strengthen stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In his words, relations with Seoul are one of Moscow's top priorities in the Asia-Pacific sphere.

Russia, the Russian president pointed out, has historically been deeply involved in the affairs of the Korean peninsula. In July it will be 110 years since the establishment of relations between Russia and Korea. Ties are developing well at the present time too. But there is a need to move on and give the "green light" to all cooperation projects in all spheres of life. This applies first and foremost to the economic sphere, the more so since opportunities and reserves do exist for this.

Russia wants the speediest possible reunification of Korea by peaceful democratic means, Yeltsin said. One of the most dangerous threats in Asia and throughout the world will thereby be eliminated. We want to see Korea as a unified, peace-loving, democratic, nuclear-free, and prosperous state and a reliable partner of Russia, the president pointed out. I believe that the way to achieve this will be found by the Koreans themselves. Russia is ready to facilitate the accomplishment of the Korean people's cherished goal of unification as soon as possible.

### **Joint Stock Society to Process Enriched Uranium**

*LD0706145094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1331 GMT 7 Jun 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Marina Barinova]

[Text] Moscow June 7 TASS—Russian Minister for Nuclear Power Engineering Viktor Mikhaylov has voiced the creation of a close joint stock society Matech to process

highly-enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into low-enriched to be sold to the United States as a fuel.

The society is the first joint venture in highly-enriched uranium technologies, sources at the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering's press and public relations department told ITAR-TASS today. It has been set up by the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Urals electro-chemical plant, the Siberian chemical plant and the U.S. Allied Fuel Energy Service Company.

In the opinion of the ministry, Matech will help nuclear arms reduction and creation of a special fund for conversion of the defence industries, increased safety of nuclear power plants and environmental protection in Russia.

### **Moscow Plans 10-Fold Cut in Nuclear Arsenal by Year 2003**

*LD0606115494 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 6 Jun 94*

[Text] Russia plans a 10-fold reduction of its nuclear arsenals by the year 2003. This has been announced by Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov. According to him, Russia will retain 3,500 highly efficient nuclear warheads capable of defending it from any form of aggression. As to nuclear weapons cuts, Moscow spends up to 1,000 billion rubles a year for these purposes. An agreement with the United States on processing weapon-grade uranium into fuel for nuclear power stations only partially compensates for the losses incurred by Russia due to the destruction of the nuclear weapons of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

### **Illicit Traders in Weapons-Grade Uranium Detained**

*PM0906103194 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 1*

[Andrey Ishchenko report: "President Informed That Butcher and Plumber Are Trading Uranium"]

[Text] Usually the reports of the arrest of Russian citizens attempting to earn foreign currency from trading in radioactive materials arrive from abroad—from Germany, Hungary, or Poland. But it turns out that our own special services do not always allow wrongdoers to cross the state border freely. As transpired just the other day, back in March. Showing exceptional vigilance, staffers from the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] St. Petersburg Directorate's Antiterrorist Service arrested a group of people intending to sell more than three kilograms of highly enriched uranium dioxide (Yevgeniy Lukin, chief of the St. Petersburg FCS Public Relations Directorate, reported that the mole fraction of the uranium-235 in the mixture of isotopes was 90 percent). The FCS believes that this time too the stolen uranium-235 was destined for foreign buyers.

In February St. Petersburg's counterintelligence officers received their first information on the planned deal. In order to locate all uranium storage sites and not miss a single gram of this strategic raw material, the FCS operatives "played along" with the dealers and rounded up all those involved in March. They confiscated 3.05 kg of uranium powder, which had been stored in a half-liter glass



jar and metal flask—the dealers were clearly not too worried about their own health.

But that is not the most important point. The fact is that until recently most of the "unorganized" traders in radioactive material (one of the people arrested turned out to be a butcher, another was a plumber) had been trying to sell as strategic raw materials radioactive waste, or even real uranium, but minimally enriched—turning it into dangerous bomb material would require huge amounts of money and a highly complex production process. But this time, if the St. Petersburg FCS directorate's information is to be fully believed, we are dealing with real weapons-grade raw material. It was stolen "from an enterprise near Moscow" (presumably the cities of Bolshevo, Elektrostal, or Noginsk—Ed.). This was where the butcher, the plumber, and co. removed three whole kilograms of highly enriched uranium (in gloves, they claim) without being stopped.

All the arrested men are now in St. Petersburg, where they are being interrogated. A case under Article 223 Note 3 (theft of radioactive materials) is being brought in the place where the crime was committed—the Moscow area. The president has been notified of the incident in a special report.

#### Instead of Commentary

We would recall that last fall our newspaper published the results of an investigation which resulted in our journalists, posing as buyers of fissionable materials, acquiring weapons-grade (highly enriched) plutonium and uranium from illegal traders. We had also come across an SS-20 warhead in private hands. People tried to refute the results of our investigation until the NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA Editorial Office received a document from Ministry of Security experts fully confirming that our correspondents had indeed obtained weapons-grade plutonium.

When the RTV program "Eks" broadcast some of the results of our work, V. Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy, issued an angry letter through ITAR-TASS categorically denying that it was possible to steal uranium and plutonium from the enterprises under his jurisdiction.

But now there is today's case.... We are not gloating, it is simply that in our reports of last year we cited Elektrostal as a city where uranium was being filched from a plant in milk cans.

The NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA investigative service and science department will henceforth be conducting joint investigations into the ways in which strategic materials and nuclear weapons are being lost. We would recall that there are two days to go until subscription closes.

#### More on Failed Effort To Sell Stolen Uranium

PM1706142394 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jun 94 p 1

[Report by Andrey Ishchenko: "Uranium Transported in a Passenger Railcar and Stored in a Cool Place—Details About the Exposed Affair of the Misappropriation of Uranium-235"]

[Text] St. Petersburg-Moscow—It was at the Federal Counterintelligence Service St. Petersburg Directorate that the details of the abortive sale of three kg of highly enriched Uranium-235 stolen from a plant near Moscow (see NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA for 9 June) were conveyed to our correspondent.

It is probably a good thing that Lenya Golubkov had the idea of making money on shares from the MMM Joint Stock Company. Otherwise, this extraordinarily henpecked proletarian, in his search for money to buy boots for his wife and other joys of family life, might also have been drawn into a venture somewhat more hazardous to those around him than trading in wallpaper. The newspapers nowadays are simply bursting with articles explaining, in the greatest of detail and from the lips of prosperous people, how best to deceive the state (to obtain fake licenses, to evade customs duties, or to avoid tax inspections), and how to pocket a fair sum of money from doing so.

So it is, for instance, that one particular butcher, living until recently in the city of Pushkin in Leningrad Oblast, after closely studying the headlines in the central press, decided that there was no better way to improve his lot than through uranium. It has to be said that, to an experienced businessman, the transaction would not have appeared particularly complex—to judge from the newspapers, it is possible to sell uranium on virtually any street, while actually getting hold of it is even simpler. Not for nothing has that distant relative been working for so many years at that Ministry of Atomic Energy closed enterprise near Moscow (in the interests of the investigation, we were asked to name neither the city nor the surnames), and he is all but treading this actual uranium underfoot....

The month was February. The Moscow region was covered with snow. Security, it seemed, had also gone into hibernation for the winter (given, of course, that we proceed on the assumption that in summertime the vigilance of the courageous armed guards actually increases). It was on one such frosty evening that the Moscow relative, without any spying aids (such as a suitcase with a false bottom, a secret pocket in his clothing, or, if the worst should come to the worst, simply a pocket) calmly marched through the entrance to his beloved enterprise, calmly giving a little wave with a bulging mitten (it was there that, a few minutes earlier, he had poured a little of the uranium-235, 90-percent enriched). Of course, no chase ensued: The plant managers only learned of the loss several months later, at the same time as the world public. However, there is nothing to be surprised about here—it is most probable that the manager placed too much trust in the words of Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov, who declared at roughly the very same moment that all fissionable materials at Atomic Energy Ministry enterprises were monitored in the strictest possible manner and that, personally, he did not know of a single documented incidence of "radioactive larceny."

At home, using scales normally employed for weighing potatoes, our hero weighed up his spoils—the arrow on the scales stopped at three kg (the primitive instrument ignored the 50-gram makeweight). Then the precious brown powder was concealed in an ordinary closet prior to the arrival of the "businessmen" from the northern capital. You have to agree that the technique for handling radioactive materials

typical of some workers at Atomic Energy Ministry enterprises arouses at the very least respect for the heroic profession of the "nuclear scientists"—for people such as these, even 10 Chernobyls are nothing to fear!

The butcher and his St. Petersburg friends—a plumber and a man temporarily out of work—did not delay but came for the goods on the very next train. They proved themselves somewhat more skilled: They asked their host for packaging to ensure safe transportation. However, not all the powder would fit into the small metal tube proffered (which, if we are honest, is also a doubtful defense against irradiation), and the remaining grams were put into an ordinary half-liter can. The commodity was transported in a regular passenger car on a Moscow—Petersburg train, and the totally unsuspecting passengers would have been highly surprised, had somebody happened to have a dosimeter to hand.

When, on arrival in Pushkin, the "merchants" put the uranium in a refrigerator (so as not to let it spoil?) and set off around the city markets in search of purchasers, their every move was already being monitored by the St. Petersburg secret service (it was impossible to ascertain at what stage precisely which respectable citizen "grassed" to the Federal Counterintelligence Service). The counterintelligence agents did not intent to pounce on them immediately—it was essential to establish how many people were mixed up in the uranium deals. However, the quest for purchasers dragged on without success—in many ways because, out of ignorance, the butcher and the plumber were asking exorbitant prices, some five or six times over the real value per gram of strategic raw material. The counterintelligence agents could no longer allow these guys to continue freely roaming the streets of St. Petersburg with samples of uranium—this was dangerous, and the time had finally come to think about the health of the people living next door to the ill-fated Pushkin apartment with the uranium lying on a shelf in the refrigerator. Following the operation to intercept the men carried out by officers from the "Grad" operative-combat group, the apartment had to be decontaminated.

Despite the fact that the counterintelligence agents have not succeeded in identifying the channels through which radioactive materials are flowing out from Russia to the West, this operation can be considered a success—after all, the entire quantity of uranium, down to the last gram, was returned to the state. Admittedly, nobody will undertake to guarantee that it will not "disappear" without trace at another Atomic Energy Ministry plant—except, perhaps, a few top officials from the Ministry for Atomic Energy itself, who according to our information are preparing another denial for disingenuous critics. We will report on this at another time.

### General Examines Nuclear Safety Concerns

94WP0103A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 22, 1 Jun 94 p 10

[Interview with Maj Gen Vitaliy Nikolayevich Yakovlev, deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense, by Kirill Belyaninov; place and date of interview not given: "Can the Nuclear Charge Be Lost: Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev From the Ministry of Defense Categorically Asserts That It Can't"]

[Text] It is said that some time ago, when the cult of personality had not yet been debunked, and people planted corn exclusively by their own wish, and not in response to a special order from the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet military-industrial complex provided a certain number of Soviet schoolchildren with a not entirely ordinary visual aid. In the city of Semipalatinsk, where a smoky-brown mushroom created by a nuclear explosion rose above the horizon, young teachers led children into the schoolyard, and said as they pointed their finger in the direction of the test range: "That, children, is where the nuclear shield of our motherland is being forged!"

With time, of course, all that was left of the former "visual aid" was radiophobia, while the formerly vast nuclear shield was torn into such a quantity of chunks and pieces that it is now absolutely impossible to determine what part of it really remains. The Semipalatinsk test range is the property of Kazakhstan, while several of the design offices are the property of Ukraine, not to mention the radar stations and nuclear strike early warning resources, which remain on the territory of small but proud and independent Baltic states. And if we add to this the numerous treaties on disarmament, cessation and nonproliferation, the cases of misappropriation of nuclear materials, and the absence of money for scientific developments and to support any sort of subsistence minimum for our nuclear scientists, the question that arises is quite simple, but extremely unpleasant: Is Russia left with anything of the nuclear shield, of what it was that made it a great power?

It is unpleasant all the more so because skeptical voices are already being heard both from across the ocean and from the "vast expanses" of the near abroad. "If sufficient concern is not displayed toward the arsenal of a superpower of such dimensions during political and economic reforms, the result may be historically unprecedented leakage of nuclear technology, and a catastrophe as yet unwitnessed in the world," declared U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter a month ago.

Yakovlev: You can't really say that the situation at enterprises of our nuclear complex is very bright. And of course, the fact that radioactive materials are being stolen is a bad symptom. But we mustn't forget that the number of such cases is relatively small, and that the uranium that has disappeared was enriched to 2-4, and rarely 30 percent. It has no relationship to nuclear weapon components. And besides its use in nuclear fuel assemblies, this kind of uranium isn't much good for anything but fishing: It might be good bait for frogfish in terms of its relative weight.

When in 1992, and in subsequent years as well, reports appeared that Kazakhstan had sold some sort of warheads to Iran, that the Chechen Republic had possession of two nuclear devices, and that a nuclear weapon cropped up in Azerbaijan, all we could do was laugh. There is, after all, an extremely strict system of controlling the presence and state of nuclear ammunition. All parts of such ammunition, even those not associated with fissionable materials—automatic units such as sensors for example—bear a plant number. There is a data bank that can be used to easily determine where a device is located, when it was made, and what work has been done with it. It can even tell us how many milligrams of precious metals a particular part contains. If any sort of work is done, written confirmation of what was inspected, what parts were replaced, and so on is transmitted immediately to the ministry's central administration.

Moreover there are also a number of organizational measures: Whenever a storage site is opened, entry of less than three workers is categorically prohibited, and when charges are shipped, not only is security intensified but also an escort system is established and so-called specialized back-up systems are put into place. I can therefore state quite certainly that it is impossible to lose not only a nuclear charge but even its vehicle or any other nonnuclear part of it.

**Belyaninov:** Vitaliy Nikolayevich, Western specialists are especially alarmed at the situation involving our tactical weapons: nuclear artillery devices, ammunition for aviation, and short-range missiles. In contrast to strategic missiles, use of which requires creation of an entire infrastructure, tactical weapons may be used by practically any state of the world without any special trouble. Moreover, as they assert in the United States, the exact quantity of our tactical devices is still unknown to them. Officials in Washington state a figure of 19,000, while independent experts such as, for example, Bruce Blaire from the Brookings Institution cites a figure of 43,000.

**Yakovlev:** It's true that we never cited a figure. Having signed an agreement with the United States to eliminate tactical nuclear ammunition for rocket forces and for ground forces artillery prior to the year 2000, we regularly hold joint consultative meetings. But no figures are thrown around in these meetings. We report that as of the given day 17 percent of such-and-such forces and resources were eliminated. And that's all. Although I can say—these data haven't been made public anywhere yet—that of the total quantity of weapons withdrawn from Ukraine, we have already eliminated 1,500 units, or over half.

And if we consider the potential danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.... Back during the time of perestroika—and as we know, perestroika meant instability—we gave some thought to this problem, and we began withdrawing weapons from Warsaw Pact states and from USSR republics. We began with the Baltic and Transcaucasian countries, such that by the end of 1991 we still had nuclear ammunition only in Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia. After the four-way treaty on elimination was signed in December 1991, in which Kazakhstan participated in addition to the republics named above, we began withdrawing weapons from the territories of these states as well.

In this case complexities arose, and are arising now, only in regard to Ukraine. The Republic's Supreme Rada began doubting that we were really destroying the withdrawn weapons, rather than placing them into combat duty in Russia, and they stopped releasing our trains across the border. But we were able to find a solution. Beginning at approximately July 1992 we began eliminating these weapons under the observation of Ukrainian specialists. The agreement is still in force, and it also foresees the presence of specialists from Belorussia and Kazakhstan. But to be honest, this isn't cheap. Money has to be paid for the presence of specialists in Russia, for housing and the like, not counting health services. Apparently understanding this, neither Belorussia nor Kazakhstan sent their own observers.

As for Russia itself, all we are doing as far as tactical weapons are concerned is dismantling them. Our enterprises have not produced a single device since the time the agreement was signed with the republics.

**Belyaninov:** How much time does it take to dismantle a single unit of ammunition?

**Yakovlev:** Not much. The Americans, for example, have two main device dismantling "points." The main one of these—Panteks [transliteration]—eliminates around 2,000 a year. Our rate is not any lower.

But as with any other country, we are dismantling more than just tactical weapons. Our ammunition has a shelf life, and a guarantee period. Upon expiration of this period it is not only unsuitable but also unsafe to store it: The charge becomes more sensitive to mechanical effects, and the radiation background may rise. This is why strategic weapons are also sent to the dismantling enterprises.

**Belyaninov:** Last year was marked by an entire series of conflicts between the Ukrainian and Russian defense ministries. Part of the strategic nuclear forces were transferred to Ukrainian jurisdiction, Russian specialists developing ammunition were deprived of access to weapons, and it became impossible to carry out routine repairs and maintenance. As a result several accidents occurred at bases in Ukraine.

**Yakovlev:** It may sound somewhat cynical, but two factors saved the day: a visit to Kiev by the American President and Ukraine's economic difficulties. The Americans raised the issue of granting economic assistance to Ukraine that would be directly dependent on the timetable for withdrawal of missiles, while the crisis in atomic energy and the shortage of fuel for nuclear power plants, which was being produced only in Russia, compelled Ukraine to sign a trilateral treaty with fewer stipulations than before. This made our situation much easier. In accordance with the agreement Russia supplied fuel assemblies for reactors to the Republic, while our department was given permission to withdraw all remaining weapons and do all of the needed work at the bases. Such that we can now take responsibility for the safety of the weapons. But I'm not about to make any long-range forecasts: The situation changes so frequently that it is simply impossible to talk about any kind of stability.

**Belyaninov:** Vitaliy Nikolayevich, the opinions of experts regarding American assistance differ. Some assert that we don't need this assistance at all, that while the Americans talk about hundreds of millions of dollars, they are barely appropriating hundreds of thousands, and that ultimately this is assisting not Russia but the American economy.

**Yakovlev:** This is true to a certain extent. Little of the \$400 million appropriated by the U.S. Congress this year has in fact been spent, but the American side shouldn't be the only one that is blamed. After all, each item in the agreements must pass through a very long and complex system of consideration and approval both there—in Congress—and here—in the Duma.

On the other hand any assistance of this sort consists not of cash transfers in the millions to the Central Bank, but of materials and equipment valued at this amount. The United States does place orders with American companies.



But agreements to provide such assistance are in effect, and some of them have already been realized. As an example we have received so-called "Kevlar linings" to be used in transportation of the devices. They are unique in their properties: They offer good protection against environmental effects, and several layers of Kevlar can easily stop a bullet from an automatic weapon. We did not have such a material before.

We also received special equipment for emergency teams, and an agreement to produce special railcars to transport nuclear ammunition is being implemented. These cars are being developed in the United States, and they offer several levels of protection. The Americans supply parts for these cars, but they will be assembled in Russia. There are several agreements between the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Energy regarding construction of a new storage facility for plutonium extracted from warheads, regarding delivery of supercontainers to transport highly radioactive materials, and so on.

It is evident at least from this list that the total volume of American assistance already exceeds tens of millions of dollars.

**Belyaninov:** Vitaliy Nikolayevich, many in the United States associate the volume of assistance being granted with access of American specialists to Russian technology for dismantling and destroying weapons. And during one of the sessions of the U.S. Congress Defense Subcommittee its chairman, John Murtha, declared that unless all Russian enterprises of the nuclear complex are opened to the Americans, including military ones, there will be "no money at all."

**Yakovlev:** An agreement to deliver processed uranium extracted from warheads to the United States was signed by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Energy. And naturally the American side wants to make sure that the materials we are transferring are in fact coming from weapons. The actual issue is at what stage American specialists could be allowed in. We insist on the beginning of the processing cycle—that is, when the warhead has already been dismantled and the material has been extracted and delivered to the corresponding enterprise. In the meantime the Americans want to supervise the process from the very beginning, from the moment the warheads are dismantled. This is a more sensitive topic, this means access to weapon design, and access to our military secrets.

When it comes to my own point of view, the problem is easily solved: Weapon-grade uranium differs dramatically in its characteristics from that used in the fuel assemblies of nuclear power plants and nuclear submarine reactors. They're simply impossible to confuse: The characteristics of a material with this degree of enrichment are known to any specialist both in our country and in the USA.

**Belyaninov:** There is one other problem that troubles many today: What is happening with the Russian nuclear program? The test ranges are closed, tests are not being conducted, and scientists are living on starvation rations.

**Yakovlev:** Testing is in fact a difficult issue. A tombstone placed over the Semipalatinsk test range long ago, and it will never again be used to test nuclear weapons. Nor is

there any sense in talking about Novaya Zemlya, as long as we aren't conducting tests there, and are supporting a policy of their prohibition. But when we—I'm referring to the military department—discussed the need for tests, what we had in mind primarily was not improving nuclear weapons but improving their safety. Only by conducting experiments, by conducting tests, can we be certain of the safety of a device that is in storage. But it would be useless to argue this now. World public opinion is so negatively oriented, and specialists of all countries possessing nuclear weapons are experiencing such problems. This is one of those issues that will not be resolved as long as no country violates the moratorium and conducts tests first.

As for the nuclear program, it existed before, and it exists today, although many scientific directions have either been curtailed or significantly reduced. We have weapon systems, the design systems have been developed, several systems of nuclear devices exist, and they have been tested and proven to be reliable. Such that we aren't under the threat of falling behind in this area as yet.

There are of course difficulties with specialists. Some of them will switch to jobs in the International Center for Science and Technology currently being established in Moscow. It is being built with American assistance. Testers from the Semipalatinsk test range will most probably work in one of our scientific institutes. And as for creating new forms and systems of weapons, that's something not worth thinking about today, it's too expensive a pleasure. Such that we are concerned more today with problems of disarmament.

#### Physicist Interviewed on Theft of Plutonium

AU1706140594 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German  
16 Jun 93 p 17

[Interview with Russian physicist Anatoliy Dyakov, head of the Moscow Center for Arms Controls, Energy, and Environment, by Andrzej Rybak; place and date not given: "Nonsense!"]

[Text]

**Rybak:** Six grams of plutonium 239, used in nuclear weapons, have been seized in Germany. Might it have come from a Russian military arsenal?

**Dyakov:** That cannot be ruled out. But controls over radioactive components in Russian military nuclear facilities are still quite stringent. The quantities of plutonium that have appeared on the black market and can be used in weapons are very small. No one can make a bomb out of that.

**Rybak:** Can plutonium for use in weapons be obtained during the process of dismantling warheads?

**Dyakov:** Russia destroyed some 2,000 warheads last year. This took place under strict supervision.

**Rybak:** In that case, where are the loopholes? The theft and smuggling of radioactive substances is reaching frightening proportions!

**Dyakov:** The situation is fully under control in all the facilities under the authority of the Nuclear Ministry. But because the wages of most employees are not enough to



subsist on, many of them try to earn extra money. Unfortunately, one way of doing that is by stealing and selling radioactive substances.

**Rybak:** Can one not control the handling of these substances more stringently?

**Dyakov:** That is very difficult. No one knows exactly how much plutonium and uranium are produced in civilian reactors. That does not apply only to Russia. In the entire world there are no exact figures, just estimates.

**Rybak:** Weapons-grade plutonium is still being produced in Russia. When will the military reactors be shut down?

**Dyakov:** Weapons-grade plutonium is produced in three reactors in Russia. The press claims that they will be closed down this year. That is nonsense. These reactors also produce electricity and provide heating for the neighboring cities of Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk. Only when there is an alternative can they be shut down. That is out of the question before the year 2000. But we are prepared to place under intentional control every gram of plutonium we produce. The relevant document has already been drafted.

**Rybak:** Could the west offer more effective help?

**Dyakov:** The Americans have already promised us lots of money just to dismantle the warheads. Now they want to provide us with gas-fueled power stations in exchange for the shutdown of the nuclear ones. I am skeptical about that, because so far we have only received a smidgen of this loudly-proclaimed assistance.

#### **Unaccounted-for Mercury Discovered in Bryansk**

LD1406131194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1143 GMT 14 Jun 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Artyushin]

[Text] Bryansk June 14 TASS—A rubber container with over three kilograms of mercury was discovered near the Bryansk Vocational Training School No.39. Due to the efforts of the staff for civil defence and the Centre of Epidemiological Survey the spilt mercury was collected and the territory was subjected to special treatment, Colonel Aleksandr Tarasenko, chief of the regional staff for civil defence and emergency situations, told ITAR-TASS. He believes that the container could either have been dropped from a passing vehicle or could have been lost during transportation. This happened last Friday.

About a dozen measures to collect mercury and treat territories and premises were made in the region from the beginning of the year. Altogether more than 20 kilograms of mercury were collected and are to be reprocessed.

Colonel Tarasenko said that industrial enterprises in the Bryansk region use limited quantities of mercury. He believes that the sharp growth in the number of cases of the emergence of mercury in the region results from transit operations during which mercury was illegally smuggled via the borderline Bryansk region to countries that were formerly Union republics.

#### **Yeltsin Introduces Controls on BW Material Exports**

LD1406165494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1630 GMT 14 Jun 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow June 14 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed today a resolution imposing a strict control on exports of gene materials which could be used in a biological warfare.

The list of substances under control includes "pathogenes ... and their genetically changed forms, fragments of genetic material and equipment, which could be used in preparation of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons," the presidential press service reported. [ellipses as received]

## **UKRAINE**

#### **Morozov Says Warheads Transfer Must Be Halted**

AU1506123694 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian  
No. 12 (54) 9-22 Jun 94 p 8

[Article by Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov, UKRAYINSKA HAZETA military columnist: "We Had and Still Have Security Guarantees in Our Hands. The Crimean Tension in Relations With Russia Is a Consequence of Ukraine's Nonnuclear and Nonaligned Status"]

[Text] From the first days of its existence as a state, Ukraine has been resolving the so-called Crimean problem on a daily basis. Even before the world felt this, it was already known in Ukraine that the Crimean issue would perhaps be a decisive one in the political relations between Ukraine and Russia. Due to the irresponsible steps taken by the Simferopol leadership, which adopted the course toward secession from Ukraine and rapprochement with Russia, especially at the beginning of May [1994], the world finally perceived a threat to peace in Ukraine, and in Europe, in these relations. Ukraine must now determine its attitude toward these issues. The history of the problem took shape right before our own eyes, and everybody remembers it. No matter how bitter one might feel about it, our Ukrainian mistakes and indecisiveness are largely responsible for the intensification of Russia's influence over the Black Sea Fleet and, through it, in Sevastopol and the entire peninsula.

In January 1992, the fleet commander [Admiral Kasatonov], who clearly occupied anti-Ukrainian positions, was not removed from his post. His presence in Sevastopol made it impossible for officers of the fleet to adopt a stand with regard to loyalty to Ukraine. Still, by the end of 1992, the majority of the officer corps anticipated the government's decisions regarding the subordination to Ukraine's Defense Ministry.

Both the Ukrainian president and the government realized that special conditions for shaping public opinion in Sevastopol (the majority of its residents are former sailors and their families that arrived there from other Russian fleets; a great number of enterprises there depend upon the fleet; there are social problems for families of veterans and

servicemen) also required special approaches, in contrast to the situation with the subordination of three military districts in Ukraine.

In April 1992, there was yet another attempt to subordinate the fleet to Ukraine. However, again, due to its indecisiveness, the government did not go beyond the creation of a parallel structure (the headquarters of the Naval Forces). Unfortunately, the headquarters was immediately discredited and its influence upon Black Sea Fleet officers who were supporters of Ukraine was insignificant.

Fearing complications, Kuchma's government even canceled the decisions—first steps of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense—in the organization of the Black Sea Fleet financing through our Naval Forces. However, even then everybody understood that, soon, there would be even more problems. That was exactly what happened.

The unsuccessful provocative officers assembly held in Moscow at the beginning of 1992 demonstrated that, in Ukraine, the majority of officers had made up their minds. That is why efforts were concentrated mainly on the fleet.

As far back as in May 1992, active work, with the help of certain Russian forces, began in the fleet. The work was aimed at strengthening anti-Ukrainian sentiment among officers. The first step involved a considerable increase in personnel salaries. The activity of the officers' assembly resumed and an assembly coordination council was created. Active politicization of the officers' corps began. The intensification of Russia's influence on the Black Sea Fleet proceeded "on a legal basis" after signing the Yalta accord (August 1992). Since that time, the fleet, subordinated to the two presidents, has been taken away from the control of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, and the fleet activity of Russia's Ministry of Defense and the main staff of Russia's Naval Fleet was practically legalized.

Russia, implementing its financial expansion in the Crimea, artificially created for itself a priority in providing for the fleet.

At the same time, assistance to Sevastopol civilians (the majority of them are former servicemen) in the creation of public organizations and political parties of anti-Ukrainian orientation intensified.

A combination of intentions on the part of those parties and politicized officers over 1992-93 led to an intensification of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Sevastopol and on the peninsula.

This situation was repeatedly discussed by a corresponding Supreme Council Commission, by the Defense Ministry's board, and by Ukraine's Security Council. Unfortunately, the commission was incapable of giving a proper evaluation of the events, the Defense Ministry's decisions did not find the government's support, and the Security Council took into account the position of the Crimean leadership. Both Bagrov, then chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, and Yermakov, then presidential representative in Sevastopol, did everything to hamper any of our initiatives and intimidated the government and President Leonid Kravchuk by claiming that "it would lead to an explosion in the Crimea."

That was precisely the reason for the July 1993 decision to suspend the formation in Sevastopol of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Marines subdivisions.

Today, all of this is attributed to the president's indecisiveness. I find it necessary to throw light on the situation and include everybody. In the majority of cases, the president remained unassisted in looking for decisions that would not lead to an armed conflict.

Such a situation prevailed until the meeting in Massandra: The Supreme Council did not adopt decisions, and the government (of both Fokin and Kuchma) dealt with no military problems whatsoever. In the two years that I held the ministerial post, the military issue was discussed only once (in November 1991, the legislative bill "On Ukraine's Armed Forces").

Under those conditions, Russia's influence on the Crimean problem intensified to the extent that virtually unprecedented territorial claims were made upon Ukraine (the Russian Supreme Council decree of 9 July 1993 on the status of the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol) and pressure was put on it at the negotiations (Massandra, 3 September 1993).

We heard a lot about Ukraine's position with regard to the presidential elections in the Crimea, but no significant decisions have been adopted by Ukraine's Supreme Council nor actions by the government. Crimean separatists took advantage of the crisis situation in the country and, instead of looking for ways to overcome it, started manipulating it. The political forces and now also the leadership, artificially creating an impression that the Crimean population has the worst standard of living and deceiving the people, are, in fact, satisfying their own ambitions.

More than once I heard about an ethnic source of Ukrainian tension. Few people even in Ukraine speak of the political aspect of the tension or its artificial nature. In this context, the assessment of the situation by chairman of Ukraine's Security Service Yevhen Marchuk (KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI of 26 May 1994) seems to be not only authentic and patriotic, but also timely: "...the whipping up of panic among the population, the intimidation of the Crimean leadership, the shaping of an enemy image (naturally personified by Kiev), the selfless assistance by experts, the commissioning of groups for propaganda support, and many other things...." I agree with Yevhen Marchuk's conclusion to the effect that all of this will have a counter effect, against the Russian plans to split Ukraine, and that this force "...will become a consolidating one for Ukraine."

All of this has been said about our Ukraine—our own fathers' home. External forces are shaking it loose, and we must rescue it and not moan that life is bad under these conditions.

Ukraine is an active participant in the European and world political process, which is establishing peace and harmony among countries. Many, if not all acts in this process tend to unite us with Russia. However, today, neither Ukraine's membership in the CIS nor bilateral interstate agreements guarantee security for Ukraine.

The fact that the program "Partnership for Peace" does not unite us with Russia is a serious warning. Russia is seeking a priority status in its relations with NATO. The formula "16 Plus One" suits Russia better. It is clear to everybody that this bargaining is not to Ukraine's advantage. Perhaps we are expecting guarantees for our security in vain. Or maybe those guarantees are still in our hands?

Why don't we also do some bargaining, now that Russia does not restrict itself by obligations to politically guarantee Ukraine's security? If, after the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, Ukraine becomes an arena for armed conflicts, maybe it is now time to halt the transfer of warheads and adopt a state program for political and technical measures to maintain them on our own?

At any rate, this will strengthen the Ukrainian position at the negotiations.

It is becoming obvious already that Ukraine's nonaligned status does not guarantee its security or noninterference into its affairs by other states. We see how Russia is increasingly exacerbating the Crimean problem in Ukraine.

Perhaps we should revise our striving for nonalignment and neutrality? Maybe a declaration of our intentions to gain membership of NATO would better guarantee Ukraine's security at least in the future? At any rate, it might strengthen our position at the negotiations. The United States must be invited as an intermediary and an authoritative monitor of the fulfillment of the accords.

In April 1994, the Ukrainian Academy of Original Ideas supported my initiative on the creation of an independent Center for Strategic Studies of Military and Political Problems in the National and Regional Security. On 28 May, the Ukrainian World Coordination Council, at its meeting, approved the idea and the draft concept of the center and thereby okayed the creation of a special non-governmental fund.

I believe that the issues raised by me urgently require an independent investigation. The conclusions of such a investigation, in the case of the creation of the center at an advisory level, might be used by state structures for promoting Ukraine's interests.

The Russian Federation is our geopolitical neighbor, an ethnic homeland to large numbers of our citizens, and our potential genuine friend and brother. It is our strong desire that it be realized by it that not only Ukraine, but also Russia are "doomed" to maintain and strengthen this friendship by all possible means. Once again referring to the chairman of Ukraine's Security Service, I want to support his important conclusion: "There will be no split of Ukraine. We are not the Caucasus or Yugoslavia."

#### **Kravchuk: Nonproliferation Treaty 'As Soon As Possible'**

BR2806141794 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian  
28 Jun 94 p 15

[Interview with acting President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk by Enrico Franceschini; place and date not given: "Leonid Kravchuk Seeks Reelection by Wooing Communists: 'The Worst Is Over'"—first paragraph is LA REPUBBLICA introduction]

[Text] Kiev—Leonid Kravchuk's fellow citizens say of him: "He could walk in the rain and not get wet, by dodging the raindrops." In politics, this "agility" has enabled him to slide from one ideology to another without losing face—or not too much, at least. The Ukrainian Houdini has elevated the quick-change act to an art: Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee until 1991, he did not say a word in defense of Gorbachev during the time of the attempted "August coup"; but after the coup failed he sided with the Ukrainian independence movement and was elected president by a landslide vote a few months later. Now he is seeking reelection by flirting with the communists (he appointed one of them prime minister), but he is also wooing the moderate nationalists. A man for all seasons who has the good fortune always to appear like the "lesser evil," helped by the absence of worthy alternative candidates and by an unscrupulous exploitation of power.

**Franceschini:** During your two-and-a-half years as president Ukraine has plummeted into an abyss. Do you not feel responsible?

**Kravchuk:** I disagree. Only those who do nothing make no mistakes. We have made some, but we have also done a great deal—building from nothing an independent state, without wars or disasters, with democratic structures and its own Armed Forces, earning the respect of the international community. The worst is over. We have a long way to go, but we are on course, and in two or three years' time everything will be resolved.

**Franceschini:** Are you in favor of forming a Slavic confederation between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, as some people have been suggesting recently?

**Kravchuk:** It is a dangerous idea. It could spark a tide of pan-Slavism and nationalism from Eastern Europe to Kazakhstan, in all the countries where millions of Slavs live. It is impossible to create unions on the basis of the ethnic-national principle. But we do want to have good relations with Russia, especially in the economic field.

**Franceschini:** Crimea and East Ukraine, where 10 million Russians live, are pressing to return to Russia's orbit. Could this prompt a conflict between Moscow and Kiev?

**Kravchuk:** Russia and Ukraine have lived together for 350 years, have never taken up arms against each other, and will never do so. To resolve the issue of Crimea's autonomy we will not resort to force under any circumstances. We are in favor of a peaceful solution of the problem, and I think we are moving in this direction.

**Franceschini:** Will Ukraine sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and thus pledge to consign its arsenal to Russia?

**Kravchuk:** With me as president, the treaty will be immediately submitted to Parliament for ratification as soon as possible. It is an essential duty that we have taken on with respect to the international community.

**AUSTRIA****Police Discover 5.7 Kg Enriched Uranium in Vienna**

AU1606101794 Vienna *WIENER ZEITUNG*  
in German 16 Jun 94 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Vienna: 5.7 Kg Enriched Uranium Discovered"]

[Excerpt] In a search of the home of 39-year-old Croatian Ilja M., on Museumstrasse in Vienna's Neubau district on Wednesday [15 June] morning, police discovered 5.7

kg of enriched uranium in metallic form—in three pieces. Alfons Burtcher, of the Seibersdorf Nuclear Research Center, who examined the metal, said that this material is usually used for containers for radioactive substances, yet after extended radiation with neutrons in nuclear power plants one might even extract small quantities of plutonium from it. In the form in which the uranium was found, it did not pose any danger to the neighborhood. Burtcher said that the radiation was 10 millirem per hour. [passage omitted]



### **Documents Name Suppliers of Technology to Iraq**

94WP0099 London *THE DAILY TELEGRAPH* in English  
29 May 94 p 14

[Article by Mark Watts and Bill Goodwin: "Saddam's Bomb Project Used the Best of British"]

[Text] There were two problems with the Government's victory celebrations over the Euromac pair's convictions for plotting to export £6,600-worth of "nuclear trigger" devices, writes *Mark Watts and Bill Goodwin*.

First, the components were *not* nuclear triggers. Second, Britain supplied technology costing millions of pounds which was used in Iraq's clandestine nuclear bomb programme.

Evidence of how Britain unknowingly aided Saddam Hussein's nuclear programme has been kept secret for more than two years by the British authorities. But an examination of 1,100 pages of detailed inspection reports and other papers compiled by the United Nations exposes the extent to which British equipment was used by Iraq for its \$10 billion nuclear weapons project.

UN documents name 16 companies as manufacturers of British technology found at 10 Iraqi nuclear bomb factories. America made just as much for Saddam Hussein's nuclear programme, the Germans far more.

Out of the 16 companies, 12 are British: Bridgeport, Colchester Lathes, FMT [expansion not given], Hadland Photonics, Harrison, Instron, Lumonics, Matrix Churchill, Millitorr, Morgan Rushworth, Renishaw-Probe and Wickman Bennett.

The other four—Cincinatti Milacron, Fanuc, Hardinge Brothers and Heidenhain—are foreign companies which made the equipment in Britain or received British export licences.

All the manufacturers say they were unaware of how their equipment was being used. They are all confident that no export controls were broken.

In some cases technology was supplied to innocent-sounding organisations such as Baghdad University. In other cases companies did not know their products were destined for Iraq. The British technology had many applications, as does practically all equipment needed to build the bomb.

Millitorr, for example, supplied equipment that it was told would be used to make "electrical components," but in fact it was used indirectly in the magnetic separation of uranium.

Iain Exeter, former managing director of the machine tool company Wickman Bennett, some of whose products were found by UN inspectors at nuclear sites, said: "Machine tools can make anything. The difficult thing is Iraq and other countries being able to produce nuclear-based arms.

"All the producers need to come together to agree not to provide the technology, and that is something which is totally outside the sphere of machine tool companies."

Separately, two British export companies, Meed International and TDG, which were Iraqi defence procurement

agents, are implicated as middlemen in Saddam's purchases of technology for the bomb programme.

Ken Timmerman, former U.S. congressional investigator and author of the book, *The Death Lobby—How the West Armed Iraq*, said vital evidence on suppliers was still being suppressed in Britain.

"The British Government seized three truckloads of documents at the offices of TDG in London in August 1990. Those documents have never been made public, and they've not been presented to the Scott Inquiry.

"It's clear that what they got were procurement records. Those documents should show who the Iraqis were doing business with, and what kind of political help they were getting. It's all there in those files and nobody's getting to see it. It's a can of worms that no one wants to open."

### **Skoda To Supply Nuclear Engineering Equipment to Ukraine**

AU1706194594 Prague *MLADA FRONTA DNES* in Czech  
14 Jun 94 p 13

["pol"-signed report: "Skoda Is Exploring Chances in Ukraine"]

[Text] Plzen—The Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi [Nuclear Engineering] Plzen company will supply compact grids for the spent fuel pool of the Rivne nuclear power station in Ukraine. Twenty percent of the order has already been paid for. Another 60 percent of the payment is due to arrive in the next few days. If it does, Jaderne Strojirenstvi will supply the corresponding part of the ordered equipment by the end of June.

According to Vaclav Lobovsky, director of Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi, this contract should, first and foremost, explore the ability of Ukrainian nuclear power stations to pay. Jaderne Strojirenstvi had signed a letter of intent with Derzhkomatom [State Committee for Nuclear Energy], their umbrella organization.

Skoda hopes to obtain \$150 million (4.5 billion korunas) worth of orders on the basis of this contract, to be realized gradually until the end of the year 2000. This is the sum at which the letter of intent estimates the needs of the four Ukrainian nuclear power stations equipped with VVER [water-moderated water-cooled] reactors—Rivne, South Ukrainian, Zaporizhzhya, and Khmelnytsky.

According to Karel Wagner from Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi, who participated in a seminar on Czech regulatory drives in the South Ukrainian nuclear power station, Skoda's program has been received well. By its design, the equipment offered by Skoda also enhances the nuclear power stations' safety.

In addition to reactor grids and drives for regulatory systems, Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi also wants to assert itself on the Ukrainian market with hermetic cable bushings [kabelove hermeticke pruchodky], spare parts, and operational inspections of the pressure vessels.

### Column Views Global 'Crisis of Nuclear Proliferation'

HK1806060894 Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO  
in Chinese 18 Jun 94 p 3

["Political Talk" column by Shih Chun-yu (2457 0689 3768): "The World Faces a Crisis of Nuclear Proliferation"]

[Text] The United States, the ROK, and Japan are kicking up an uproar over the DPRK nuclear issue. From the international inspections to the sanctions proposal submitted to the UN Security Council, the state of events is developing through twists and turns and is attracting people's close attention.

However, in the world as a whole, especially after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation has become an inevitable trend. This has become a hidden peril facing world peace.

Some countries have already secretly developed their own nuclear weapons. Reportedly, Israel and India possess or will soon possess nuclear weapons; Iraq, Iran, and Libya are also likely to become possessors of nuclear weapons. There are also signs that Pakistan is developing nuclear bombs. In order to deal with the Indian "threat," it is no wonder that Pakistan might develop nuclear weapons. In October 1990, the then Bush administration of the United States accused Pakistan of developing nuclear weapons and froze economic and military assistance to Pakistan. After Clinton took office, the new administration prohibited the sale of 38 F-16 fighters to Pakistan on the same grounds. Recently, foreign news agencies have said that Pakistan has imported sophisticated machinery from two German companies to refine enriched uranium.

On 13 June, a spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said: "Pakistan is exploring the possibility of importing certain sophisticated machinery from countries which can produce such equipment." These remarks actually exposed something the spokesman tried to cover up or deny.

A more complicated and potential crisis of nuclear proliferation not only exists in reality, but is also spreading.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union took their own course independently. This has made it uncertain whether the gigantic nuclear arsenal, missile force, and nuclear submarine fleet of the former Soviet Union is still under effective control.

On 16 June, Riyabev, first vice minister of nuclear industry in the Russian Government, announced that in the last 18 months, ten cases of the theft of nuclear fuel had occurred in Russia. In one case, the stolen fuel was highly enriched uranium-235, which can cause nuclear fission, and in nine other cases, uranium-238 was stolen. Uranium-238 is less likely to cause nuclear fission if it lies idle.

The stolen highly enriched uranium-235 was in the possession of a scientific research and production center in Bodolisk in Moscow Oblast. An employee of the center stole a total of about 1.5 kg of uranium-235 on several occasions. The criminal was arrested in April this year and the stolen nuclear materials retrieved. The authorities are investigating the criminal's background.

In addition, the Russian federal counter-espionage department arrested three thieves last March in St. Petersburg. The criminals sold 3 kg of uranium-235 to some Germans for \$300 per gram. The uranium was stolen from a nuclear plant in the Moscow suburbs. Two of the three criminals were salesmen from a meat shop and one was a plumber. They transported the enriched uranium in a container.

After the above-mentioned cases were publicized, Western countries were stunned by Russia's failure to effectively manage its nuclear materials. In particular, an underground market for secret transactions in nuclear materials stolen and smuggled from Russia has arisen in some West European countries. Some Middle East oil-producing countries and Islamic countries have a strong interest in buying such materials. If Russia still cannot effectively check the illegal outflow of nuclear fuel, sooner or later more countries will be able to produce atomic bombs. Moreover, there has been a brain among nuclear scientists in Russia and Ukraine.

The United Nations will be plagued by a complicated situation of nuclear proliferation and will find that it can do very little to bring this under control.

### RWE Planning to Sell Plutonium to Russia

AU2006123294 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG  
in German 17 Jun 94 p 7

[Hermann-Josef Tenhagen report: "Kalkar Plutonium to Russia"]

[Text] Berlin—RWE [Rhine-Westphalian Electric Works] AG plans finally to get rid of the plutonium-containing remains of its fast breeder in Kalkar, which has never been put into operation, by selling it to Russia. A total of 123 Mox fuel elements consisting of uranium and plutonium, which the electrical company in Essen once produced for Kalkar, are to be brought to Beloyarsk. Nikolay Oshankov, chief engineer of the fast breeder in Beloyarsk in southern Russia, told this Greenpeace environmentalists. "This was not our initiative, it came from the German experts."

Negotiations are under way with the responsible TWE subsidiary Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Plant Company (SBK) and with Siemens. An RWE spokesman confirmed the contacts: "However, the talks are not in a decisive stage." There are also contacts with the operators of the Japanese breeder reactor in Monju. In addition, the reprocessing and direct final storage of the fuel elements is also being considered.

At the moment, the fuel elements, which contain 1.2 tonnes of plutonium, are still stored in the so-called federal bunker in Hanau. When it became clear in 1991 that the breeder reactor in Kalkar would never be put into operation, the RWE subsidiary SBK (RWE share 67 percent) first tried to bring the fuel elements, which contain 40 percent of plutonium, to Dounreay in Scotland. Breeder fuel elements made in Belgium had already been flown to the Scottish nuclear plant in 1991. According to Greenpeace information, the SBK even rented storage room in Dounreay for 1.2 million German marks.

But then more and more obstacles emerged for the transport to Scotland. Despite existing permits by the Federal Government, considerable resistance against transporting

the plutonium by plane developed. The Hesse land government did not want to tolerate a flight with 1.2 tonnes of the fiendish stuff aboard from Frankfurt/Main Airport. And local and land politicians responsible for Pferdsfeld, the airport in Rhineland-Palatinate, which should have been used instead, also reacted negatively.

Second, the fuel elements in the federal bunker in Hanau had been radioactively contaminated during a nuclear accident at Siemens, which is located in the same building. At first, the fuel elements were not permitted to be transported in this contaminated state. However, one could not clean them, either, because the facility at Siemens has been out of operation since the accident in 1991.

Now they are supposed to be sent to Beloyarsk. The operators of the fast breeder there are pleased. Chief Engineer Oshankov told Greenpeace: "The German side supplies us with the fuel elements, and we use them in our reactor. And with our technology we would finally process the used fuel elements further." The reprocessing is to be done in the ailing nuclear factory of Mayak near Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals.

Oshankov, too, affirms that the contracts have not yet been concluded. The responsibility for potential accidents has not yet been clarified. In addition, a bit of reconstruction has to be done in Beloyarsk for the German fuel elements. It is unclear who is going to pay for the reconstruction. "If we reprocessed the German fuel elements, we would no longer need the reconstructed facility afterwards," Oshankov says.

Yesterday Greenpeace said that the planned transfer of the plutonium is completely irresponsible. Fire broke out in the 14-year-old BN-600 breeder reactor in Beloyarsk in October and May because of leaks in the cooling system. Each time radioactivity was released. And plutonium for the Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons program was produced in Mayak until 1992. In 1957 a nuclear waste container exploded in the plant. Thousands of square kilometers of land and several hundreds of thousands of people were contaminated with radioactive elements.

#### **Russian Paper Reports Secret Finnish Nuclear Research Program Noted**

PA10806091194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 4 Jun 94 First Edition p 6

[Sergey Pankratov report under the "Not Secret At All" rubric: "History of Finnish A-Bomb"]

[Text] Helsinki—Information about one of the most secret projects on which Finnish scientists have ever worked has become public knowledge 20 years after the event. It turns out that at the very height of the "Kekkonen era," when relations between Moscow and Helsinki were of a "special nature," experiments were being conducted in Finland which the Kremlin was not supposed to know about. For nearly 10 years a special laboratory worked within the "Balmet" concern conducting experiments on uranium enrichment.

It is difficult to say now whether the ultimate aim of this classified program was to create nuclear weapons. Reports about this which were leaked to the press were very short and sometimes contradictory. But, according to the story

of the Julia state television and radio broadcasting company, research on the "uranium project" was conducted and did yield encouraging results. This was urgently reported in Helsinki, where a decision was adopted on continuing the encouraging experiments. Thus, a super-secret laboratory began work in the forests of central Finland at the beginning of the 1970's, and only a handful of people in the whole country knew about its existence and tasks.

However, by the end of 1978 it had become clear that the method was erroneous. The experiments were discontinued as having no practical value. Curiously, however, commenting on this fact, which is now history, Radio Julia notes that in the event of the successful conclusion of the experiments, "Finland could have obtained all the necessary materials to create its own nuclear weapons."

#### **Spokesman Says DPRK Mutual Aid Treaty 'Remains in Force'**

OW1606103094 Tokyo KYODO in English  
1018 GMT 16 Jun 94

[Text] Beijing, June 16 KYODO—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Thursday [16 June] a 1961 Chinese-North Korean treaty guaranteeing mutual military aid in case of invasion "remains in force."

Shen Guofang, speaking at a weekly ministry briefing, refused to go into details about the 1961 treaty, saying only there is still room and the possibility for the participants involved in the nuclear issue on North Korea to arrive at "a proper settlement."

Article 3 of the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid Treaty stipulates that if either China or North Korea is invaded by a third country, mutual aid will be offered to the country under invasion. "When one of the signatory countries of the treaty enters a state of war due to the military attack of another country or its ally, then the other signatory country must immediately, to the extent of its authority, offer military and other aid," the treaty states in a Japanese translation.

Shen, reiterating that China does not want to see the development of such a situation, said, "it is our hope that all the parties concerned choose not to talk about war but talk about ways for solving the nuclear issue."

He did not comment on North Korea's unilateral position that any UN sanctions will be treated as "a declaration of war" but said, "we hope that the interested parties will carry on their dialogues and try to relax the tensions in order to find a proper solution in the end."

The UN Security Council is considering implementing sanctions on North Korea in an effort to urge the Stalinist state to accept international inspections of its suspected nuclear weapons program.

The treaty could be seen as a good indication that China will use its power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to veto any sanctions resolution, analysts said. The treaty, signed by the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and North Korea leader Kim Il-sung, also stipulates that neither signatory will join any kind of international bloc against the other signatory.



### Israeli Envoy Says DPRK Selling Missiles to Middle East

SK1906015694 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network  
in Korean 0100 GMT 19 Jun 94

[YONHAP report from Jerusalem]

[Text] Na'im Asher, Israeli ambassador to the ROK, expressed worry over the fact that North Korea is selling long-range Scud missiles to Middle East countries, such as Syria, Iran, and Libya.

In an interview with an Israeli radio station, Ambassador Asher expressed worry by saying that Israel has had a bad experience with North Korea, which is selling dangerous Scud missiles to Middle East countries.

Ambassador Asher pointed out that in the past Israel contacted North Korea to stop its export of weapons to the Middle East region, but realized Israel lacked the capability to persuade North Korea. He said that U.S. efforts to apply sanctions against North Korea considers Israel's interest.

### DPRK Reportedly Transferring Weapons Technology to Mideast

SK0806110094 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network  
in Korean 1000 GMT 8 Jun 94

[Text] It was revealed that North Korea is transferring [chonsu haejugo issomi] manufacturing technology for up-to-date biochemical weapons to the Middle East.

It is likely, therefore, that the German cabinet meeting today will work out appropriate measures against the threat of such mass lethal weapons imposed recently by North Korea.

Correspondent Yi Myong-ku reports from Berlin: [Begin Yi recording]

Yi: The German newspaper, DIE WELT, quoting an intelligence source in the West, reported that North Korea is selling nuclear-delivery rockets to radical states in the Middle East and handing over technology on biological weapons and chemical weapons to them.

This paper wrote that the nations to which North Korea is selling weapons are capable of paying North Korea in foreign currency at once, and Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Libya are included in these nations.

A German intelligence source pointed out that the arming of these countries with mass lethal weapons poses a direct threat to European countries. The source expressed worries about the possibility of Europe being taken hostage by these countries even from next year.

This source also revealed that some business firms in Europe, including Germany, are involved in the Middle East nations' manufacturing of weapons based on North Korean technology.

Another intelligence source pointed out, however, that Germany effectively blocked the weapons produced in Germany from being handed over to the Middle East nations, and transaction of such mass lethal weapons is being carried out in a more skillful and secret manner with

each passing day. Therefore, tenacious efforts are necessary to prevent Arab states from arming themselves with such weapons.

Meanwhile, the German cabinet meeting to be held today will discuss measures to cope with the issue of uranium produced in the Former Soviet Union being brought into Germany and with the issue of the armament of Arab states with nuclear-delivery rockets and biochemical weapons. It was learned that a secret report on the proliferation of such lethal weapons will be submitted to today's cabinet meeting. In addition, the cabinet meeting will also work out effective countermeasures for the threat imposed by North Korea. [end recording]

### ROK Papers React to DPRK Withdrawal From IAEA

SK1506102094

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of articles and editorials published in Seoul vernacular newspapers on 15 June regarding North Korea's withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA.

The conservative CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "We Can No Longer Let North Korea Take the Initiative." The editorial stresses that North Korea is not a rational society and that it has been obstinate in its unreasonable demands for almost half a century. The editorial holds our side partially responsible for "spoiling" the North by accepting their unreasonable demands.

Analyzing the withdrawal from the IAEA as "a strategy to earn some more time to develop nuclear weapons and gain better conditions for negotiations," the editorial warns that it is not significant that North Korea is holding back its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT, and the government should stop accepting unreasonable demands.

The editorial concludes that the government should review how the United States and Russia ended their nuclear competition after the cold war and should develop the most practical strategy to deter war.

CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 4 a 1,200-word article by reporter Pak Tu-sik on the ROK Government's stance regarding the withdrawal. The article reports that the government believes North Korea's withdrawal is a strong political and psychological attack aimed at restraining further resolutions and leaving the U.S.-North Korean talks as the only communications channel.

The article reports that the government plans "to include a measure in the UN Security Council's sanction resolution that could cause North Korea substantial damage," while continuing to persuade China to agree to the UN resolution.

The article continues that the government's policy is that there is no other alternative than sanctions and that the existing strategy of inducing North Korea to reform and opening up may change to a strategy of isolating North Korea.

CHOSON ILBO publishes on page 5 a 1,600-word article by the deputy editor-in-chief entitled "North Korean



Nuclear Issue and the Economy." Noting that the ROK people have finally become aware of the emergency situation and have begun to purchase emergency materials, the column reports that it is very fortunate, however, there are no signs of an economic crisis. The column reviews that "the ROK people have been well trained for emergencies for the past 40 years of confrontation between the North and the South" and even developed an economy amid such a tense situation. The column recalled that the ROK people were able to create a "compressed growth" in a short period with an aim to outdo the North during the Pak Chong-hui regime. The column stresses that the government should strengthen internal cohesion and concludes that the best way for the people to repel a North Korean threat is to concentrate on their daily life dauntlessly and not show signs of social chaos.

The pro-government SEOUL SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,100-word article by reporter Yang Sung-hyon on the ROK Government's reaction to North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA. The article reports that the government does not view the withdrawal as a new trick, but a part of the existing card, however, the withdrawal can be interpreted as "North Korea's determination that a UN Security Council sanction resolution will be followed by North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT." The article reports that a government official analyzes that the withdrawal only makes China and Russia less inclined to oppose sanctions.

The article continues that the government may expedite the adoption of a UN sanction resolution early next week if North Korea does not change its attitude after former U.S. President Carter's visit to the North. The article reports that the government is also considering economic consequences and doing its utmost to maintain stability through impeccable security measures against North Korea's armed provocation. The article concludes by quoting a government official: "Our side, as well as North Korea and the international community, are all in a tense confrontation fearing that one step back will make one lose the initiative forever."

The independent moderate MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN, specializing in economic topics, publishes on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "Tension of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Preparedness." The editorial analyzes that North Korea withdrew from the IAEA merely to avoid losing face caused by the IAEA resolution and urges readers not to be affected by North Korea's nuclear game. The editorial stresses that the ROK people should not respond to North Korea's threats, such as their remarks about regarding sanctions as a declaration of war, and maintain economic activities unswervingly.

The moderate KYONGHYANG SINMUN publishes on page 3 a 1,000-word article by Yi Sung-chul on the government's reaction to North Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the IAEA. The article reports the government "will continuously push ahead with its original policy for sanctions against North Korea by the UN Security Council" because it believes North Korea's declaration on withdrawal from the IAEA "does not have any practical meaning, but has political and symbolic meaning." The article continues: "The government believes the nuclear issue has not changed at all in essence since North Korea is

still obligated to accept inspections as a signatory of the NPT despite its declaration of withdrawal from the IAEA."

The article quotes a ranking government official as saying that the declaration by North Korea is "at an expected level [yejongdoen sujun] following the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution" and is regarded as "a bluff to counter the UN Security Council's moves toward sanctions" rather than "a new card."

The article also reports that the government's adherence to its original position on sanctions shows its will to take the lead in South-North relations in the adverse situation following North Korea's replacement of fuel rods.

Quoting a government official's remarks, the article notes: "The declaration by North Korea gave us an advantage in persuading countries like China, which have declined to agree to sanctions against North Korea."

The article reports that the government considers adding "stronger terms [kanggyong naeyong]" in the UN Security Council draft resolution in response to North Korea's follow-up measure and that the government will convey "the international community's mood" and the fact that "there is a limit to the flexibility of the United States and the ROK" through former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

The moderate TONG-A ILBO publishes on page 5 in its "Today and Tomorrow" column a 1,000-word article by senior reporter Choe Maeng-ho entitled "The 'Level of Crisis' on the Korean Peninsula." The article remarks on the lack of attention to security on the part of the people because they think "North Korea cannot afford to carry out a war" and believe "it will not provoke a war unless the United States attacks first." Noting that the purchase of emergency food supplies does not seem to be motivated by serious anxiety, the article ascribes the people's "lack of security sense" to the feeling "there would be no particular way out even if a war takes place."

After touching on the government's "inconsistent policy on North Korea" and stressing that "the situation regarding the nuclear issue is certainly developing into a crisis," the article concludes by urging the government and people to make every effort to "avoid the possible demise of both South and North Korea."

The moderate HANGUK ILBO carries on page 3 an 800-word editorial entitled "North Korea's Reckless Run to Withdrawal From the IAEA." The editorial denounces North Korea's withdrawal from the agency as "a serious challenge and an illicit act that has devastated the international order," and warned against North Korea's aim to "bargain over the nuclear inspection issue only with the United States, excluding the IAEA." The editorial stresses the need to "sternly proceed with imposing pressure and UN Security Council gradual sanctions on North Korea in close cooperation among the ROK, the United States, and Japan until North Korea retreats from its withdrawal from the IAEA and allows an overall nuclear inspection [chonmyon haek sachal]." The editorial also emphasizes that "exclusive negotiations between the United States and North Korea should be held after North Korea returns to the IAEA and allows the inspection."

The left-leaning HANGYORE SINMUN carries on page 3 a 900-word editorial entitled "North Korea's Adventurous Choice" analyzing the reason for North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA. The editorial analyzes this action by North Korea as "a reaction against the agency's repeated acts, unfavorable to North Korea, following the United States" and as an expression of its "determination to be separated from the IAEA, which has ceaselessly raised new issues even after North Korea allowed nuclear inspections." Pointing out the possibility that "the keen confrontation between North Korea's strong strategy and the U.S. intent to show its stern resolution to punish the North will further aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula," the editorial stresses the need to make efforts to find a way "from confrontation to dialogue." The editorial also comments on the "need to review closely the reason for North Korea remaining in the NPT, after withdrawing from the IAEA."

### Europe, Japan Join Forces in Fast Breeder Development

OW1706061094 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0531 GMT 17 Jun 94

[Text] Tokyo, June 17 KYODO—European and Japanese organizations involved in the development of fast breeder reactors signed an agreement Friday [17 June] pledging cooperation in the research and development of the plutonium-fueled reactor type, the Science and Technology Agency said.

Participating in the joint program are four Japanese organizations including the governmental Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., which operates Japan's prototype fast breeder reactor "Monju" in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.

France's Atomic Energy Agency and British Nuclear Fuel Ltd., both involved in the development of the European Fast Reactor (EFR), represent the European side.

Japan plans to have its first demonstration fast breeder with a planned output of 660 megawatts early next century. The EFR, designed to generate 1,500 megawatts of electric power, is still in a conceptual stage.

In the agreement both sides pledge to promote the mutual use of existing research facilities to improve knowledge about reactor coolants, fuel and safety measures.

### ICRC Calls For Ban on 'Inhuman' Weapons Being Developed

AU0206203894 Paris AFP in English 1929 GMT 2 Jun 94

[Text] Geneva, June 2 (AFP)—The International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] called Thursday for a ban on the some types of "inhuman" weapons currently being developed, a statement said.

In particular the ICRC is concerned about laser weapons which can blind, arms using microwave and infrared technology, and allegedly non-lethal chemical weapons.

The call for the ban came after an ICRC-organized meeting of experts Tuesday and Wednesday to consider the dangers of certain types of weapons, some have which have already been produced.

The experts expressed concern at the possibility of such weaponry coming into the hands of terrorists or criminals, in particular in the case of laser arms.

The experts will draw up a report detailing their conclusions, to be presented to a conference of government experts to debate amending the 1980 UN Convention on arms. The conference will be held at the end of the year.

### Russian Official Says North Korea Has No Nuclear Bomb

LD1506140094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1340 GMT 15 Jun 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[Text] Moscow June 15 TASS—"North Korea does not have a nuclear bomb. There might have been insignificant research developments in this field which have most likely started the conflict with the International Atomic Energy Agency," a Russian top official said.

Speaking at a news conference at the Russian-American press centre in Moscow on Wednesday, Lev Ryabev, first deputy minister of nuclear engineering, denounced North Korea's decision to withdraw from the IAEA.

He did not rule out the possibility that this step is North Korea's response to the threat of sanctions made by other members of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Ryabev believes that the nuclear problem in North Korea could be solved by peaceful, diplomatic means.

Speaking about the possibility of shutting down Russian nuclear power plants which use Chernobyl-type reactors, Ryabev noted that some of them will be modernised, others reequipped in order to increase their safety.

### Blix Report Says Measurement of Fuel Rods 'Impossible'

SK0206232894 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2207 GMT 2 Jun 94

[by Nam Son-yong from UN Headquarters]

[Text] Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], today reported officially to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali that it has become impossible for the IAEA to make a follow-up measurement [chuhu kye-chuk] of nuclear fuel rods at a reactor in Yongbon, North Korea.

In his written report, Director General Blix said: Based on the IAEA inspection team's report on the replacement of nuclear fuel rods at a North Korean 5-megawatt reactor, the IAEA came to the conclusion that the selection [son-byol] of fuel rods to determine whether North Korea has diverted nuclear fuel or not has become impossible.

Serving as a final confirmation on the failure of the IAEA inspection on the nuclear fuel rods in North Korea, his report provides grounds for the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against North Korea.

Accordingly, following a verbal report by Director General Blix this afternoon [3 June], the UN Security Council will likely have full-fledged discussions on methods of sanctions against North Korea.

A UN diplomatic source says the United States, ROK, and Japan have begun to discuss a resolution on sanctions, and France, which holds a hard-line position, has also separately drafted a resolution.

According to this source, in light of the present atmosphere, it is highly possible that the UN Security Council will directly apply economic sanctions without taking steps for warning. If China continues opposition to sanctions, measures to prohibit remittances from Japan and North Korean missile exports to the Middle East will likely be taken, while permitting China to continue supplying oil and food to North Korea.

### **Joint Communiqué Declares New ROK-Russian Bilateral Ties**

SK0206090694 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0858 GMT 2 Jun 94

[Text] Moscow, June 2 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Russia announced a "constructive and mutually complementary partnership" at Thursday's [2 June] summit, promising broad cooperation ranging from the economy to the North Korean nuclear and regional security issues.

Presidents Kim Yong-sam and Boris Yeltsin wrapped up the second day of their summit by issuing a joint declaration supporting Moscow's ongoing reforms and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Delving into the finer points of bilateral relations, the declaration says Yeltsin promised to give favorable consideration to South Korea's bid for non-permanent U.N. Security Council membership while Seoul will do the same for Russia's application to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Moscow agreed with Seoul's insistence on maintaining the present Korean armistice regime until a new peace structure can be created between the two Koreas.

To implement the new partnership, the two countries plan to engage in more active political dialogue at all levels including heads of state and government figures.

Kim arrived in Moscow Wednesday for a four-day visit that began with a dinner meeting on the day of his arrival and continued with a second summit round Thursday.

"The presidents declared that the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation is now turning into a 'constructive and mutually complementary

partnership' based on the common values of freedom, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy," the declaration read.

Much of the declaration was given over to an emphasis on finding common principles between the two countries and expressing support for each other's stands on key issues.

Kim reassured Yeltsin of Seoul's support for and cooperation with the ongoing reform process in Russia and pledged to promote human rights improvement.

They found common ground in seeking a security dialogue among Northeast Asian countries and agreed to keep open a bilateral channel on formulating a regional security forum.

They took note of the other side's concerns, chiefly South Korea's position on the North Korean nuclear crisis.

"President Yeltsin confirmed that Russia, along with the states involved, will continue to play an active part in the efforts of the international community to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," the declaration states.

Recording that Kim explained his country's bid for a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, it notes that "President Yeltsin promised to consider it favorably."

Likewise, Kim "welcomed Russia's intention to participate actively and constructively in all areas of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and... Would give favorable consideration to the candidacy of the Russian Federation for APEC membership when the matter is taken up at future APEC fora."

They touched briefly on clearing up the awkward past, with Kim thanking Moscow for its efforts in restoring the dignity of ethnic Koreans in Russia, handing over documents related to the downing of a Korean air passenger jet in 1983 by a Soviet fighter jet and delivery of archival documents on the Korean war.

On the economic front, Kim and Yeltsin hoped to combine Russian technology with the industrial know-how of South Korea and to encourage investment in developing Russia's natural resources.

Capping the declaration, the presidents state they will "intensify the political dialogue at various levels, including summit meetings of the heads of state or government, parliament leaders, and ministers."

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